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Abstract
The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the 
form of contracts and studies its welfare implications. The main focus is on founda­
tions of incomplete contracts. The thesis studies to what extent incompleteness of 
contracts can be linked to contract renegotiation. Particular emphasis is put onto 
explaining the absence of a contract from a relationship.
Chapter 1 reviews the literature on contract renegotiation and incomplete con­
tracting.
Chapter 2 is based on a version of the hold-up problem. It shows that contracts 
that are vulnerable to renegotiation cannot provide better investment incentives 
than no contract. The main driving force is that investment, although beneficial 
from a total surplus point of view, has an ambivalent effect on the investing party’s 
payoff. It increases the benefit of an efficient action and decreases the benefit of an 
inefficient action. An example is investment into human capital, such as additional 
job training. It increases personal satisfaction in a challenging job but may also 
increase the frustration from a job that consists only of repetitive tasks. If an exact 
job description is not feasible ex-ante and if the non-investing party has all the 
bargaining power ex-post, contracts cannot compensate for the cost of investment.
Chapter 3 formalizes the intuition that contracting involves a cost because a con­
tract constitutes a less flexible status quo for ex-post bargaining than no contract. 
For this, asymmetric information is introduced. With asymmetric information con­
tracting is potentially costly because an inefficient outcome is not necessarily undone 
by an ex-post bargain. For example, during the renegotiation of the contract be­
tween General Motors and Fisher Body, the latter adopted a cost intensive produc­
tion technology in order to convince its partner to renege on the former agreement. 
In the model of this chapter, parties weigh the benefit of a contract against lost 
flexibility. If these effects are similar, no contract is written.
The possibility that a contract might be strictly dominated by no contract is 
explored in chapters 4 and 5. Such a strict dominance result is interesting because
it is a more forceful advocate for the incomplete contract assumption.
Chapter 4 contains a version of the durable good monopoly model with no dis­
counting but costly contracting. These could be writing or legal costs. Early con­
tracting is less costly than late contracting which highlights the idea that bargaining 
at a deadline is more costly. But also, early contracting suffers from the ratchet ef­
fect because it releases information. The main result says that the costs of the 
ratchet effect outweigh the cost savings, even if initial contracting costs are of order 
of magnitude smaller than late contracting costs. The seller strictly prefers to offer 
no contract.
In chapter 5, a sequential screening model endogenizes the fixed contracting 
cost. The buyer is privately informed about one part of the good’s value but ignores 
the second part, which is revealed later. Early contracting is beneficial because it 
suffers less from asymmetric information than does late contracting. Nevertheless, if 
uncertainty with respect to the first variable is greater than uncertainty with respect 
to the second variable, the seller cannot take advantage of this fact and he strictly 
prefers to wait. Moreover, if this is not the case, contracts are partially incomplete 
because they are not conditioned on the second variable.
Finally, the thesis reports the new effect that all contracts are renegotiated in 
equilibrium. This is in contrast to the renegotiation proofness principle, which 
states that in models of contracting with renegotiation one can restrict attention to 
renegotiation proof contracts.
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Introduction
The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the form 
of contracts and studies its welfare implications. The aim is to provide an un­
derstanding of why and to what extent contracts are incomplete. The problem of 
foundations of incomplete contracts has received attention in the literature on con­
tract theory because it constitutes a major divide between two parallel streams of 
this theory, ’complete’ and ’incomplete’ contract theory.
1.1 Com plete versus Incomplete Contracts
1.1 .1  C o m p lete  C on tracts
Complete contracting has developed traditionally by trying to offer contractual so­
lutions to problems of asymmetric information. These can be broadly divided into 
three categories. One party has some private information to which another party 
has no access, the case of adverse selection or hidden information. A party can take 
an action unobserved by another party, the case of moral hazard or hidden action. 
Parties share the same information which is unverifiable by outsiders, in particular 
courts, the case of nonverifiable information. In what sense the described informa­
tion asymmetries are an obstacle to reaching efficiency and what are optimal ways
1
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to cope with them is the focus of contract theory.
The literature on the first type of problem, hidden information, initiated with the 
mechanism design literature, which was pioneered by Hurwicz (1960), Clarke (1971) 
and Groves (1973), who study the optimal provision of a public good, and with 
literature on auction theory, (Vickrey (1961)). These approaches make decision rules 
contingent on the reports of agents about private information. It also developed in 
a principal-agent context as can be found for instance in Baron and Myerson (1982) 
or Maskin and Riley (1984). In this class of problems an uninformed principal 
screens the different possible types of an agent by offering contingent contracts. 
The symmetric problem, first studied by Spence (1971), where the informed party 
tries to signal his type, also shows how contingent contracts can help overcome 
informational problems. In the context of adverse selection, the main trade-off arises 
between providing incentives for truthful revelation of information and giving up 
informational rents to privately informed agents. In general, this leads to allocations 
that are less efficient than the first-best.
The paradigm of moral hazard, pioneered by Mirrlees (1975), Shavell (1979) and 
Holmstrom (1979), studies ways to provide incentives to an agent to exert effort. If 
this effort is unobservable, an employment contract cannot be made contingent on 
it. Instead, an incentive scheme will be based on the worker’s performance, which 
is only an imperfect signal of his effort. Because performance is also dependent on 
variables that are not under the agent’s control, such an incentive scheme introduces 
risk into the agent’s wage. If he is risk averse, a contract has to strike a balance 
between incentives and insurance.
The case of non verifiability of information can be found when contracting parties 
have symmetric information but third parties, such as courts, have no access to 
this information. The implementation literature, which started with Maskin (1977), 
studies what allocations can be implemented when mechanisms are made contingent 
on agent’s reports concerning non verifiable information. The main message that 
has emerged from this literature is that non verifiability of information does not
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pose a serious threat to implementability.
A particular problem that arises from non verifiability of information is the 
hold-up problem, which is close to the moral hazard paradigm. Parties engaging in 
a relationship are uncertain about future benefits of their relationship. If this in­
formation is non verifiable and message games as above are neglected, parties have 
to bargain ex-post over the split of the surplus. In this situation parties will under­
invest in the relationship because they fear expropriation of the investment benefit 
by their partner in the transaction. Given the work on implementation theory the 
hold-up problem can in principle be solved in symmetric information environments 
if no further assumption restricting the set of feasible contracts are made. Similarly, 
Rogerson (1992) provides solutions to the hold-up problem in asymmetric informa­
tion environments and concludes that it can be dealt with without loss of efficiency 
in a wide variety of circumstances.
Apart from the efficiency cost of asymmetric information, complete contract 
theory abstracts from any other cost of contracting.
1 .1 .2  In co m p lete  C ontracts
Incomplete contracting on the other hand starts by assuming that either only very 
simple contracts can be written or that contracting is altogether impossible and 
studies the implication for organizational structures of economic institutions. The 
divide between incomplete contract and complete contract theory is not always ob­
vious. Coming back to the moral hazard example, one could argue that this problem 
falls into the domain of incomplete contracts because the contract is not contingent 
on the effort variable. This is true, but in the moral hazard example, there is no 
way to include this variable into the contract because it is unobservable and cannot 
be elicited. In contrast, incomplete contract theory starts by assuming that it is 
rather some aspect of the agent’s rationality, the legal framework or of the nature of 
information that prevents contracts from being complete. By limiting the possibility 
of contractual solutions to economic problems, this theory has allowed rich devel­
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opments in the study of organizations and institutions. The initial focus, starting 
with the important contributions by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975), was on 
the nature of the firm, see also Hart (1995). The central insight of this literature is 
that integration of firms is beneficial because it reduces the hold-up problem that 
arises between two independent entities. Similarly, a merger between firms reduces 
problems of asymmetric information in adverse selection problems. This theory can 
therefore trace the boundaries of firms, something which prior theories were unable 
to do. Consequently, the incomplete contract approach has enabled economic theory 
to conceptualize other important phenomena such as ownership, (see Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)), and authority, (Aghion and Tirole (1997)). 
Other applications have for instance been derived in corporate finance. The first 
articles, Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore (1994), explain shifts in con­
trol rights in financial contracts. Later articles study the role of diversified claims of 
investors in disciplining a firm’s manager, see for example Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994).
So far, the incomplete contract literature has developed mainly in symmetric 
information settings. Since the main focus of the complete contract literature is on 
asymmetric information settings, this difference does not help to clarify the nature 
of the divide. Moreover, independent of the debate on foundations of incomplete 
contracts, it seems important to assess the robustness of existing models and results 
of incomplete contracting to the extent of informational asymmetries. Therefore, 
the main focus of this thesis is on problems in which contracts may or may not be 
complete in the presence of asymmetric information.
1.1 .3  A n  I llu stra tiv e  E xam p le
To illustrate the type of questions this thesis is going to focus upon consider the 
following example.
Exam ple 1 A buyer plans to purchase a software package for his computer. An
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upgrade of the software will become available in a year’s time. At the time of the 
purchase the buyer is still uninformed about the exact value of the upgrade to him. 
This will for example depend on his use for a computer and on his specific needs 
concerning the software. Importantly, the value will be private information to the 
buyer, i.e. the seller will not be informed. The seller has the bargaining power in 
the negotiations. He sets the price in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer. How 
does the efficiency of the transaction depend on a contract? Does asymmetric infor­
mation matter?
For simplicity, assume that the seller’s cost for the software is 0 and that the up­
grading service costs 2. The value of the software’s use from now on is 6. In a year, 
it will have decreased to 5 whereas the upgraded version will have a value of either 
9 or 12, that is, the upgrade will increase the software’s usefulness by either 4 or 
7. Assume that the buyer estimates the two possibilities as equally likely and that 
this information is common between both parties. Remark, that in either case the 
increase in the value of the software due to the upgrade lies above the seller’s cost. 
It is therefore always beneficial to undertake the upgrade.
Assume that the buyer purchases the software package today but that he and the 
seller do not agree on a price for an eventual upgrade. Instead they wait until the 
buyer has received his private information and bargain over the price of the service 
at that time. The following inefficiency might occur. The seller prefers to set a high 
incremental price of 7 for the service which is only accepted by the buyer with .5 
probability instead of setting a low price of 4 which would guarantee the deal. That 
is, the seller wants to save on information rent that a buyer with high valuation 
would obtain. In the absence of a contractual arrangement concerning the upgrade, 
asymmetric information leads to an inefficient allocation.
Consider two scenarios. The buyer and seller write a complete contract in the 
form of a service contract that comes with the purchase of the software. With this 
contract the seller commits himself to provide the buyer with an upgrade of the 
software in a year’s time. The buyer pays a price of 5.5 in advance. He accepts
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the deal because he receives 0 in expectation and he can’t expect to obtain more 
by refusing this offer. The seller on the other hand is better off because he obtains
5.5 — 2 =  3.5 instead of .5 x (7 — 2) = 2.5. In this simple example, optimally, parties 
should write an early sales contract with a fixed price for the upgrade. Intuitively, 
by contracting early, they can circumvent the problem arising from asymmetric 
information.
Now assume, as could be the case in the incomplete contract paradigm, that a 
contract, stipulating that the buyer will receive an upgrade for his software after a 
year, is impossible. For instance, it might be difficult to specify in advance what 
exactly is entailed in the upgrade because technological progress in computer soft­
ware is hard to predict. Following the incomplete contract approach, although an 
initial contract cannot be written, parties can jointly decide on different ownership 
structures for the basic version of the software package. If the software becomes 
the buyer’s property, we are in the same situation as described above. After a year, 
the seller will ask a high price for the upgrade and the low valuation buyer will not 
buy. Alternatively, the buyer can rent the software for a year, such that the seller 
remains the owner. The rental price is set equal to 1, the value of the software’s 
use over the next year. A year from now, the seller can sell the already upgraded 
version to the buyer for a price of either 9 or 12. Given his beliefs about the buyer’s 
valuation, he prefers the lower price, because 9 — 2 > 0.5 X (12 — 2). Efficiency 
is achieved. The buyer’s outside option in the final bargaining is decreased by a 
shift in ownership and the seller can therefore commit himself to offering a better 
deal. While with complete contracts ownership plays no role, ownership matters in 
achieving efficiency in the incomplete contract approach.
A characteristic of the example is that there is no issue of ex-ante incentives. The 
upgrade becomes available after a year without any further investment of either of 
the contracting parties. The main part of the thesis considers similar problems. 
Hence it belongs to the branch in incomplete contract theory concerned with ex­
post problems, as is for example Hart and Moore (1994). Usually, these ex-post
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problems are due to cash constraints limiting bargaining efficiency. The source 
of inefficiency in most of this thesis is novel as it stems from ex-post asymmetric 
information1. Another branch of the incomplete contract approach investigates ex- 
ante problems, as in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). The 
problem considered in chapter 2 falls within this category.
Remark, that in the above example both the complete and the incomplete con­
tract yield the first-best. In this context there is therefore no loss in assuming that 
contracts are incomplete. The point here is that the particular form of contract in­
completeness does not prevent parties from achieving efficiency. A ’simple’ contract 
like ownership gets around this problem. In a more complex environment this is 
not necessarily true as the efficiency of the solution in general depends on the set of 
contracts that are assumed feasible.
1.1 .4  S en s it iv ity  o f  R esu lts
One problem of the incomplete contract approach is the sensitivity of its predictions 
to modelling assumptions. In particular, the intuition that with simple contracts 
relatively robust results would be obtained has turned out to be misleading. The 
outcomes of incomplete contracting models tend to depend delicately on the spe­
cific assumptions about contractual possibilities and on the assumed extensive form 
game.
To see that the form of assumed contractual incompleteness matters, reconsider 
the above example. In the incomplete contract version it is assumed that a contract 
specifying a particular upgrade of the software package is infeasible. On the other 
hand, a rental agreement of the software is assumed to be perfectly enforceable. It is 
possible though, that a rental contract suffers from a different kind of incompleteness, 
namely from a commitment problem. If it is impossible to ensure that the buyer 
indeed hands the software back to the seller, he could for example retain a pirate
*A paper that considers ownership allocations in an incomplete contracting model with ex-post 
inefficiencies of this type is Matouschek (2000)
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copy, such an agreement would be useless.
Several recent papers have tested the robustness of predictions derived from the 
incomplete contract approach with respect to the timing and assumed extensive form 
of the bargaining game. One important result in the incomplete contract literature 
for example is that asset ownership motivates investment. The intuition is that asset 
ownership enhances a party’s bargaining power in ex-post negotiations by raising 
its disagreement payoff. Therefore, a larger share of the surplus can be obtained, 
which in turn increases returns from investment. This implies in particular that 
joint ownership is never optimal because none of the investing parties can protect 
its own investment.
DeMeza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998) point out that the first result is 
only true if a specific class of bargaining games is assumed for the ex-post negotia­
tions, namely, bargaining games in which parties disagreement payoffs are taken to 
be inside rather than outside options. With inside options, i.e. when disagreement 
payoffs are realized during the bargaining period, a party’s final payoff is indeed his 
disagreement payoff plus a fraction of the gains from agreement. In contrast, with 
outside options, a party’s final payoff is either simply the payoff from his outside 
option or total surplus minus the value of the other party’s outside option. Shifting 
ownership away from a party reduces his outside option which may then become 
non binding. The party therefore receives total surplus minus a constant, which 
provides optimal investment incentives. Although the central intuition that own­
ership matters for investment incentives still holds, with a bargaining game that is 
different from the one that is usually assumed in incomplete contracting models, 
asset ownership demotivates investment.
Halonen (1995) tests the role of asset ownership in a dynamic model in which 
contracting parties interact repeatedly and use trigger strategies to support equilib­
rium outcomes. In this setting, joint ownership might be optimal because it allows 
parties to punish severely in case of deviation from the equilibrium path. But joint 
ownership is never optimal in the static incomplete contract model, which points to
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a need to carefully examine the timing of such models.
1.2 O bjective o f the Thesis
The main question of the thesis is under what circumstances, incompleteness of 
contracts can be assumed without loss of generality. Put differently, when does 
contracting not matter?
Providing an answer to this questions is important because it lies at the heart 
of the criticism that has been levied on the incomplete contract approach. Its most 
substantial problem is the ad hoc assumption about what kinds of contracts are 
deemed possible. Although heuristic arguments are used to motivate incompleteness 
of contracts, they are rarely made precise and are often not tailored to the specific 
contracting problem under study. The discussion in section 1.1.4 points to the need 
to understand more clearly what the exact limitations of complete contracting are. 
Also, a link should be established between theoretically well founded assumptions 
and specific forms of contractual incompleteness.
The thesis aims at evaluating the inefficiencies of a particular limit to contracting, 
a commitment problem. More precisely, parties cannot commit not to renegotiate 
a contract if this is in their common interest. Renegotiation has been extensively 
studied in various contracting models and is by now a well accepted paradigm in 
the literature. It generally restricts the set of achievable outcomes and therefore 
makes contracting less valuable. In this thesis it is used to explain one special form 
of contract incompleteness, the absence of a contract. I consider various complete 
contracting frameworks in which the constraints on a contract imposed by incen­
tive considerations and the possibility of contract renegotiation induces parties to 
refrain from writing a contract. The absence of a contract is of particular interest 
because many incomplete contracting models are based on the assumption that a 
contract cannot be written. Before going into details of the thesis’s contribution I 
contrast the premise of my approach with existing assumptions about contractual
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incompleteness.
1.3 Existing Foundations
1.3 .1  T ransaction  C osts
The main argument evoked to support contractual incompleteness are transaction 
costs. These are centered around three themes. First, possibly because of bounded 
rationality, contracting parties cannot foresee all relevant future contingencies and 
actions. Second, even if they could foresee them it would be inherently costly to 
include every single one of them in a contract. Finally, some form of legal authority 
must be able to read and interpret the terms of a contract and verify the contracted 
upon contingencies. I will discuss each of these in turn and indicate how far the 
theoretical literature has advanced in addressing these issues. Tirole (1999) provides 
an exhaustive survey of this literature.
1.3 .2  U n fo reseen  C on tin gen cies
Bounded rationality and the existence of unforeseen contingencies seem to be an 
intuitive argument to explain why contracts are incomplete. Nevertheless, it is quite 
difficult to capture these concepts in a theoretical model. For one, economic theory 
has so far not developed a concise notion of what constitutes boundedly rational 
behavior2. Similarly, only few models of unforeseen contingencies exist.
One way of modelling unforeseen contingencies is to assume that an individual 
has subjective, non additive beliefs over future states of the world. This is equiva­
lent to assuming that, instead of using a single probability distribution to describe 
the world, an individual considers a whole range of possible distributions. Allowing 
for uncertainty over the exact distribution captures the idea that the individual is 
uncertain about the future. He is called ambiguity averse if, when evaluating a deci­
2For an introduction into the topic of bounded rationality, see Rubinstein (1998)
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sion, he always considers the probability distribution that offers the lowest expected 
payoff. Mukerji (1998) uses this approach to explain incompleteness of contracts in 
a hold-up problem. Here, the role of a contract is to make a party’s payoff sensitive 
to his investment. With two investing parties this can be achieved if different states 
of the world are affected differently by each party’s investment. To induce party A, 
say, to invest, a contract needs to offer a high compensation in the state that is most 
affected by party A’s investment. The effect of such a contract is to make a party’s 
payoff volatile. With ambiguity aversion, similarly as with risk-aversion, this re­
duces a party’s expected payoff and in certain circumstances, a contingent contract 
violates parties’ participation constraints. A completely uncontingent contract that 
allows for a relatively equal distribution across states is the optimal contract. Un­
fortunately, it is quite difficult to distinguish this setting from one in which parties 
are risk averse.
The papers by Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2000) offer an 
alternative model of unforeseen contingencies. The authors consider a two stage 
decision problem of a single agent. In a first stage he chooses a set of actions 
from which he has to select one at the second stage. If he can foresee all future 
states of the world, he is able to foresee the consequences of every possible action. 
Therefore, if he is able to make a contingent choice at the first stage, that is, if 
he can write a plan that specifies an action in each future state of the world, the 
second stage is void. He does not gain anything from leaving his choices open. On 
the other hand, if he fears unforeseen contingencies, he might initially prefer a larger 
choice set so as to allow himself more flexibility at the second stage. The authors 
derive a representation theorem for the initial preferences over choice sets. If these 
preferences exhibit preference for flexibility, the derived utility over ex-post actions 
will be state dependent. The additional states are interpreted as ’unforeseen’, see 
Kreps (1992). This set-up seems to capture the intuition of incomplete contracts 
quite well. If a large choice set is interpreted as an incomplete contract, the above 
model provides an explanation for a preference for incompleteness.
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In this approach the agent can perfectly describe all possible future actions but is 
unable to come up with a complete list of future states of the world. He is therefore 
unable to forecast his future payoffs in a contractible way. In contrast, the notion 
of unforeseen contingencies put forward in the paper by Maskin and Tirole (1999) 
is that the physical attributes of a future state or an action is unforeseen so that 
they are indescribable ex-ante but payoffs resulting from these actions are perfectly 
foreseen.
The authors use this idea to provide a criticism to the argument that contracts are 
incomplete because of unforeseen contingencies. The authors point at a tension in 
existing incomplete contracting models between, on the one hand, infinitely rational 
parties who perfectly foresee all possible future payoffs, and on the other hand the 
assumption that parties are unable to describe the actions that will lead to these 
payoffs. In particular, the authors show that given the assumption that actions and 
states of nature are perfectly describable ex-post, an assumption which is usually 
made in incomplete contracting models, the problem of ex-ante indescribability can 
be overcome by writing ’payoff based’ revelation mechanisms.
To see the intuition of their result, the software example is slightly modified. As­
sume, that the software can be developed along several possible lines. By how much 
each of these approaches will have advanced in a year is not yet known. Similarly, 
it is not known which one will finally turn out to be the most efficient alternative. 
Therefore, technical descriptions cannot be included in a contract. Nevertheless, 
assume that it is possible ex-post, i.e. once all relevant uncertainty is resolved, to 
costlessly describe all feasible upgrades. Furthermore, ex-ante contracting parties 
can foresee (or at least estimate) the values and costs of all possible future alter­
natives. Therefore, parties know what the utility profiles are that they want to 
implement. The following table summarizes costs and increments in value. Three
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feasible alternatives are considered.
values costs
S1 52
Oil 4 7 2
Ot 2 5 8 4
Oi3 1 4 0
The parties foresee three feasible upgrades with the above payoff structures, but 
there might be many more infeasible ones. State S! is the state in which the buyer 
has a low valuation for an upgrade, s2 is the state in which he has a high valuation, 
whereas the seller’s cost are the same in both states. Parallel to Example 1, I 
assume that Sj and s2 are equally likely. In addition, a state includes the physical 
description of the feasible upgrades with payoff profiles (ai, a 2, a 3).
In this situation, regardless of the realization of S{, the first set of payoffs cni 
should be implemented, because it guarantees the highest joint surplus. For example, 
the set of payoffs a i results in a surplus of 2 in state sj, whereas profiles a 2 and a 3 
result in a surplus of only 1. Similarly, in state s2 the surplus in the profile Qi is 5 
compared to 4 for the other two profiles.
A contract along the following lines could be proposed: The buyer initially pur­
chases the software. For an advance payment of 5.5, the seller commits himself to 
’upgrade’ the program in a year’s time. The exact details of the upgrade are filled 
in later. More precisely, in a year the seller has to describe the physical details of 
three possible upgrades, X, Y, and Z, say, and propose one of them as the efficient 
one. That is, he must designate the upgrade that has utility profile o l\ .  Because the 
naming of upgrades is arbitrary, assume that he proposes upgrade X. The buyer can 
accept the proposal in which case the upgrade is undertaken by the seller. Alterna­
tively, the buyer can challenge the seller’s proposal. If he does so, the seller pays 10 
to the buyer. The buyer can challenge in several ways
(i) He can claim that one of the proposed upgrades is not feasible, which is ex-
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post verifiable by assumption. If the seller has indeed lied in that way, the 
software is not upgraded and the buyer keeps the fine.
(ii) The buyer can claim that the seller has proposed the wrong upgrade amid 
the feasible ones. To prove his point he must choose a number m  6  {1,3.5}. 
The seller then has the choice between a) delivering X or b) paying m  and not 
upgrading the software. The challenge is successful if m  — 3.5 and the seller 
picks alternative b) or if m  =  1 and the seller picks alternative a). Otherwise 
the challenge is unsuccessful. If the challenge is successful, the alternative 
chosen by the seller, either a) or b), is enforced. If the challenge is unsuccessful 
the buyer has to pay a fine of 20 to the court.
Step (i) ensures that the seller has no incentive to lie about the type of upgrades 
he can deliver because the fine he has to pay if the buyer challenges is larger than 
his disutility from implementing the efficient upgrade. It allows parties to fill in the 
ex-ante indescribable details ex-post and constitutes the central result of Maskin and 
Tirole. Step (ii) ensures that the efficient upgrade is chosen out of the three feasible 
ones and is standard in the literature on subgame perfect implementation. Assume 
for example, that the buyer wants to claim that the seller’s proposed upgrade X in 
fact corresponds to profile c*2 . The buyer can challenge and set m  =  3.5. If the 
seller has indeed lied in that way, his true costs for the upgrade are 4 and he will 
prefer to pay m  rather than undertake it. If he has told the truth on the other hand, 
he will prefer to deliver the upgrade. Similarly, the buyer might want to claim that 
the seller has proposed the upgrade with profile a3. To expose such a lie, he sets 
m = l .  If the seller has lied, he will prefer the actual upgrade to the payment, and 
the opposite will be true if he has told the truth. This implies that it is possible to 
detect who has behaved untruthfully and the fines ensure that lying is too costly.
Remark, that for the mechanism to work the buyer needs to be informed about 
the seller’s preferences because he must decide on the correct m. Maskin and Ti­
role only consider symmetric information settings, i.e. settings in which there is
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complete information between contracting parties. In specific circumstances, the 
proposed mechanism can be adopted to a setting with one-sided asymmetric infor­
mation, as is the case in the software example. It is therefore irrelevant whether 
or not the seller is informed about the buyer’s valuation. If there was two sided 
asymmetric information, i.e. the buyer was also uninformed about the seller’s cost, 
such a finely tuned mechanism would no longer be feasible. In general, asymmetric 
information restricts the set of allocations that are implementable when payoffs are 
unverifiable. Nevertheless, it seems that as long as there is no asymmetry of in­
formation concerning the feasibility of ex-post actions, the central result of Maskin 
Tirole remains unaffected. What can be achieved by an ex-ante contract if ex-post 
only one of the parties is informed about the feasibility of some of the actions, is yet 
unknown and remains future work.
Two key reasons ensure that the above contract works. The first is the existence 
of large punishments. The seller pays 10 to the buyer if the buyer challenges and the 
buyer pays 20 to a third party if his challenge is unsuccessful. The contract fails if 
such punishments are not enforceable. Contract renegotiation may for example void 
the latter type of punishment because parties can jointly renegotiate contractual 
clauses that prescribe large payments to third parties. Maskin and Tirole show, 
that even with renegotiation it is possible to construct mechanisms that overcome 
the problem of indescribable actions. The restriction needed for the second result 
are albeit more stringent. More precisely, they show that with renegotiation it 
is more difficult to ensure that a contract is ’welfare neutral’. Welfare neutrality 
means that the contract implements the same utility profile in states of nature 
which are characterized by an identical set of utility profiles. This is a necessary 
requirement also in a setting without renegotiation because for two such states, 
any utility profile that emerges as an equilibrium in the first state will also be an 
equilibrium profile in the second state. In our example, states are differentiated by 
the type of upgrades that are feasible, but feasible upgrades all give rise to the same 
set of utility profiles (modulo states Si and S2 ). The contract is welfare neutral
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because it requires implementation of the same profile Qi in all these states. To find 
out how restrictive welfare neutrality is under renegotiation and under asymmetric 
information is another way in which to extend this line of research.
The contribution of Maskin and Tirole (1999) is to show that ex-ante indescrib- 
ability of actions is no hindrance to contracting as long as actions are assumed to 
be describable ex-post. In contrast, the paper by Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 
(2000) considers the situation in which actions are unverifiable both ex-ante and 
ex-post. Intuitively, this limits the scope of revelation mechanisms such as the one 
above because a contract can no longer implement different actions depending on 
the parties’ announcements. In particular, challenges as in points (i) and (ii) are 
no longer feasible. It is therefore not surprising that revelation mechanisms will 
have much less bite. In order to introduce scope for ’partial contracting’ the authors 
consider situations, in which, although actions are not contractible, the control over 
an action can be either contracted upon or can be transferred from one party to 
another. They term the former situation contractible control actions and the latter 
transferable control actions.
In the first case the authors show that in a dynamic relationship, where co­
operation between two parties is desirable and where there is sufficient strategic 
complementarity between actions, a partial (incomplete?) contract that implements 
a switch of control from one period to the next is the optimal contract. Thus, a sim­
ple contract dominates any complicated message game. The idea is that a switch in 
control allows parties to punish non cooperative play and reward cooperative play. 
In the second case it might be optimal for the party in charge of an action to relin­
quish its power if the other party has private information. This allows the latter to 
build up reputation in a dynamic game.
1.3 .3  W ritin g  C ost
The reason that contracts might be incomplete because of costs of writing them 
has been first addressed by Dye (1985). He assumes that each contractual clause
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involves a fixed cost and argues that the cost of including an additional clause should 
be weighted against its benefit. Consequently, relatively unimportant contingencies 
are optimally excluded from a contract. A main shortcoming of this paper is the 
assumed rigidity of the contracting language. For example, the rule f (x)  = x  — 1 
is infinitely costly in his framework, because it specifies for each x  a different value 
f (x).  But with a richer language the rule could be contained in a very simple 
statement.
Battigalli and Maggi (2000) develop an explicit language that is used to describe 
the contracting environment and parties’ behavior. Their language is composed 
of simple statements describing either states of nature or actions which are linked 
by logical operators. A typical contractual clause in their framework would be ’If 
it is feasible to add a windows surface to the software, do so’. Writing down a 
statement is costly and these costs are assumed to take the form of a fixed cost c per 
simple statement. The above clause would for example cost 2c because it contains 
the description of a state of nature and the prescription of an action. With this 
assumption, contracts can be overly rigid, i.e. not as finely tuned as the first-best. 
Alternatively, they can be too loose, i.e. an agent has discretion over his behavior. 
The exact form of contractual incompleteness is endogenous and depends on the 
size of the writing costs and on the uncertainty in the environment. An interesting 
conclusion of the paper from the viewpoint of this thesis is that, depending on the 
form of contractual incompleteness, both overinvestment and underinvestment can 
be rationalized in the hold-up problem. If a contract is too rigid, overinvestment 
will occur, and the opposite is true if a contract is too loose. In contrast, the main 
intuition of the incomplete contract literature is that incompleteness of contracts 
will always lead an agent to underinvest. This result once more highlights the 
importance of studying sources of contractual incompleteness.
An issue missing in the above papers is the notion of complexity of a contract 
which is taken up by Anderlini and Felli (1994). The problem studied in this paper 
is a coinsurance problem and a contract prescribes a transfer payment conditional
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on a realized state of nature. In this context, the authors restrict complexity of 
the contracting language by assuming that a formal contract must correspond to 
a computable function, i.e. a function that can be calculated with an algorithm 
in a finite number of steps. This assumption alone does not restrain parties from 
approximating the first best. The rough intuition is that because parties’ utilities 
are continuous in money terms, the first best contract must prescribe relatively 
’smooth’ transfers. These transfers can be approximated by step functions which 
are computable and can thus be prescribed with a computable contract. The paper 
proceeds by showing that, if the contract selection process is subject to a similar 
restriction, the resulting contract has features of incompleteness.
Retaining the assumption that formal contracts must correspond to computable 
functions, the authors study the impact of additional complexity costs on the form 
of contracts in Anderlini and Felli (1999), (2000). In Anderlini and Felli (1999) a 
computation involves a minimum cost c, so that a contract that contains n steps 
of calculation costs nc. In Anderlini and Felli (2000) the authors use an axiomatic 
approach to contracting costs, in which the complexity cost function needs to fulfill 
two axioms. First, the null contract (the contract that leaves parties utility levels 
unchanged for every state of nature) involves no costs. Second, a contract with 
bounded costs y , can only result in a finite set of outcomes. The axiomatic approach 
in Anderlini and Felli (2000) encompasses the direct modelling approach used in 
Anderlini and Felli (1999). The authors are then able to show that there exist 
contracting problems within the set of coinsurance problems, such that complexity 
costs generate incomplete contracts in the strong sense, that is, the optimal contract 
is the null contract. Intuitively, if the first-best contract is not far away from the 
null contract the extra restriction through complexity costs generates this result.
1 .3 .4  L egal C ost
A contract needs to be detailed enough for an outsider such as a court, to understand 
its terms. Furthermore, contingencies, on which the prescriptions of a contract are
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based, need to be verifiable. In the software example, if the contract stipulates that 
the seller is to deliver an ’appropriate’ upgrade to the buyer, it must be possible 
for an outsider to decide what is meant by this term. It is likely that this is more 
difficult for a judge who is not familiar with this type of software. An expert might 
need to be paid to give his advice. Many incomplete contracting models make the 
simplifying assumption that it is impossible for an outsider to verify certain variables 
or that the cost of doing so is prohibitive. This has led to the term of ‘observable 
but unverifiable information’ which means that information is observable by the 
contracting parties themselves but not by outsiders such as courts or other legal 
institutions. Incomplete contracting models conclude that a contract cannot be 
made contingent on this nonverifiable information. This is in contrast to existing 
theory because parties messages concerning this information can be included into 
the contract. Implementation theory has provided a body of results showing that in 
a wide range of circumstances unverifiability of information is no serious obstacle3.
1.3 .5  S tra teg ic  In com p leten ess
The idea that strategic considerations in conjunction with some form of transaction 
costs might lead to more contractual incompleteness than pure transaction costs 
alone is the focus of the papers by Spier (1992), Allen and Gale (1992) and Bernheim 
and Whinston (1998).
Spier (1992) considers a risk sharing contract in which a risk-averse principal 
is privately informed about the value of a project for which he hires a risk-neutral 
agent. A good principal, whose project has higher chances of success, might want 
to signal this information to the agent. Without asymmetric information, the agent 
should bear all the risk and receive a contingent wage. Suppose now that there are 
transaction costs any time a new contingency is included in the contract. Then, 
even if contracts are fully contingent under complete information, the presence of
3For a survey on this topic, see Moore (1992).
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asymmetric information leads the good principal to offer a non-contingent contract 
in equilibrium. A non contingent contract prevents the transfer of risk to the risk 
neutral party. It is costly for the principal to do so, and more costly for the bad 
principal than for the good principal. Hence, there is a possibility of signalling.
In contrast to the separating result of Spier, Allen and Gale (1992) concentrate 
on a pooling equilibrium in which uncontingent contracts are offered by all principals 
in equilibrium. In their model, suppliers facing uncertainty about future costs want 
to insure against this risk by writing contingent supply contracts with their clients. 
Suppliers are differentiated by the quality (unobservable) of their product and not 
by the riskiness of their production technology as in Spier. There are neither writing 
nor legal costs but production costs must be apprehended by a measurement or ac­
counting system. This in itself is not costly, but it is assumed that the principal can 
distort the output of the measurement system by incurring some cost. Importantly, 
a ’good’ principal, who provides a high quality good, pays a higher cost for manip­
ulating the system and therefore gains less from a contingent contract. This implies 
that he can credibly signal his type with an uncontingent contract. The authors 
argue in favor of the pooling equilibrium with uncontingent contracts because it is 
the unique stable equilibrium in the sense of Universal Divinity. Furthermore, all 
supplier types are better off in this equilibrium.
The above two papers are concerned with signalling properties of incomplete 
contracts. The paper by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) studies the disciplinary 
role of an incomplete contract. In a dynamic setting, an unverifiable and a verifi­
able action are undertaken in sequence by two agents. Contracts can be written to 
restrict the second agent’s action set but cannot be conditioned on the first agent’s 
action. Incomplete contracts, i.e. contracts in which the second agent’s choice is un­
restricted, emerge if actions are strategic complements, whereas complete contracts 
emerge if actions are substitutes. The intuition for the result is that, with comple­
ments, the second agent, having observed the first agent’s action, tends to reward 
good behavior and punish bad behavior. He should therefore be given discretion. In
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contrast, with substitutes bad behavior is rewarded and good behavior is punished 
if parties have too much discretion. The central message is that it can be optimal 
to leave contractible actions unspecified in a contract because this ensures a better 
handling of the informal part of the relationship.
A related idea is explored in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). The authors de­
velop a dynamic model in which a contract can be made contingent on two variables 
which are set in sequence. The contract is a risk-sharing agreement between a risk 
neutral principal and a risk-averse agent who has private information. The difference 
with the model by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) is that no use of a transaction 
cost argument is made by assuming that one of the variables is unverifiable. In­
stead, another ingredient, renegotiation, interferes to create an incomplete contract. 
Renegotiation can occur in between the two stages at which the variables are cho­
sen. Since the observation of the first variable may reveal information about the 
informed party’s type, it can interfere with the second variable’s risk-sharing role. 
Thus it may be optimal to leave the first variable unobservable.
1.3 .6  R en eg o tia tio n
The first paper that draws a formal link between unverifiable information and con­
tract renegotiation is Hart and Moore (1988). The authors define a contract as 
incomplete when it cannot be made contingent on a future state of nature, i.e. 
when the state is ex-post unverifiable. In spite of this restriction the overall out­
come is dependent on the state of nature through an exchange of ex-post messages 
between the parties. The contract can structure this ex-post exchange which serves 
to complete the initially incomplete contract. The crux is that these messages can 
simultaneously be used to renegotiate the initial contract and therefore severe lim­
itations are put on the initial contract. It is shown that these restrictions hinder 
parties from achieving the first-best in a version of the hold-up problem.
The papers by Che and Hausch (1999) and Segal (1999), Hart and Moore (1999) 
provide an even stronger result in the same type of problem by emphasizing different
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aspects of the contracting environments. The main result of these models is that 
under certain conditions contracting parties may be indifferent between writing an 
ex-ante agreement and simply relying on the ex-post bargaining game. Hence, an 
initial contract has no value in the relationship. The important assumption needed 
for this result is that contracts can be renegotiated. Here, a contract that is made 
indirectly contingent on the state of nature through parties’ ex-post messages is not 
called incomplete. Rather, the null contract which emerges as the (weakly) best 
contract is called incomplete.
To understand the intuition I will explain the details of Che and Hausch (1999). 
The models by Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) provide a different ex­
planation for contractual incompleteness and their contribution will be discussed 
extensively in the second chapter of the thesis. In contrast to most of the literature 
on the hold-up problem, Che and Hausch consider cooperative investments, that 
is, investments that not only benefit the investing party but also directly affect her 
partner’s payoff.
Consider a version of the software example with purely cooperative investment.
E xam ple 2 When designing the software’s upgrade, the seller can pay particular 
attention to the buyer’s needs. He can for example take into account the buyer’s 
wishes for a user friendly surface. This relationship specific investment involves a 
cost to the seller which is set to 1. The investment results in a deterministic increase 
in the buyer’s valuation for the upgrade. The upgrade enhances the software’s value 
to the buyer by 7 if the seller has undertaken the relationship specific investment, 
and by 4 otherwise. The cost of the actual upgrade is set equal to 2. The investment 
is desirable because 7 — 4 > 1. The upgrade is desirable regardless of the seller’s 
investment, because 4 > 2. Investment costs are sunk when parties bargain over the 
price for the upgrade, in contrast to the upgrade’s costs, which are only incurred when 
the upgrade is actually undertaken. Because the buyer’s valuation is determined by 
the seller’s investment, there is no asymmetric information ex-post. Furthermore, 
assume that the buyer has all the bargaining power in the ex-post negotiation.
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First consider the situation in which there is no contract. Because the buyer has 
all the bargaining power and investment costs are sunk, he will offer the seller a 
price of 2 for the upgrade regardless of whether the seller has invested or not. The 
seller has therefore no incentive to invest.
Now, consider the situation, in which the parties can commit themselves to 
a contract. An efficient solution to the above hold-up problem is the following 
contract. The purchase of the software includes the option for the buyer to upgrade 
the software for a price of 7 in a year from now. Because the buyer will exercise his 
option if and only if the seller has indeed undertaken the investment, this provides 
the seller with the right investment incentives. He obtains 7 — 2 — 1 = 4 if he invests 
and 0 otherwise.
Now, assume that this option contract can be renegotiated. Namely, the buyer, 
if he rejects the upgrade, can make another offer to the seller. This offer will have 
the same form as if no contract had been written, the price will just be high enough 
to cover the production cost of 2. As it does not take the seller’s sunk investment 
into account, the seller has no incentive to invest.
In the above example, even more general contracts than the simple option con­
tract cannot provide the seller with investment incentives. Because the seller’s payoff 
is not directly affected by his own investment a simple contract that enforces trade 
for a fixed price does not improve investment incentives. Instead, a contract must be 
made contingent on either of the parties’ announcements about investment. Now, 
the seller has always an incentive to claim that he has invested whereas the buyer, 
having the bargaining power in contract renegotiation, always has an incentive to 
claim that he has not. Therefore, it is impossible to prevent both of them from lying. 
Che and Hausch show in a more general setting that, depending on the parties’ re­
spective bargaining powers and on the extent to which investments are cooperative, 
ex-ante contracts have no power.
Interestingly, renegotiation, although very powerful in the above example, is not 
necessarily harmful nor does it always destroy the value of contracting. In fact,
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adding asymmetric information to the above example will restore efficiency of an 
option contract even if contracts can be renegotiated. To see this, assume that the 
seller’s cost for the actual upgrade are uncertain. They can be either 0 or 4, where 
these events are equally likely. The seller will find out whether the costs of the 
upgrade are high or low after investment has taken place and the investment cost 
are sunk, but shortly before trade. Assume, that the buyer is uninformed about the 
seller’s cost realization.
In the absence of a contract the buyer will propose to purchase the upgrade 
from the seller for a price of 0 regardless of whether the seller has undertaken the 
investment or not. To see this, compute the buyer’s expected utility for either 
case. In the case in which the seller has made the investment, the buyer obtains
0.5 X (7 — 0) =  3.5 if he offers the low price and 7 — 4 =  3 if he offers the high price. 
In the case in which the seller has not invested, the buyer obtains 0.5 X ( 4 - 0 )  =  2 
if he offers the low price and 4 — 4 =  0 if he offers the high price. Therefore, a 
price offer of 0 is optimal for the buyer. Given this, the seller has no incentive to 
invest because he obtains a 0 payoff in either case but he has to bear the cost of 
investment.
Now, consider an ex-ante contract that gives the buyer the option to purchase 
the upgrade at a price of 3. Remark, that this price must lie below the price that 
is set when renegotiation is not an issue, because the buyer’s outside option is 
strictly positive with renegotiation. With this contract, the buyer has an incentive 
to exercise the option if and only if investment has taken place. If the seller has 
invested, the buyer obtains 7 — 3 =  4 from exercising the option, which is more 
than what he would get from not exercising the option and relying on renegotiation. 
If the seller has not invested, the buyer prefers not to exercise the option because 
4 — 3 =  1 is less than what he can expect from renegotiation. The seller has a (weak) 
incentive to invest because he expects to obtain 3 — 0.5 X 0 — 0.5 x  4 — 1 = 0 if he 
invests and 0 if he does not invest.
The reason for the failure of the Che-Hausch result is that with asymmetric
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information the renegotiation game is not efficient. Therefore, contracting parties 
fearing a loss of surplus due to the inefficiency of the bargaining game are more 
likely to obey the rules’ of a contract. Remark, that in both set-ups, although 
parties might not gain from writing a contract as is the case in the paper by Che 
and Hausch, there is no loss involved in contracting. The above option contract is 
always better or as good as no contract.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The aim of the thesis is to study how renegotiation affects contracting in asymmet­
ric information environments and how this can be used to explain incompleteness of 
contracts. In addition to the theoretical interest of establishing foundations of in­
complete contracts in such environments, there is another reason for this approach. 
Asymmetric information seems to be a necessary ingredient to explain a specific 
form of contractual incompleteness, the absence of a contract.
The papers by Che and Hausch (1999) and Segal (1999), Hart and Moore (1999) 
are concerned with this latter type of incompleteness. Because complete contracts 
are useless in these models, it is argued that they provide theoretical foundations 
for the incomplete contract approach.
There is one shortcoming of this explanation. If contracting parties are indifferent 
between writing a contract and not writing one, there remains a slight ambiguity. 
A still stronger advocate for the incomplete contracting front seems to be needed, 
namely, to show that contracting parties strictly prefer not to write a contract. 
If the null contract strictly dominates any more complicated contract, the basic 
assumption of most of the incomplete contracting models is on safe grounds.
In this thesis, a contract merely serves as a starting point for ex-post negotiations 
between contracting parties. That is, a contract decides on the status quo point of 
an ensuing out-of-contract bargaining game. The rules of this bargaining game 
are fixed, i.e. decided by nature. These negotiations can be interpreted as the
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renegotiation of the existing contract if a non trivial contract is in place. Then 
the question is under what circumstances parties strictly prefer the null contract as 
the uniquely optimal contract to serve as the status quo for this ex-post bargaining 
game.
What could be reasons for a strict preference? The above foundation models 
are ’only’ concerned with incentive constraints. It is impossible to obtain a strong 
dominance result in their context because the outcome of the ex-post bargaining 
game under symmetric information can always be mirrored by an ex-ante contract.
Given this, asymmetric information seems to be a necessary ingredient. With 
asymmetric information, there is a potential for ex-post inefficiencies and therefore 
for harmful contracting. Contracts, by implementing an action or by changing 
parties’s beliefs, affect the outcome of the ex-post bargaining game above a simple 
change in the division of surplus. On the other hand, in light of Example 2, it seems 
that asymmetric information might also serve as a disciplining device. Because it 
hinders parties from achieving ex-post efficiency, it might be easier to force them to 
adhere to a contract’s rules.
In order to test and validate the hypothesis that asymmetric information can 
provide a strict dominance result, I proceed in three steps.
The second chapter of the thesis reconsiders the model by Hart and Moore (1999), 
hereafter the HM model. In their paper, the complexity of the contracting environ­
ment together with renegotiation imposes a large number of incentive constraints 
on contracts. Consequently, contracts have very limited scope. If the complexity of 
the environment, i.e. number of possible trading opportunities, increases without 
bounds, any complicated contract approaches the null contract. In Chapter 2, I 
simplify the HM model, and show that their result can be obtained without using a 
complexity argument4. Instead, the assumed nature of uncertainty makes it impos­
sible to construct a revelation mechanism and at the same time provide investment
4I am grateful to Michele Picchione for inspriring this symmetric information version of the 
model.
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incentives. The main driving force is that investment may have a positive as well as 
a negative effect on the investing party’s payoff. Ex-post, parties have to decide on 
a joint action. They can only contract on this action to a limited extent because it 
is not known ex-ante which action is going to be efficient. Furthermore, this infor­
mation is ex-post non verifiable. Early investment increases expected surplus if the 
most efficient action is chosen but decreases the surplus arising from an inefficient 
action. In equilibrium, the effect of investment is positive because parties will always 
renegotiate to the efficient action. But because the other party can always threaten 
to enforce an inefficient outcome she can expropriate the benefit from investment. 
The hold-up problem arises even if complete contracts can be written.
The simplification of the HM model allows me to introduce asymmetric infor­
mation and to assess the consequences of this change more easily. This is done in 
Chapter 3. In the new setting, ex-ante considerations are neglected, i.e. there is 
no investment. Instead, I concentrate on ex-post inefficiencies created by the in­
formational asymmetry which are similar to the ones in the introductory example. 
The intuition that I try to capture is that contracting might be costly because a 
contract is inflexible, i.e. constitutes a less flexible status quo for ex-post bargaining 
than no contract. More precisely, a contract might prescribe an inefficient outcome 
which has to be undone through ex-post bargaining. With the informational friction 
parties might get locked into this inefficient outcome.
For example, during the renegotiation of the contract between General Motors 
and Fisher Body, the latter adopted a cost intensive production technology in order 
to convince its partner to renege on the former agreement. Klein (1992) argues 
that this inefficient behavior was adopted by Fisher Body to credibly signal private 
information to General Motor. Importantly, the contract itself gave rise to the 
lock-in effect because it created an opportunity for Fisher Body to hold up General 
Motors.
Then, if the resulting inefficiencies of such lock-in effects are greater than the 
benefits of a contract, it might be strictly optimal to write no contract. This intu­
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ition is not confirmed by the model of this chapter. In contrast to the symmetric 
information version, parties do write complete contracts which produce the pre­
scribed lock-in effects unless the costs of these effects are very close to the benefits 
of a contract. The intuition is that a contract can devise better punishment for 
misrepresentation of information because the ex-post bargaining game is inefficient 
under asymmetric information. Only in one instance, namely when costs of lock-in 
effects and benefits of contractual commitment are equal, there is no loss involved 
for the parties in adopting the null contract. At this point, it seems that asymmet­
ric information has led us rather further away from showing the optimality of no 
contract.
In the last two chapters of the thesis I reexamine this conclusion with a new 
ingredient, individual rationality constraints. Two models are studied in which the 
interplay of incentive constraints, individual rationality constraints and the con­
straint imposed on contracts through renegotiation can actually make contracting 
harmful. Importantly, contracts do not decrease overall efficiency, but may reduce 
the payoff of the party who makes all the contracting offers. Hence, under certain 
conditions, the null contract is the strictly preferred alternative. The explanation 
is that a contract suffers from the ratchet effect because it releases information too 
early.
Chapter 4 contains a version of the durable goods monopoly model with no 
discounting but costly contracting. A seller with one unit of a good for sale faces a 
set of buyers with differentiated valuations. He can offer the good on two consecutive 
days on a market. To do so, he has to set up a stand and wait for customers. 
These actions are costly because the seller must pay for the stand and he incurs the 
opportunity costs of time spent waiting. These are the costs of contracting in this 
model. It is assumed that early contracting is less costly than late contracting. In 
our market place story, the price of a stand on the second day is higher than on the 
first. Alternatively, the seller might have to pay a fixed storage cost for the good 
over night. Importantly, the anonymous nature of the market makes it impossible
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for the seller to write a contract that fixes the price over the two periods. He can 
choose a price for the good today and is free to name a different price the next day, 
given his beliefs about the remaining buyers in the market. The main result says 
that the seller strictly prefers not to set up his stand on the first day even if the 
transaction costs he incurs on the first day are much smaller than the transaction 
costs he incurs on the second day. That is, he chooses the ’null contract’, even 
if initial contracting costs are of order of magnitude smaller than late contracting 
costs. This result is interesting because it goes beyond a mere comparison of size in 
transaction costs. Second, I derive a parsimonious representation for the first stage 
contract that is solely due to incentive constraints. This representation is useful in 
the model of the following chapter.
In chapter 5, a sequential screening model endogenizes the fixed contracting 
cost. A seller and a buyer write a sales contract. The buyer is privately informed 
about one part of the good’s value but is still uninformed about the second part, 
which is revealed later. Early contracting is beneficial because it suffers less from 
asymmetric information than does late contracting. If the seller can commit himself 
to a single contracting offer he will offer a sequential mechanism in form of a fixed 
initial fee and a price. The contract allows the buyer to decide on whether to 
purchase the good once the second parameter of his valuation is realized. Sequential 
price discrimination is common practice in a variety of circumstances, such as fidelity 
cards in cinemas, book clubs or air plane tickets. In this chapter it is assumed that 
commitment is not feasible. More precisely, whatever an early contract prescribes, 
the seller has always the opportunity of making one final renegotiation offer. Then, 
if the uncertainty concerning the second variable is smaller than the uncertainty 
concerning the first, early contracting has no benefit while still suffering from the 
ratchet effect. The null contract is therefore strictly dominant. Second, if this is 
not the case, some early contracting can be observed, but contracts are partially 
incomplete. It can be shown that any screening of the second variable does not 
affect final payoffs, and therefore this variable can be excluded.
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1.5 Renegotiation-Proofhess
The important assumption needed to derive a strict dominance result for the null 
contract is that the final bargaining game cannot be included into the contract. 
Indeed, if it were possible to write into the contract what is to be done in the 
bargaining game, i.e. to define a two stage contract with the renegotiation game 
as second stage, a strict dominance result could never be obtained. Parties are 
obviously indifferent between the outcome of such a contract, where the first stage is 
left blank, and the outcome of the ’one stage’ null contract followed by the bargaining 
game itself.
The fact that renegotiation cannot be defined as part of a contract is not stan­
dard in the literature on contract renegotiation. In fact, it seems to contradict 
an important principle, the Renegotiation-Proofness-Principle, which has first been 
evoked by Dewatripont (1989) and Hart and Tirole (1988).
The underlying idea of the principle is that renegotiation is a bargaining game 
whose rules can be explicitly written into a contract. Hence, there is no need to 
resort to out-of-contract renegotiation in equilibrium. Similar to the revelation prin­
ciple, which allows a planner to restrict his search for an optimal mechanism to the 
set of direct revelation mechanisms, the renegotiation-proofness principle allows us 
to restrict the set of contracts to renegotiation-proof contracts. As the revelation 
principle introduces incentive constraints, the renegotiation-proofness principle in­
troduces renegotiation-proofness constraints. It therefore constitutes a convenient 
tool for studying contracting problems with renegotiation.
Although the renegotiation-proofness principle has found ample application, in 
contrast to the revelation principle it is less easy to provide a formal statement and 
proof for it. Consider two possible interpretations that are both expressed in the 
above paragraph:
II The renegotiation-proofness principle states that for every contract that is 
renegotiated in equilibrium, there is a renegotiation-proof contract that repli-
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cates the outcome of this contract.
12 The renegotiation-proofness principle states that the set of mechanisms over 
which a planner optimizes can be taken to be the set of renegotiation-proof 
contracts.
First, I want to argue that there are situations in which interpretation II is in 
contrast with the assumption that contracts can be renegotiated. More precisely, 
the fact that renegotiation cannot be made part of a contract is a direct implication 
of the way renegotiation is modelled.
In this thesis I assume that any inefficiency of a contracting outcome is subject 
to renegotiation. This implies that parties cannot contractually commit to pay a 
transfer to third parties or to destroy part of jointly realized surplus in some other 
way. But more importantly it implies that a contract cannot stop at an outcome at 
which surplus is left unexploited. For example, it cannot end at a point at which 
parties do not trade although they are both aware that trade will raise total surplus.
In contrast, an out-of-contract bargaining game can stop at such a point. This 
assumption can be defended by thinking of the bargaining game as real time negotia­
tions with an infinite time horizon and discounting. If these negotiations suffer from 
asymmetric information, inefficiencies occur because agreement is reached only with 
delay. Although I do not formally model the bargaining game as an infinite time 
horizon game and instead take it to be a take-it-or-leave-it offer by one party, the 
same intuition applies. After this offer is rejected, the size of surplus shrinks below 
parties’ opportunity costs of time and they leave the bargaining table voluntarily. 
Importantly, this ’shrinking’ cannot be recreated artificially by a contract. The only 
way to achieve it is by having parties effectively enter into the bargaining game. 
Because the outcome of the bargaining game itself is inefficient, it is impossible to 
include it as part of the contract.
I would like to stress that in symmetric information environments, this assump­
tion does not interfere with the existence of renegotiation-proof contracts. In con­
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trast, in asymmetric information environments this assumption does pose an obstacle 
to achieving renegotiation-proofness.
Second, there are situations in which although II applies, 12 is violated. This is 
the case if the renegotiation game must be effectively played as part of the contract 
as is the case in asymmetric information settings, and cannot be circumvented by 
simply adding its outcome as is the case in symmetric information settings. Then, 
12 claims that the renegotiation game, as part of the contract, can be designed 
optimally subject to the constraint that parties do not want to ’renegotiate renego­
tiation’. Below, I will provide an example in which the set of renegotiation-proof 
contracts is bigger than the set of renegotiated contracts. Therefore 12 is violated. 
Intuitively, this is the case if the exogenously given renegotiation game is not interim 
efficient.
Instead of reviewing the extensive literature on contracting with renegotiation, I 
am going to demonstrate the renegotiation-proofness principle in its interpretations 
II and 12 in the context of two examples. I am then going to discuss my assumption 
of renegotiation and show how renegotiation-proofness fails in its interpretation 
II. Finally, I am going to show in a Myerson-Satterthwaite type setting why even 
without this assumption there might be a problem with interpretation 12.
The first strand of literature on contracting with renegotiation is concerned with 
renegotiation in implementation problems of symmetric information, as pioneered 
by Maskin and Moore (1999). The discussed foundation models, Che and Hausch 
(1999), Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) are all problems of that kind. With 
symmetric information, one can always bypass the renegotiation stage by considering 
only renegotiation-proof contracts. Indeed, with symmetric information and in the 
absence of other sources of inefficiencies like cash constraints, any contract C\ is 
renegotiated to C\(C\ ), where, for every initial C\, Ci(*) is pareto-efficient. If so, 
one can simply offer the initial contract CJ =  C\{C\). By definition of Ci(-), C[ is 
pareto efficient and therefore necessarily renegotiation-proof. Hence, one can restrict 
attention to initial contracts that are NOT renegotiated: a renegotiation-proofness
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principle.
The same feature can be found in environments with asymmetric information 
between parties. Typically, these are dynamic contracting problems, (see for exam­
ple Dewatripont (1989) and Hart and Tirole (1988)), in which renegotiation arises 
naturally between two consecutive contracting dates. Take the following dynamic 
version of Example 1:
Exam ple 3 The seller can upgrade the software twice within a year at date 1 and 
date 2 . At the time at which the seller proposes a sales contract for both upgrades, 
date 0 say, the buyer is already informed about his valuation. I f he has a high use 
for the software, each upgrade will increase his valuation by 7, if he has a low use, 
his valuation will be increased by 4. The seller is uninformed about the buyer’s exact 
preferences and he estimates the probability that the buyer is of either type with 0.5 . 
The seller’s costs for each upgrade are 2. There is no discounting between the dates.
We know from Baron and Besanko (1984) that the optimal long term contract in 
the absence of renegotiation is the repetition of the optimal static contract offered 
at every period. Here, the seller should offer a price of 7 at every date and the buyer 
should buy at each date if and only if his valuation is equal to 7. Obviously if this 
price is rejected at date 1, the seller wants to renegotiate and if he cannot commit 
not to do so, he will then offer a price of 4 for the next period. However, in this 
framework, one can still focus on the set of contracts which are never renegotiated. 
For instance, the above contract that stipulates a repetition of the optimal static 
offer can be implemented by considering a mixed strategy for the buyer at date
1. Namely, the low valuation buyer rejects the first upgrade, whereas the high 
valuation buyer mixes between rejecting and accepting it. If, for example, he rejects 
the first upgrade with probability | ,  the seller, after a rejection at date 1, can still 
credibly maintain a high price of 7 at date 2. Nevertheless, this contract might 
not be optimal anymore. Instead, the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in this 
example is such that the first upgrade is sold to both buyer types for a price of 4
Chapter 1. Introduction 34
and the second upgrade is only sold to the high valuation buyer for a price of 7. 
The seller does not learn anything about the buyer’s type from the first contractual 
arrangement and has therefore no incentive to renegotiate the second contract offer. 
Observe, that whatever the preferred contract is, no renegotiation takes place along 
the equilibrium path.
Hence, I have presented two settings where the renegotiation-proofness principle 
holds. One can restrict attention to contracts that are not renegotiated as any 
outcome which is achieved by a contract which is renegotiated can be replicated by 
“bringing backward” , at the time of writing the contract, what renegotiation would 
do.
Consider now a static version of the previous dynamic example: suppose that 
only one upgrade can be sold. When parties meet to bargain over the price, the 
seller makes one single offer after which, if it is rejected, the value of trade decreases 
to zero. In this bargaining game the seller will make a price offer of 7.
Imagine now that the seller can try to alter the status quo of this bargaining 
game by offering an initial contract. Importantly, this contract is vulnerable to 
renegotiation, where renegotiation takes place according to the original bargaining 
game. Hence, if the contract prescribes and inefficient outcome it is subject to ex­
post bargaining. Then, since the price offer of 7 is the optimal static offer for the 
seller, he has no incentive to write such a contract.
This result is in itself trivial but I believe that there are two ways of thinking 
about the implementation of this offer.
In the tradition of the renegotiation-proofness principle, one could say “Suppose 
no contract is written in the beginning, and the seller offers the upgrade for a price 
of 7 in the bargaining game. Instead, one could write an initial contract stipulating 
that the offer of 7 will be made in the bargaining game”. This contract contains the 
renegotiation game and therefore the renegotiation-proofness principle holds.
I would like to argue that this is in contrast to assuming that a contract can be 
renegotiated. Namely, since the seller cannot contractually commit himself to stop
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bargaining as long as there are positive gains from trade and since the value of trade 
only decreases once parties have effectively spent time negotiating, it is impossible 
to circumvent out-of-contract negotiations.
Now, consider an example, in which the second interpretation 12 of the renegotiation- 
proofness principle is violated. Two agents contract over the sale of one unit of a 
good. The buyer is privately informed about his value v and the seller is privately 
informed about his cost c for this good. Both parameters are uniformly distributed 
on the unit interval. We know from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) that the 
second-best solution to this problem involves trade of the good if and only if the 
buyer’s value and the seller’s cost lie at least  ^ apart. This outcome can for example 
be implemented by a double auction as in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). Now 
assume that such an auction can be renegotiated and that at the renegotiation date 
one of the parties, the buyer say, has all the bargaining power. We can reinterpret 
this extension, which has the same timing as the above examples, in the follow­
ing way. The good can be sold at either date 1 or at date 2. At date 0, parties 
can write a contract regulating the date 1 trade, whereas at date 2 the buyer can 
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. First, remark that this two stage procedure, con­
tract-(-renegotiation, cannot mimic the solution of the optimal static mechanism.
To see this, assume that v =  The optimal static mechanism would prevent trade 
regardless of the seller’s cost. But this outcome can never be achieved in the con- 
tract+renegotiation setting, because if no trade occurred at date 1, the buyer would 
make an offer at date 2 and with some probability this offer would be accepted. 
More generally, because we know from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), that the 
contractual outcome of date 1 cannot be ex-post efficient, the buyer will always want 
to make another offer at date 2, a failure of the renegotiation proofness principle?
In the spirit of the renegotiation-proofness principle, interpretation II, the date 
0 contract could already prescribe what is to be done at date 1 and date 2. The 
buyer does not want to renegotiate this outcome if renegotiation can occur between 
dates 1 and 2 and this contract is therefore renegotiation-proof. But the question
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is why parties would ever want to write such a contract at date 0. More precisely, 
since the contract prescriptions for date 2 are not optimal, we cannot interpret this 
two stage contract as arising from an optimization procedure under an additional 
renegotiation-proofness constraint. Instead, the optimal contract arising from such 
an interpretation prescribes no trade at date 1 and the double auction at date 2. It is 
renegotiation-proof, even if renegotiation, in which the buyer has all the bargaining 
power, can occur between the two dates, but it implements a pareto superior outcome 
to the outcome of the above contract-(-renegotiation procedure. Therefore, the set of 
’optimal, two stage, renegotiation-proof’ contracts is larger than the set of ’optimal, 
one stage, renegotiated’ contracts and 12 fails.
Chapter 2 
Am bivalent Investm ent and the  
Hold-up Problem
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies a simple version of the hold-up problem in which the underin­
vestment problem created by the expropriation of investment benefits by the other 
party cannot be alleviated by a contract. That is, investment is unaffected by any 
written ex-ante agreement if contracts are vulnerable to renegotiation.
The reason for this effect is neither the cooperative nature of investment as in 
Che and Hausch (1999), nor the complexity of the trading environment as in Segal 
(1999) and Hart and Moore (1999). Instead, it is due to the fact that investment 
may have a positive as well as a negative effect on the investing party’s payoff. That 
is, I consider purely selfish investment that increases the investing party’s expected 
payoff if an efficient action is undertaken ex-post and decreases her expected payoff 
if an inefficient action is undertaken. Although investment can have both a positive 
and a negative effect it is in fact riskless, provided that parties decide on the ex-post 
efficient action. That they will indeed coordinate on the right action is guaranteed 
by the assumption that there is symmetric information between contracting parties 
throughout. Therefore, it seems puzzling that investment should be unaffected by
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an ex-ante contract.
I call the type of investment considered in this chapter ambivalent Compare this 
with the usual assumption about investment in the incomplete contracting literature. 
In Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999), there is one efficient trading opportunity 
and N  inefficient ones. Investment is selfish and has no effect on the surplus resulting 
from the ex-post inefficient trades, see the next section for a detailed discussion of 
the two papers. In Hart (1995), the efficient action is to trade with a longtime 
contracting partner and the inefficient action is to sell the product on the spot 
market. Here, investment has a smaller but positive benefit if the good is traded on 
the spot market.
In the model of this chapter, one party can make a non contractible investment 
with the described ambivalent effect on her own expected payoff. The parties would 
like to write an ex-ante contract that increases her investment incentives. Because 
investment is non contractible they have to contract on the ex-post action and distri­
bution of surplus. This is only possible to a limited extent though, because it is not 
known ex-ante which action is going to be efficient. Furthermore, this information 
is ex-post non verifiable and the contract must therefore be made contingent on par­
ties’ announcements concerning this information. If parties can commit themselves 
not to renegotiate the contract ex-post, a contract can achieve first-best investment 
incentives. If, on the other hand, parties cannot commit themselves not to renegoti­
ate the contract and if the positive and negative effect of investment on the investing 
party’s payoff balance each other, any contract is a good as no contract.
To better understand the intuition for this result, consider the following example 
of ambivalent investment which is due to Hemingway. He writes in his book, ’Death 
in the afternoon’:
’The chances are that the bullfight ... may not be a good bullfight artistically; 
for that to happen there must be good bullfighters and good bulls; artist bullfighters 
and poor bulls do not make interesting fights, for the bull fighter who has ability to 
do extraordinary things with the bull... will not attempt them with a bull he can not
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depend on to charge; so, if the bulls are bad, that is only vicious rather than brave, 
undependable in their charges, ..., it is best that they be fought by bullfighters with 
knowledge of their profession, integrity, and years of experience rather than artistic 
ability. Such bull fighters will give a competent performance with a difficult bull 
... However, if such a bullfighter ... without either genius or inspiration happens 
to receive in the ring a truly brave bull, one which charges in a straight line, which 
responds to all the cites of the bullfighter, ... and the bullfighter has only bravery 
and honest ability ... and nothing of the wrist magic and aesthetic vision, ... , then 
he fails completely, he gives an undistinguished, honest performance and he goes on 
lower down in the commercial ranking of bullfighting ...’.
In this example, the right match between a bullfighter and a bull produces a 
good fight, whereas the wrong match results in a bad fight. Assume that this effect 
can be measured in monetary terms because a good fight attracts a large crowd. The 
recipient of these monetary benefits is a capitalist who is the owner of the arena. The 
capitalist hires an organizer who is responsible for procuring the bull and engaging a 
matador. In contrast to the capitalist, the organizer is only interested in the private 
benefits he receives from associating with famous bullfighters and in his reputation 
for engaging the most artistic matador. That is, he always prefers to send a great 
bullfighter into the ring. Assume, that the capitalist’s monetary benefits from the 
right match outweigh the private benefits and reputational effects of the organizer, 
so that the efficient action is to match the right pairs of opponents.
Imagine, that the organizer has to invest time and money in the search for a 
good bull. If he manages to find a ’truly brave’ bull, his reputation will be increased 
significantly by sending a great matador into the ring, that is he will benefit from the 
efficient match. In contrast, the organizer’s reputation will be harmed if a mediocre 
bullfighter is engaged, that is he suffers from the inefficient match. This situation is 
reversed if the organizer procures a bad bull. Then, his reputation suffers from the 
efficient match and is enhanced by the inefficient match.
What are the organizer’s incentives to invest effort in the search for a bull? Can
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an ex-ante contract provide him with the right incentives? Assume, that every ex- 
ante contract between the organizer and the owner is open to ex-post renegotiation 
in which the owner has all the bargaining power. Then, the parties’ announcements 
will be independent of the true states of nature, i.e. the type of bull. Namely, the 
owner always wants to claim that a mediocre bullfighter is needed. Either, this is in 
fact the efficient ex-post action or, as this is the organizer’s least preferred option, 
the owner will be able to reap a high benefit from renegotiation. On the other hand, 
the organizer always wants to claim that a great bullfighter is needed because this 
gives him the highest benefits. There is no way in catching any of the two from 
lying.
Ambivalent investments are pervasive in other situations. For example, a phar­
maceutical company could invest in the promotion of a newly discovered chemical 
substance that can be used to create a cheap substitute for an existing drug. If the 
campaign is successful in changing patients’ preferences in favor of the new drug, 
the existing product becomes redundant. If the campaign is unsuccessful, it is not 
worthwhile producing the new drug at all. Another example is the expansion of a 
business project or a production operation. This corresponds to a proportionate in­
crease in revenues if, following the expansion, an efficient project is undertaken but 
also in a proportionate decrease in revenues if an inefficient project is undertaken.
Finally, the result that no contract can improve over the null contract hinges on 
the fact that the investing party’s payoffs from the efficient and inefficient action are 
perfectly negatively correlated. In our bullfighting example this translates into the 
assumption that the organizer’s preference for the famous matador are unaffected 
by the quality of the bull. The second part of this chapter contains a model in 
which payoffs are not perfectly negatively correlated. I show that in such a model, 
contracts have some advantage. Nevertheless, as the correlation tends towards — 1, 
contracts become less and less good in providing the right investment incentives.
The chapter is built as follows. Because my model is very close in structure to 
the model by Hart and Moore (1999), I will explain their model and result in the
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next section. It will become clear that my model is in a sense a simplification of 
their model, I will also discuss the intuition for this. Section 2.3 spells out my model 
in more details and shows that the result that no contract is optimal holds in this 
set-up. Section 2.4 checks for robustness of the result when cost are not perfectly 
negatively correlated and the final section concludes.
2.2 The Hart-M oore M odel
To allow the comparison with the HM model more readily I will repeat their set-up 
and state their main result. I will then explain the difference to my set-up. It will 
be shown that their result follows directly from the change in the set-up without the 
need to resort to a ’complexity’ argument.
Two parties consider a future trade opportunity of one unit of a specific good, 
a widget. The widget’s value v to the buyer is known in advance but its cost 
is uncertain ex-ante. There are two possible cost realizations C\ and C2, where 
ci < c2 < v. This assumption implies in particular that trade is always efficient. At 
an interim stage before the contract is carried out the seller can make a relationship 
specific investment that lowers expected production cost. More specifically, 7r(cr) is 
the probability with which production costs are C\ and 1 — 7r(<r) is the probability 
with which they are c2, where a is the amount of the seller’s investment. It is 
further assumed that 7r'(cr) > 0 for o > 0, 7^ (0) =  oo and 7r"(<r) < 0. To simplify, 
the investment cost is equal to the investment level a. The seller’s investment is 
observed by the buyer but not by outsiders. After the investment, the level of 
production cost is realized and becomes known to both parties.
Also, to capture the idea that it is difficult to contract on the exact nature of the 
good ex ante, there are N —1 other general purpose widgets in addition to the specific 
widget. Neither of these yield a positive surplus if they are traded. The generic 
widgets’ costs are fixed and lie evenly distributed between the specific widget’s low 
and high cost realization C\ and c2. Formally, these costs are Qi =  Ci +  ^ (c2 — C\). For
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simplicity, the generic widgets’ values are set equal to zero, this is not a restrictive 
assumption. What is needed is that the value of a generic widget lies below its cost. 
Remark, that the seller’s investment a only affects the special widget’s cost but not 
the generic widgets’ cost. This assumption will be modified in this chapter.
At the contracting stage it is not known to either of the parties which of the 
overall N  widgets will turn out to be the efficient one. The parties have a uniform 
prior about this event, i.e. each widget has a probability of jj of being the spe­
cial widget. For the remaining N  — 1 widgets the probability of being any of the 
other general purpose widgets is x =  jj. At the same time at which the 
cost realization of the special widget becomes known, both parties observe the true 
configuration of widget types, i.e. there is symmetric information about the nature 
of the N  widgets. Thus, a realization of the state of nature is a tuple (i , r ) where 
i = 1,2 is the possible cost realization of the special widget, and r  is a permutation 
of the numbers 1 to N. There are 2N\ possible states of nature. To clarify the 
assumptions about the various costs and values consider the following graph:
costs of generic widgets
9 l  92  .... 9 n - 2 9 n -  l
—I------- 1------------------------1-------- 1---
0 Cl C2 V
value of generic widgets cost of special widget value of special widget
The timing of the model is the following:
date 0 date 1/2 date 1 date 2 date 3
I------------------- 1------------------- 1------------------- 1------------------- 1
B and S S invests o r  and c* messages renegotiation,
contract realized are sent trade
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The purpose of a contract in this set-up is to ensure the right investment in­
centives. The first-best level of investment, call it a*, is found by maximizing total 
expected surplus, i.e.
o* € argmax ir(o)(v — Ci) 4- (1 — 7r(<r)) (v — C2) — cr. (2.1)a
Rearranging the first order condition of this maximization problem yields
(2-2)
c2 — C1
Second order conditions are satisfied because of the assumed strict concavity of the 
function tt(<t), moreover the solution a* is unique.
If the seller’s investment is not observed by outsiders, a contract can only in­
directly provide him with the right investment incentives. Call the seller’s final 
expected payoff in the low cost state Ilf and in the high cost state Ilf. When choos­
ing a, the seller maximizes the expression
7r(o-)Ilf +  (1 — 7r((j)) I l f  — a.
It follows that a first-best contract must ensure Ilf — Ilf  =  —(C2 — Ci). In fact, 
if parties can commit to a particular contract a very simple contract achieves this 
result. If parties sign a contract that allows the seller to make a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to the buyer at date 3, the seller will indeed invest a* because he is the residual 
claimant of his investment.
The result relies heavily on the fact that there is no further interaction between 
the parties in case the buyer rejects the seller’s take-it-or-leave-it offer. Hart and 
Moore continue in their analysis by assuming that it is impossible for parties to 
commit themselves to a contract. In particular, any inefficient contract outcome is 
subject to further bargaining between the parties. In this bargaining game the buyer 
has all the bargaining power. That is, the buyer reaps the entire surplus from pareto 
improving renegotiation. This assumption dramatically changes the situation. Take 
for example the contract in which the seller is supposed to make a take-it-or-leave-it
Chapter 2. Ambivalent Investment and the Hold-up Problem 44
offer to the buyer. The buyer has the option of rejecting this offer. He then gains all 
the surplus by just offering to pay the seller’s production cost Cj, i = 1,2. Expecting 
this outcome, the seller has no incentive to invest in cost reduction and sets o =  0. 
This is also the outcome after the null contract, i.e. the contract that does not 
specify any contingencies in advance. Under this assumption the authors establish 
their main result
P roposition  2.1 (Hart and Moore) I f  the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate 
a contract, then, as the number of widgets N  tends to infinity, no contract can 
improve the sellers investment incentives over the null contract.
The intuition behind this proposition is the following. A contract has to drive a 
wedge between the seller’s payoff in the high cost and low cost state. Also, because 
Ci and C2 are not directly observable a contract has to provide the right incentives 
to the parties to truthfully reveal the state of nature. Both parties can announce a 
widget configuration r  and a cost realization i. A simple way to parametrize these 
announcements is by asking both parties how much each of the widgets 1 to N  
costs. For example, the claim of (ci, g N - 2 ? 9 n - i )  fu lly  describes the state of
nature in which the first widget is the special widget with cost C\ and the remaining 
2 to N  widgets are the generic widgets with cost g\ to gx-i- Obviously, because 
buyer and seller share the same information, their announcements should coincide in 
equilibrium. If their announcements differ the contract has to be designed carefully 
to punish them. It is here that renegotiation plays a crucial role. Because parties 
are assumed to be able to renegotiate inefficient outcomes, any form of punishment 
that involves large fines to outsiders is automatically voided. Regardless of the 
prescriptions of the contract the sum of the parties final payoffs is always equal to 
the total surplus v — C{.
The situation is especially critical if the two parties’ announcements differ in the 
following way. Assume that the claims are such that for each widget 1 to N  the 
cost attributed to this widget by the seller lies just below the cost attributed to it
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by the buyer. If for example the seller claims that the state is s =  (ci, pi,..., 9n-2, 
gN-i) and the buyer claims that it is s = (pi, p2, •••) 9 n -  i>c2)> the difference that 
each claim imposes on the seller’s cost is exactly C \) . Importantly, if N  goes
to infinity the two states s and s, although they are distinct states of the world, 
become more and more similar in the sense that the seller’s payoff from a physical 
action1 is almost the same in both states. There are two possibilities in the case that 
announcements are as above. Either the buyer is lying or the seller is. Intuitively, 
in the above situation it is difficult to ’catch’ the lying party because state s and s 
are nearly identical.
To see this more precisely consider the following argument. It is crucial to find
an outcome o for any pair of states of nature (s, s) as above, such that the seller
prefers the equilibrium outcome in state s over o, whereas the buyer prefers the
equilibrium outcome in state s over o. That is, o is the punishment outcome if the
seller announces s and the buyer announces s. Formally,
n5(s) >  Us {s,o)
nB(s) > nB(s,o),
where IIs (s) denotes the seller’s equilibrium payoff in state s and n s (s, o) denotes 
his payoff out-of-equilibrium when he announces s instead and outcome o is imple­
mented. IIs (s) and IIB(s, o) are similarly defined for the buyer. Because the buyer’s 
and seller’s payoffs always sum to a constant, one can add these two constraints to 
obtain
ns(s) -  ns(a) > n5(s,0) -  ns(s,o).
From our observation above, if N  is very large, the right hand side is almost 0 
regardless of the choice of the punishment outcome o. In particular, it cannot be 
smaller than — Ci). Because for each state s such as s a matching state s'
such as s can be found, taking expectations over such pairs turns the left hand side 
of this expression into Ilf — Ilf and the proposition follows.
XA physical action is trade of one of the N  widgets.
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Importantly, through the increase in N  the two states s and s become similar in 
the seller’s payoff from any possible action that can be taken. In the next section I 
provide a set-up that directly assumes the existence of two such states.
2.3 A Simplification
The problem is very similar to the one in the preceding Section 2.2. Namely, there 
is a special widget that has either cost C \  or cost and value v , with C \ < c2 < v. 
The seller can invest into cost reduction, i.e. he can make an investment o that 
increases the probability of the low cost state c\. In contrast to the model in Section 
2.2 though, I merely assume that there is one other good, a ‘bad’ widget which 
yields a negative surplus from trade. For simplicity, its value is set equal to 0; again 
the value is known from the outset. The cost structure of the bad widget is the 
same as the cost of the efficient widget, cost can be low, ci, or high, C2, such that 
0 < Ci < C2. Furthermore, it is assumed, that the costs of both widgets are realized 
simultaneously. They are observed by both buyer and seller but not by any outsider.
In order to tie together the two extreme cases in which the right action is very 
beneficial and the wrong action is especially harmful the costs of the two goods are 
negatively correlated. If the good widget is especially cheap to produce, i.e. surplus 
from trade is very large at v — Ci, the bad widget is very expensive and thus trading 
it will result in the largest possible loss of surplus of —C2 and vice versa. To clarify 
the assumptions about the cost structure, consider the following picture:
cost value good widget
C i  V
I II I
0 c 2
value cost bad widget
probability
7r(<T)
cost value good widget
1 /  \  C2 V1 -  n(a) ,--------1--------- - -------- 1
0 ci
value cost bad widget
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What the assumption about negatively correlated cost buys us will become ap­
parent in the following section. If costs are interpreted as a widget’s value to the 
seller a negative correlation is quite plausible. A good’s value is influenced by ex­
ogenous conditions, such as personal tastes, fashion and the good’s resale value in 
a market. These conditions are likely to be determinant for both widgets, where if 
one of them is especially fashionable and therefore preferred by the seller the other 
is likely to be unfashionable and of low value to him.
The information and time structure in the game is as in Section 2.2, namely: Ex- 
ante at date 0, there are two goods, only distinguishable by their physical attributes, 
such as color, size etc. A full description of these attributes is subsumed under a 
name, for example widget X and widget Y. Neither of the contracting parties knows, 
which of the two goods will be the good widget. They have a uniform prior about 
this event, i.e., each widget has a probability of |  of turning out to be either good 
or bad. In other words, there is a probability of  ^ that widget X  has value v and 
widget Thas value 0 and vice versa. Also, costs are unknown. At date 1/2 the seller 
makes his relationship specific investment <r. At date 1, all relevant uncertainty 
is resolved. Both parties observe the configuration of widget types, as well as the 
cost realization. At date 2, messages are sent according to which the outcome 
prescribed by the contract agreed upon at date 0 is determined. Finally, parties 
can renegotiate any remaining inefficiencies before trade at date 3. The bargaining 
game at renegotiation is as in the above section, namely, the buyer makes a take-it- 
or-leave-it offer to the seller.
A state of nature is denoted by sT*, r  =  X , Y, i = 1,2, where the first index 
indicates which of the two widgets, widget X  or widget Y, is the special widget 
and the second index stands for the cost realization of the good widget (which 
simultaneously determines how much the bad widget costs). To summarize, there 
are four possible states of the world:
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state widget X widget Y probability
(value, cost) (value, cost)
sx  1 (v,Cl) (O.ca)
<5X2 (v ,ci) (°>ci) K 1 —
Syi (0,c2) ( v .C l )
SY2 (0, Ci) («> Ca) 5 (1 — 7r(<7))
Observe one important difference between this model and the Hart-Moore model: 
While in their model the seller’s investment does not affect the generic widgets’ cost, 
in this set-up, an increase in o also increases the probability that the bad widget is 
very costly. This is the key assumption of the model.
Because assumptions concerning the special widget are unchanged, the first-best 
level of investment and the seller’s investment in the absence of a contract are exactly 
as in the Hart-Moore model. The first-order condition in (2.2) defines the first-best 
level of investment <7*, whereas the seller’s investment after the null-contract is 
0. The analysis of this set-up proceeds exactly as in the Hart-Moore model. As 
an introduction to the problem I will consider some straightforward contracting 
examples to show that none of them incites the seller to invest a positive amount.
First, take the contract in which the seller can choose a widget which is then 
traded for a fixed price p. In the model of the preceding section, for finite N  this 
contract raises the seller’s investment incentives slightly, because it guarantees a 
difference in his payoff between the high and the low cost state of ~(c2 — Ci). This 
is also the case for the contract in which the buyer is allowed to choose a good. 
In the model of this section, with only two goods but negatively correlated costs, 
these two contracts are worthless. Take the contract in which the seller chooses a 
good. He always chooses the low cost good, regardless of whether it is the good or 
the bad widget. This gives him a payoff of v — ci, because he gains nothing from 
renegotiation. Therefore he has no incentive to invest. For a similar reason the
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contract in which the buyer chooses the widget does not work either. The buyer 
always chooses the more expensive good. If the more expensive good is the special 
widget, there is no further renegotiation, the seller’s payoff is v — C2. If on the other 
hand, the more expensive good is the bad widget the buyer will obtain the good 
widget through renegotiation by asking the seller to pay an additional amount of 
C2 — Ci. The seller is as well off as without renegotiation, he obtains v — C2 in both 
states, which is again independent of his investment level.
Second, consider a specific performance contract in which one widget is desig­
nated ex ante to be traded for a fixed price p. If there are N  goods ex-ante, with 
probability this is the special widget, in which case the seller’s payoff differs from 
the low to the high cost state. If the widget is one of the generic widgets, which 
happens with probability his payoff is independent of his investment. Overall 
this contract raises the seller’s incentives by — C \) . Take now the situation 
with only two goods and negatively correlated cost. The seller’s payoff from trade 
of widget X  for example is
i(7T(<r)(p -  Cl )  +  (1 -  7r((7))(p -  c2)) +  i ( ( l  -  7r(oj)(p  -  Cl) +  ir (o j(p  -  c2))
1 1 
p ~  2Cl ~  2C2’
which is independent of his investment. The first term in the upper equation is his 
expected payoff if widget X  turns out to be the good widget, the second term is his 
payoff when widget X  is the bad widget.
It is very easy to see that this result holds for all possible contracts:
Proposition 2.2 I f  parties cannot commit not to renegotiate, the seller will not 
invest regardless of the contract that they write.
Proof.
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Take the following announcement by the two parties
seller buyer
SX1 SY2
That is, the seller claims that widget X  is the good widget with low cost whereas 
the buyer claims that widget Y  is the good widget with high cost. Remark that 
these announcements imply that B and S attribute the same cost to both ’physical’ 
widgets, namely, both claim that widget X  has cost C\ and widget Y  has cost c2. 
They only disagree on the identity of the special widget. Either the seller is lying 
and the state is indeed S y 2 °r the buyer is and the state is Sxi- A contract should 
ensure that the seller has no incentive in state S y 2 t°  claim that the state is s^i and 
the buyer should have no incentive in state Sx 1 to claim that the state is S y 2 -
In state Sy2, call the seller’s equilibrium payoff p(sy 2 ) — C2, where p(sy2 ) is the 
final payment that the buyer makes to him. It includes the payment prescribed by 
the contract plus the additional payment that the buyer offers for possible renegoti­
ation. As information is symmetric, the good widget is always traded. Similarly the 
buyer obtains v — p(sxi) in equilibrium in state s x i . Assume that after the above 
announcements, the contract prescribes trade of widget X  with probability ax  and 
trade of widget Y  with probability aY. The transfer payment from buyer to seller 
that the contract prescribes is q. For the seller to tell the truth in state S y 2 it must 
be that
P ( s y 2) ~ c 2 > q -  olx C! -  aYc2, 
whereas for the buyer to tell the truth in state s^i R must be that
v  -  p(sx  1) > olx v  + a y (c2 4- v  -  C i)  +  (1  -  a x  -  a Y ) ( v  -  C i)  -  q , 
which is equivalent to
ci -  p(sxi) > OiXCi +  aYc2 -  q.
Together the incentive constraints for seller and buyer imply
\p(sY2 ) ~  c2\ -  b (s*i) “  ci] > (2-3)
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The same reasoning can be applied for the pair of states Syi and Sx2 to obtain
\p{sX2 ) -  c2] -  \p(sYi) ~  Ci] > 0. (2.4)
Adding (2.3) and (2.4) and multiplying this expression by |  shows that the difference 
in the seller’s expected payoff from the high cost states Sx2 and Sy2 to the low cost 
states Sxi and sn  cannot be more than 0. Therefore, the seller has no incentive to 
invest regardless of the choice of the contract.
■
The intuition for this result is the following. For each state in which the special 
widget’s costs are low there is a corresponding state in which its costs are high, 
such that the seller’s payoff in both states from trading either of the widgets X  or 
Y  is the same. Therefore, it is impossible to write a contract in which the seller’s 
equilibrium payoffs in these two states differ.
Remark that Proposition 2.2 does not depend on the assumption that it is only 
possible to trade one good. This assumption on technological feasibility is the driving 
force in the HM model. In their model, if all goods could be traded simultaneously, a 
contract prescribing trade of all goods would achieve first-best investment incentives. 
In the present model, a contract that forces trade of both widget X  and widget Y  is 
as good as no contract.
The crucial assumption is the negative correlation of the good and bad widget’s 
cost. To see, how the result is changed when cost are positively correlated for 
example, consider the specific performance contract that enforces trade of widget X. 
The seller’s payoff from such a contract would be
|(7r((T)(p -  Cj) +  (1 -  7r(<7))(p -  c2)) +  i(7r(oj(p -  Cj) +  (1 -  7r(<7))(p -  c2))
p -  7r(tr)ci -  (1 -  7r(ff))c2
and this contract would be first-best. The next section shows that if we take some 
negative cost correlation between the two goods’ cost which approaches —1, all 
contracts approach the null-contract.
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2.4 Imperfect Correlation
Take the model in which the good and bad widget’s costs are not perfectly negatively 
correlated. With probability k  costs are the same for both widgets, with probability 
1 —  k  costs are different. The probability that the good widget’s costs are low at C\ 
is 7r(<r), high costs C2 occur with probability 1 — 7r(o'). There are 8 possible states of 
nature s Ti j , t  = X ,Y , i , j  = 1,2. Here, r  indicates which of the two widgets is the 
special one, i stands for the cost realization of the G widget, j  stands for the cost 
realization of the B  widget. The table of states is
s ta te w idge t  X w idget Y probability
(value, cost) (value, cost)
s x  11 (v,ci) (0, ci) lkir(a)
SX12 (” ><*) (0,c2) 1(1  -  k)7T(<7)
SX21 (v,c2) (0,ci) l ( i  -  fc )(l -  7r((T))
SX22 {v,c2) (0,c2) l f c ( l  -  7t(ct))
Syn (0 ,c0 K c i) lfc7r(<7)
Syi2 (0 ,c2) ( v , C i ) 1(1  -  k)n(a)
SY 21 (0, Ci) {v, C2) | ( 1 - fc) ( 1 - 7r(<:r) )
SY22 (0,c2) {v, c2) l f c ( l  -  tt(o-))
The correlation coefficient is corr(G.B) =  r -   2k) ..... = where
V ’ '  >/ 7 r ( l - 7 r ) - s/ 7 r ( l - 7 r ) ( l - 2 f c ) 2 + * : ( l - f c )  ’
the dependency of 7T on a  has been suppressed. Obviously, if k  =  1, costs are 
positively correlated, if Ac =  0 cost are negatively correlated. If 0 < k  < 1, the 
correlation is as in the following graph:
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Coefficient of Correlation for 7r(cr) =  0.9
The following can be shown
Proposition  2.3 I fk  approaches 0, that is, costs become more negatively correlated, 
all contracts approach the null contract.
Proof.
Following the proof of Proposition 2.2, the same argument can be applied to the 
pairs of states (sxi2,Sy2i) and (syi2,sx 2i) to show that \p(sY2 i)-C 2]-\p(sxn)-C i] > 
0 and \p(sx21) ~ c2] — [p(syi2) — Ci] > 0. To conclude the proof, the remaining states 
must be paired in the following way: (s^n, Sy22>) and (sy 11, 5x 22)- For the first pair 
the set of incentive constraints is
p{sY2 2 ) ~  c2 > q  -  olx c 2 -  aYc2
and
ci -  p(sxn) > olx C! 4- a YCi -  q.
Making the right-hand-side as big as possible involves setting ax — 1 for example, 
which gives
\p(sY2 2 ) ~  c2] -  \p(sXn) ~  ci] > (c2 -  Ci).
The same applies for the second pair of states. Conditional on the cost of the good 
widget being c2 (ci), the probability of states Sy2 i and Sx21 («xi2 and Syi2) is |( 1 —k) 
and the probability of states sy 2 2 and Sx2 2 (syii and «xn) is 2 *^
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Then, weighting the above expressions by the probabilities with which these 
states occur and adding the incentive constraints implies
nf -  nf > - k ( c 2 -  c i ) .
The smaller k, that is, the more negatively correlated the good and the bad widget’s 
cost, the smaller is the gain from a contract. ■
The probability that the two goods have the same costs is k. In these states 
a contract can raise investment incentives over the null contract. With probability 
1—k, costs for the two goods differ and no contract can provide investment incentives. 
Intuitively therefore, the larger k the better a contract performs, the smaller k , the 
more useless it becomes.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that in a specific trading environment in which investment 
can raise the surplus of a future transaction, contracts cannot improve investment 
incentives. The specificity of the trading environment is that each state of nature 
must have a ’mirror’ image. That is, for each state of nature there must exist a 
second state in which the investing party’s payoff from every action is the same, but 
where each action results in a different payoff to the non-investing party. This makes 
it impossible for a contract to effectively distinguish these two states of nature. If 
the party that does not invest has all the bargaining power at renegotiation, it is 
impossible for a contract to make the investing party’s payoff dependent on the 
realization of cost. Therefore, beneficial investment will not be undertaken.
Chapter 3
Incom plete Contracts and 
Inefficient R enegotiation
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, asymmetric information concerning the cost variable is introduced 
into the model of chapter 2. I abstract from the investment problem considered 
in the preceding chapter and concentrate solely on the inefficiency created in the 
buyer-seller model through asymmetric information. The goods’ values, i.e. the 
widgets’ types, remain symmetric information between both parties.
In the resulting model, contracting parties face an implementation problem that 
has both an aspect of asymmetric and symmetric information. In addition, due 
to the asymmetric information aspect, the renegotiation game is inefficient. This 
is one of the first models that studies inefficient ex-post renegotiation. Also, the 
joint aspect of symmetric and asymmetric information is new in an implementation 
problem.
The motivation for the analysis is to extend the foundation literature that is 
based on ex-post contract renegotiation into asymmetric information problems. As 
already noted in the introduction, it is not clear how far renegotiation, so powerful in 
symmetric information environments, can take us here. On the one hand, a contract
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has more power because parties expect to obtain less through inefficient renegotia­
tion. On the other hand, a contract is weaker because the privately informed party 
has to be given an information rent and parties’ announcements cannot be cross 
checked against each other. Potentially, these two effects could tilt the balance 
either in favor or against contingent contracts.
The main intuition that I try to capture is that contracts might be costly because 
they introduce inflexibility into the ex-post bargaining game. More precisely, under 
asymmetric information a formal contract may lead to an inefficient outcome that 
needs to be ’’undone” through ex post bargaining. Because with the information 
friction bargaining is inefficient, parties can get locked into the contractually speci­
fied inefficient outcome. Parties may therefore prefer to leave contracts incomplete 
because this provides a more flexible basis on which to conduct future business.
As an example of this type of lock-in effect consider the contract between General 
Motors and Fisher in 1919 (see Klein (1992)). The two parties wrote an exclusive 
dealing contract with a pre-specified price equal to variable cost plus a mark up. 
This exclusive dealing contract was in fact used by Fisher to ’hold-up’ General 
Motors, taking advantage of the mark-up by adopting an inefficient, highly labor 
intensive technology and by refusing to locate its body-production plants adjacent 
to General Motors assembly plants. Thus, the contract resulted in a dissipation of 
real resources before General Motors was convinced to renege on the initial agree­
ment. One possible explanation for the inefficiency of the renegotiation process is 
asymmetric information.
The above argument raises the question of why parties would ever want to com­
mit to a detrimental outcome. One possible answer is that parties may simply be 
incapable of foreseeing all future consequences of their actions. This implies that 
they might find themselves in situations where their contractual agreement is no 
longer optimal and they try to renegotiate. But Maskin and Tirole (1999) show 
that most models in the contracting literature, incomplete contracting models in 
particular, are incompatible with the assumption of unforeseen contingencies.
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The approach adopted in this chapter proposes a different explanation for con­
tractual lock-in effects. At the date at which the contract is enforced all relevant 
information is known to at least one of the parties but it is unknown to outsiders. 
Therefore, a contract has to be designed to incite truthful revelation of this informa­
tion. This introduces incentive considerations which will force parties to commit to 
a detrimental action on the equilibrium path. Ex-post renegotiation is then about 
undoing this negative outcome, which due to asymmetric information is not always 
feasible. On the other hand, not writing a contract leads to some surplus not being 
realized because of asymmetric information. Therefore a contract has some benefit 
(more trade of the good widget) and cost (trade of the bad widget).
Incentive considerations concern the seller’s costs and the widget’s types. The 
seller alone knows the costs whereas both parties know the widget configuration. 
The interplay between these two types of constraints constitutes the main analysis.
Revelation of the asymmetric information parameter, the widgets’ costs, implies 
very stringent conditions for the contract (Lemma 3.2), which interfere with the 
incentive constraints imposed by the revelation of the goods’ types, similarly as in 
the model of the preceding chapter. But the former constraints are stronger, i.e. a 
contract is weaker, in the asymmetric information context. Consequently one result 
of the model (Lemma 3.3) is that truthful revelation of the cost parameter cannot be 
achieved. This implies that for any contract the ensuing renegotiation will happen 
under asymmetric information. But also the position of a contract is stronger in the 
asymmetric information context, because the uninformed party, the buyer, is at a 
disadvantage in the renegotiation stage. It is thus easier for a contract to satisfy his 
incentive constraints with respect to the truthful revelation of the goods’ types.
As noted above, these two forces could tilt the balance either towards or against 
contracting. But it turns out that there is no trade-off in this model. Generically, 
parties do write a contract that produces the kind of lock-in effect described above. 
So the cost of contracting is always smaller than the benefit. Only if the negative 
impact of the lock-in effect is very close to the positive effects of contractual com­
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mitment does the benefit of a contract vanish to zero. Therefore, one important 
implication of the model is that asymmetric information reinforces the position of 
complete contracting in the presence of ex-post renegotiation.
Second, the way renegotiation is modelled in this chapter makes it impossible 
to include the renegotiation game into the contract. The interplay of the incentive 
constraints implies that a contract is not ex-post efficient, similar to the result in 
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), and cannot separate cost types. Also, due to the 
nature of the assumed ex-post bargaining game, there is separation of cost types 
at renegotiation. Then, because all contractual inefficiencies are subject to ex-post 
renegotiation, parties will make use of renegotiation in equilibrium.
There is ample literature on contracting with asymmetric information and rene­
gotiation. The first articles on renegotiation in dynamic contracting environments 
with adverse selection are Hart and Moore (1988) and Maskin and Moore (1999). In 
these papers renegotiation can occur before parties exchange messages, whereas in 
the model of this chapter renegotiation occurs after messages have been exchanged. 
The papers by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Matthews (1995) study renegotia­
tion in a static moral hazard problem. Renegotiation occurs after the unobservable 
effort has been chosen by the agent, but before the outcome has been realized. 
In Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), the principal offers a menu of renegotiation-proof 
contracts (one for each effort level). The authors argue in favor of contracts that 
are renegotiated as they guarantee uniqueness of a particularly desirable equilib­
rium. Matthews (1995) studies a similar set-up but concentrates on the emergence 
of straightforward sale contracts which are renegotiated in equilibrium. Menus of 
contracts are ruled out a priori due to complexity considerations. The papers most 
closely related are Beaudry and Poitevin (1993) and (1995). They study adverse 
selection problems (signalling and screening) in which principals can solicit further 
contracts after the first contract has been signed. Importantly, there is potentially 
an infinite round of renegotiation before the initial contract is carried out. In these 
contexts, the authors show that separation of types is achievable with an initial
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contract. The equilibrium is less efficient than if no renegotiation is allowed.
The following section introduces the model. Section 3.3.1 solves for the parties’ 
strategies in the renegotiation game. Some simple contracting examples are con­
sidered in Section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 contains the main derivations. Section 3.4 
summarizes the main results and contains a discussion. Section 3.5 provides the 
proofs of Lemmata 3.4 and 3.5.
3.2 The M odel
The set-up is similar to the set-up of Section 2.3 in the preceding chapter, differing 
from it only in so far as I consider an asymmetric information problem. Therefore, 
I drop the assumption that the seller can make an investment in cost reduction but 
introduce the assumption that only the seller can observe the final realization of 
cost. The widget configuration on the other hand, is still observed by both parties. 
The cost of the good widget can be either low at C\ or high at C2, these two events 
occurring with the respective probabilities 7r and 1 — 7T. The value of the good widget 
is v and both cost realizations lie below the value. Costs of the bad widget are also 
either low or high, where the realizations are tied with the cost realizations of the 
good widget. That is, I only consider the case of perfectly negatively correlated cost. 
Therefore, the probability that the bad widget costs Ci is 1 — 7r, the probability that 
it costs C2 is 7r. Its value is fixed at 0.
The existence of two different goods in the model captures the idea that there 
are benefits and costs from acting. Namely, the benefits stem from trading the good 
widget which raises surplus, the cost come from exchanging the wrong widget which 
results in a loss of surplus. Therefore, a contract will have to be designed carefully 
as to ensure that the correct action is taken.
The time structure is as in the model of the last chapter except for the investment 
stage:
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date 0 date 1 date 2 date 3
B and S r  and c* messages renegotiation,
contract realized are sent trade
The information among the involved parties is as follows. At date 1, all relevant 
uncertainty is resolved. I assume that both parties observe the configuration of 
widget types, so that there is symmetric information about the nature of the 2 
widgets. On the other hand the cost of the two goods are observed only by the 
seller, i.e. there is asymmetric information on the cost parameter.
It seems plausible that two partners in a relationship know the general direction 
of their common activity and therefore agree on the surplus maximizing action. In 
this model, the two parties agree on the type of widget that they want to trade. 
Nevertheless, the exact size of total surplus might not necessarily be known. In 
particular, the value to the buyer and the cost to the seller could well be private 
information of the concerned party only. In this set-up I simplify by assuming that 
only the costs are private information. Making also the value to the buyer uncertain 
and private information would not alter the general conclusions1. Nevertheless, as 
is common in most contracting models, outsiders have no information about the 
realization of either r  or c.
Call a state of nature sTi. As in the preceding chapter, r  =  X ,Y  indicates which 
of the two goods is the special widget, i stands for the cost realization of the special 
widget. For a full list of all possible states of nature consider Figure 1 of chapter 2. 
A contract written at date 0 can only be made indirectly contingent on the seller’s 
and buyer’s information. Remark, that, given the described information structure, 
the seller knows the whole state sT*, whereas the buyer can only observe part of it.
XA further discussion on the implication of the assumption that the widget configuration is 
symmetric information can be found in Section 3.4.
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With a slight abuse of notation I will call the buyer’s information sT. As the cost 
configuration i is private information to the seller, it will be identified with his type.
The problem I want to solve is whether trade of the special widget can be achieved 
in all four states of the world. Without going into details at that stage, observe that 
if parties can be made to truthfully reveal the widget configuration a contract could 
in principle achieve this goal2. Revelation of costs, on the other hand, is not a 
priori important. Finally, in what follows I will be only concerned with incentive 
constraints that a contract has to fulfill. An optimal contract is therefore a contract 
that maximizes total surplus.
3.2 .1  R en eg o tia tio n
Because the model in this chapter is a contracting problem with both asymmetric 
and symmetric information I want to discuss the assumption of possible contract 
renegotiation at this point.
It seems plausible to assume that parties meet after the date at which they 
have exchanged messages and renegotiate any ex-post inefficient outcome. It is well 
known from implementation theory that, if arbitrarily large punishments off the 
equilibrium path are allowed and parties have to strictly abide to the contract’s 
rules, nearly everything can be implemented. In particular, if in the current set-up 
both the buyer and the seller were asked to specify the type configuration and high 
punishments were levied on them in the case of disagreement, it would be very easy 
to enforce the first-best. But, given that the parties can not be prevented from 
communicating with each other after the mechanism has been played, they would 
not abide to it’s prescriptions if there is room for pareto improvement. Then, as 
agents know that inefficient outcomes will be renegotiated to a pareto superior one, 
to employ these kinds of punishments becomes impossible.
This line of thought has been mainly explored within implementation problems
2 A  fixed price sale contract of the good widget is one possibility.
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under symmetric information. To admit renegotiation in this context makes a lot 
of sense. In addition to the argument outlined above, renegotiation in symmetric 
information environments achieves pareto efficiency. It will not leave any surplus 
unexploited. This means that renegotiation does not need to be modelled explicitly. 
Any additional surplus realized through the renegotiation process is split between 
the involved parties according to an exogenously given fraction (A, 1 — A), indicating 
the parties’ respective bargaining power. Thus, renegotiation can be seen as a 
cooperative game played after the mechanism has been carried out. The mechanism 
only serves as a status quo point from which parties move forwards. The two most 
important papers in this area are Hart and Moore (1988) and Maskin and Moore 
(1999).
Another strand of literature has been concerned with how the introduction of 
renegotiation into a dynamic game under asymmetric information changes the form 
of an optimal long term contract and information disclosure over time. Here rene­
gotiation at the end of period t is over those terms in the contract that regulate the 
relationship in future time periods, t 4-1, £4- 2 ,.. .  etc., but not over the outcome 
of the contract in period t itself. The first paper to study this issue is Dewatripont 
(1989).
The model in this chapter departs from both approaches in so far as it consid­
ers renegotiation of a contract under asymmetric information in what is basically 
a static game. The major departure from renegotiation in symmetric information 
environment is that agents are not necessarily able to achieve a pareto efficient 
outcome. In comparison with common models of contract renegotiation in asym­
metric information environments two things can be said. First, the usual ratchet 
effect and slow information revelation is observed as well. That is, although there is 
no discount factor which discounts payoffs from different dates in the model, some 
trade is concluded through the initial contract, some only through renegotiation. 
Second, in contrast to other models, in this static model renegotiation occurs on 
the equilibrium-path. That is, no contract is renegotiation-proof. This result is
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discussed at length in the introduction and conclusion.
The renegotiation game considered is as in the preceding chapter. It consists of 
one stage in which one of the parties can make an offer to the other party who can 
accept or reject it. To exploit possible inefficiencies arising from the absence of a 
contract it is the uninformed party who makes the offer, i.e., the buyer is assumed 
to be having all the bargaining power.
3.3 Analysis
Because this is a model of contracting under asymmetric information and ex-post 
renegotiation, we need to separate the parties’ behavior under the contract, i.e. at 
the message sending stage (date 2), and at the ex-post bargaining game (date 3). 
The buyer’s strategy in the overall game is a message concerning r  at date 2 and a 
renegotiation offer at date 3. The seller’s strategy in the overall game is a message 
concerning i and r  at date 2 paired with either the rejection or the acceptance 
of the buyer’s renegotiation offer at date 3. The player’s strategy at date 2 will 
be explained in more details when I turn to the analysis of general mechanisms in 
section (3.3.3). The next section deals with the analysis of the renegotiation game.
3 .3 .1  T h e  R en eg o tia tio n  G am e
After parties’ have exchanged messages and the outcome of a contract has been de­
termined, the buyer can make a final take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller to overcome 
remaining inefficiencies. Bargaining takes place under asymmetric information over 
the widgets’s costs and symmetric information over the widgets’ types.
There are two possible types of inefficiencies at that stage. First, the outcome 
of the contract is no trade, i.e. trade of the good widget has not been concluded. 
Second, the contract prescribes trade of the bad widget. In the first instance, renego­
tiation is only about concluding the efficient trade. The buyer must decide between 
offering a price q o  for the good widget of either C\  or c<i. In the second case, in ad­
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dition to bargaining about the price of the good widget, the buyer will try to undo 
the bad trade. The optimal solution for the buyer for these a priori mierdependent 
problems is a direct revelation mechanism. The mechanism, conditional on the 
seller’s type announcement, prescribes a probability of trading the good widget and 
a probability of returning the bad widget together with a transfer payment from the 
buyer to the seller. In fact, the outcome of the optimal revelation mechanism can be 
implemented more easily. The buyer makes two independent price offers, qc for the 
good widget and qB for the bad widget, after which the seller chooses if he wants 
to sell the good widget at price qo and if he wants to ’buy back’ the bad widget at 
price qB. The seller’s decisions on these two offers are independent as well. This 
result is a direct implication of the assumption that technically, simultaneous trade 
of both widgets is feasible.
To prove this formally, some notation is needed. As the buyer’s beliefs about the 
seller’s type is influenced by the seller’s message at the message sending stage, call 
p the updated probability that the seller is of type 1, i.e. has low cost for the good 
widget. Symmetrically, 1 — p  is the probability that he is of type 2. The dependance 
of this probability on the seller’s equilibrium strategy at the message sending stage 
will be detailed in section 3.3.3, when general mechanisms are considered.
The above discussion is summarized in the following Lemma.
Lem m a 3.1 I f  the status quo of the ex-post bargaining game is no trade, the buyer 
will offer a price qc for the good widget. This offer can be rejected or accepted by 
the seller. I f  the status quo is trade of the bad widget, the buyer will in addition ask 
a price qB for the bad widget. The seller decides independently on the two offers. 
He can either accept both offers, reject both offers or accept only one of them. The 
renegotiation offers can be classified according to the size of p.
• I f  p < the buyer sets qo = c<i and both seller types agree to trade. I f
M the buyer offers to purchase the good widget at a price of qc = c\.
This offer is only accepted by the type 1 seller.
Chapter 3. Incomplete Contracts and Inefficient Renegotiation 65
• I f  fi < the buyer returns the bad widget to both seller types for a payment 
° f 9b =  ci. I f p > £L, the buyer asks qs =  c2 for the return of the bad widget.
C 2
This offer is only accepted by the type 1 seller.
Proof. The claim is trivial if the status quo is no trade.
If the bad widget is traded under the contract, the buyer solves the following 
constrained maximization problem at renegotiation:
max m(0i(u — gf) + y>\bi) 4- (1 — p)((f)2(v — <72) +  <^ 2^ 2) s.t.
\<Pif<Pi>9i^ i)i=l,2
(T)
<t>i{gi -  Cl)  +  ^ i ( c 2 -  bi) >  4>2(g2 -  Ci) +  (p2(c2 -  b2) ( I C 1 )
$ 2(92 — c2) +  Vp2 (c l ~  ^2 ) >  0l(<7l — c 2) +  ¥> l(c i — bi)  ( I C 2 )
-  Ci) + Wife -  bi) > 0
where for seller type i = 1,2, 0* is the probability that the seller has to provide the 
good widget, for which he is paid gi, and (fi is the probability that the bad widget 
is returned to the seller (or not produced by the seller), for which he has to pay 
b{. The index i is the screening parameter, i.e. the seller self selects his intended 
renegotiation offer. (IC1) and (IC2) ensure that he has no incentive to select the 
wrong proposal.
Using a standard argument we can dispense with IR1, the individual rational­
ity constraint of type 1: the right-hand-side of the IC 1-constraint is larger than 
the left-hand-side of the IR2-constraint and thus by ensuring IC1 and IR2, IR1 is 
automatically fulfilled. Similarly, we can ignore IC2, the incentive compatibility 
constraint of type 2, and solve for the parameters when IC1 and IR2 are binding. If 
IR2 is not binding, we can simply lower g2 or raise b2 which does not interfere with 
IC1. Equally, if IC1 is slack, we can lower g\ or raise &i without violating IR2. The 
objective function then becomes
<t>ip(y -  cf) +  (p!iic2 +  (j>2(v -  c2 -  p(v -  Ci)) +  y 2{ c i - p c 2) (3.1)
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From (3.1), the buyer’s decision on the good and the bad widget are independent of 
each other. The first two terms in (3.1) are positive and (p\ and (f)i are optimally set 
to 1 independent of the buyer’s beliefs. In contrast, the solutions for (j)2 and <f2 and 
the payments and bi between buyer and seller do depend on the buyer’s beliefs. 
In particular, the solutions for (j)2 and p>2 are set equal to either 1 or 0, depending 
on whether the last terms in expression (3.1) are positive or negative. The transfer 
payments are found by substituting (fi and fa into IC1 and IR2. ■
The offers detailed in Lemma 3.1 can result in four possible different outcomes 
of the renegotiation game. First, the seller accepts both prices and the outcome 
is first-best, that is, the good widget is sold to the buyer and the bad widget is 
returned to the seller. Second, the seller accepts only the price of the good widget, 
in which case both widgets become the buyer’s property. Third, the seller accepts 
only the bad widget’s price, in which case, the bad widget is returned but the good 
widget is not traded. The second and third alternative are mutually exclusive, i.e. 
their existence depends on the parameter configuration of the model. Finally, the 
seller rejects both prices, in which case the good widget is not traded and the bad 
widget remains the property of the buyer. This is the worst outcome.
D efinition 3.1 There are three types of renegotiation offers
(a) A type (a) renegotiation offer is such that qG = c2 and qs =  Ci. It is made if 
m i n [ ^ , ^ l  > a.
l u  — Cl  ’ C 2 J “
(b) Two mutually exclusive cases must be distinguished
(bi) This case applies if v — C2 > c\. A type (hi) renegotiation offer is such
that qG = qB — c 2 • It is made if > p >
(bii) This case applies if  v — C2 < C\. A type (hii) renegotiation offer is such
that qG = qB = c 1 • It is made if  ^  > p  > •
(c) A type (c) renegotiation offer is such that qG =  c\ and qs = c2 • It is made if 
ll > m a x [ ^ , H
“  —  Lu —c i  ’ C2 1
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The buyer’s offers are ranked in order of increasing efficiency. A type (a) rene­
gotiation offer is fully efficient, whereas a type (c) offer is the most inefficient.
With no contract in place, the buyer’s ex-post belief coincides with the initial 
probability distribution on seller types, i.e. p  =  7r. In order to exclude the trivial 
case, where there is no need for a contract because ex-post bargaining achieves 
efficiency, I will make the following additional assumption:
A ssum ption 3.1 7r >
Because we are interested in finding a situation in which contracting can be 
harmful and produce lock-in effects which are not reneged upon, we need to exclude 
the possibility that bad trade is always undone by the ex-post bargaining game. 
This motivates the following assumption.
A ssum ption 3.2 7r >r  C2
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 imply that for the initial belief the renegotiation game 
is of type (c), i.e. the most inefficient one.
In light of Assumption 3.1, let us reconsider the assumed bargaining procedure. 
As much of what is to come depends on the assumption that the buyer can only make 
a take-it-or-leave-it offer at the renegotiation stage, it is important to investigate 
this assumption further. Clearly, as the model contains only one-sided asymmetric 
information, the seller’s information could be exploited by making him an active 
player in the renegotiation game which would increase efficiency. In fact, if the 
seller was allowed to make the offer, he would offer to sell the good widget for 
a price of v, which would be accepted by the buyer and the first-best could be 
achieved. But then, the contracting problem would be void and the null contract 
would trivially be the (weakly) preferred alternative. This result extends to a more 
general split of bargaining power such as (A, 1 — A), where this notation means that 
with probability A the seller makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer and with probability 
1 — A the buyer makes the offer. As long as A < 1, the null contract remains the
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optimal contract under the given restrictions on the parameter space. Moreover, 
the described lock-in effects can still be found. What cannot be allowed, is for 
parties to design their renegotiation game as part of a contract3. In that sense the 
assumption about renegotiation is restrictive. What I have in mind is a situation, 
where a contract can design outcomes in a formal meeting such as a trial in court, 
but an informal meeting between the two parties afterwards cannot be prevented 
and cannot be subject to any form of ex-ante agreement. Then, even in this simple 
situation of one-sided-asymmetric information there is potential for inefficiencies, as 
long as the uninformed party is involved in the bargaining.
Similarly, in light of Assumption 3.2, let us reconsider the assumption about 
negatively correlated cost. If instead costs are perfectly correlated, i.e. the good 
and bad widget are either both cheap or both expensive, an easy first-best solution 
to the contracting problem exists. A fixed price sales contract of either of the two 
widgets X  or Y  achieves efficiency. If the traded widget turns out to be the good 
one, there will be no further renegotiation and ex-post surplus is maximized. If it 
turns out to be the bad widget the buyer will simply offer to exchange the two goods 
without any further payments. As the two goods are equally valuable to the seller 
he will agree. The bad trade is undone and at the same time the efficient trade is 
undertaken.
3 .3 .2  S om e C ontract E xam p les
The above section establishes that the absence of a contract involves an efficiency 
loss because the good widget is not traded in all states of the world. Similarly, 
surplus can be lost by a contract that enforces harmful trade. To better understand 
this trade-off, I will describe three contracting examples. These contracts highlight
3The effect of renegotiation design on a contractual solution to the hold-up problem has been 
studied by Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994). The authors show that, if a contract can monitor 
renegotiation by assigning bargaining power to one of the agents and specifying default options in 
the event that renegotiation breaks down, contracts can in general solve the hold-up problem.
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various results that will be established in greater generality in the following section.
Contract 1: A possible simple contract specifies the trade of widget X  for a fixed 
price of p. This contract will raise surplus if widget X  turns out to be the good 
widget and will decrease surplus if it turns out to be the bad widget. According to 
Lemma 3.1 this contract only affects joint surplus in the states sT2, t  =  X ,Y , where 
each occurs with probability |(1  — 7r). In state Sx2> X  is the good widget and costs 
C2, in which case the contract raises efficiency by v — c2. In state Sy2 i X  is the bad 
widget and costs Ci, in which case the bad trade is not undone by the renegotiation 
game and C\ of the total surplus is lost. Therefore, the contract affects total surplus
by
1(1 -  n)(v -  ct) -  1(1 -  tt)ci.
Clearly, it depends on the sign of v — C2 — c\  whether this contract will be chosen 
over the null contract. Namely, if the change in surplus is greater than zero this 
contract performs better in expected terms than the null contract, if it is smaller 
than or equal to zero this contract does worse.
Contract 1 is the first example of a contract with a lock-in-effect. The bad 
widget is traded on the equilibrium-path and this trade cannot be reversed by ex­
post bargaining, given the constraint of asymmetric information. It can be shown 
(Lemma 3.5) that the optimal contract has the same feature as long as v — C2 > C\. 
Intuitively, the increase in surplus from the good trade outweighs the decrease in 
surplus from the bad trade
Contract 2: Let us examine a contract in which the buyer is allowed to choose a 
widget for trade at a fixed price of p. If he chooses the good widget he will obtain 
a payoff of v — p, if he chooses the bad one, given the analysis in section 3.3.1 and 
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, he will obtain 7r(u +  C2 — Cj) — p : Under the contract he 
pays p for a widget with no value to him. At the renegotiation stage, he offers to 
sell the bad widget back to the seller for a price of C2 and to buy the good widget for 
a price of C\. Thus, he offers to exchange goods for a negative payment of (C2 — Cx).
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Only a type 1 seller accepts. For this contract to fail, we need the assumption that 
A ssum ption 3.3 7r > — JLr~
r  V  — C 1 + C 2
Contract 2 highlights a second aspect of the model. If the probability 7r of low cost 
for the good widget is very high, the buyer has a strong position at the renegotiation 
stage. He expects to obtain the good widget at a low price and to eventually resell 
the bad widget at a high price. Reaching an agreement under a contract is therefore 
of little interest to him. A slightly stronger version of Assumption 3.3 implies in 
particular, that no contract can have a fully separating equilibrium (Lemma 3.3).
Contract 3: As a last example I want to consider a contract that gives the seller 
the right to pick a widget. This is a signalling game in which the seller’s choice 
under the contract signals his type to the buyer4. First notice, that a type 2 seller 
would never choose the good widget. This would result in a payoff of p — c2 to him. 
But he does better by picking the cheap bad widget which costs only C\ regardless 
of the renegotiation offer by the buyer. Consider now a type 1 seller: Should he 
pick the good widget which is cheap or the more expensive bad widget? Remark, 
that choosing the good widget implies a separating equilibrium whereas choosing 
the bad widget would mean that the equilibrium involves pooling.
In a separating equilibrium, the buyer would correctly infer the seller’s type 
from the latter’s behavior at date 2 and adjust his renegotiation offer accordingly. 
Observing the seller select the bad widget the buyer would conclude that the seller 
is of type 2 and offer to exchange widgets for a payment of c<i — C\. But then a 
type 1 seller would obtain a payoff of (p — c2) +  (c2 — Ci) +  (C2 — Cj) if he mimicked 
the equilibrium behavior of type 2. The first term is the seller’s payoff under the
4The underlying assumption is that both the buyer and the seller are present at the revelation 
stage. This implies that the buyer observes the seller’s strategy at date 2. The situation can be 
thought of as a trial in court as opposed to an anonymous revelation procedure where each party 
sends unobservable messages to a social planner. A discussion of this assumption can be found in 
Section 3.4
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contract itself, the second term is the cost saving that will result from exchanging the 
relatively more expensive bad widget against the cheap good widget at renegotiation, 
the third is the additional payment he receives from the buyer at renegotiation. This 
total payoff is obviously greater than p — Ci, his own equilibrium payoff. Thus, a 
fully separating equilibrium does not exist in this game.
A pooling equilibrium in which both seller types choose the same widget is 
equally infeasible. The only candidate for a pooling equilibrium is the one in which 
both seller types choose the bad widget. Now, in a pooling equilibrium the buyer 
does not update his beliefs and his renegotiation offer will consequently be of type
(c). A type 1 seller choosing the bad widget will thus receive a payoff of p — c<i as he 
will reject the unfavorable renegotiation offer at the renegotiation stage. As trading 
the good widget will give him an overall payoff of p — c\ he will prefer to do so.
In fact, a range of semi-separating equilibria exists in this game, in which the 
type 1 seller mixes between choosing the good and the bad widget. Depending on the 
parameter configuration of benefits and costs of trade (u, c*, i = 1, 2) this contract 
will be either better than or equivalent to the null contract. I will not expand upon 
this point further but rather consider general mechanisms in the next section.
Contract 3 is illustrative of several results that will be obtained for general con­
tracts. First, it highlights the fact that cost separation is impossible in this model. 
In a separating equilibrium a type 1 seller gains too much from imitating a type 2 
seller’s equilibrium strategy. Second, only semi-separating equilibria exist.
3 .3 .3  R ev e la tio n  M ech an ism s
Now consider the question of general contracts more formally. In a revelation mech­
anism the seller announces sTi and the buyer announces sT after which a contract 
specifies an action and some money transfer. If parties agree on r 5, let $  be the 
probability that the good widget (widget r) is traded if the seller has announced
5We will also refer to this situation as on-the-equilibrium-path.
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type sTj. Similarly, let a* be the probability that the bad widget is traded and call 
Pi the transfer from buyer to seller. If parties disagree on r , i.e., we are off-the- 
equilibrium-path, let 7* be the probability that the widget the buyer claims to be 
the efficient one is traded. Define 7? in a similar way and let g* be the transfer 
payment. The contract is dependent on the seller’s announcement i about cost, but 
dependency on the announcement r  is suppressed. This is without loss of gener­
ality as taking expectations over the states sTi , r  =  X , Y ,  which occur with equal 
probability, eliminates any possible dependency. To summarize:
on the equilibrium path good widget bad widget transfer
seller: sri buyer: sT A OLi Pi
off the equilibrium path good widget (buyer) good widget (seller) transfer
seller: sr* buyer: sT> 7i 7/ Qi
Then, a contract G is defined as G := (A, a*, 7?, 7?, p{, 6
[0, 1], pi, Qi 6 R  . A revelation mechanism of this form is the most general type of 
contract in this set-up. Although it is impossible to apply the Revelation Principle 
directly because of the subsequent renegotiation stage, a modified version of the 
Principle does indeed apply. First, consider the revelation of the widget configu­
ration. Because this information is shared between the two parties, beliefs do not 
play any role. Therefore truthful revelation of this part of the state of nature can be 
considered without loss of generality. Only the incentive constraints resulting from 
truthful revelation of r  need to be studied. On the other hand, i is private informa­
tion and it is not straightforward to show that attention can be restricted to direct 
revelation of i. Appendix A of chapter 4 proves formally that there is no loss in 
generality in considering contracts in which the seller mixes over announcements of 
his private information. The seller’s strategy can be simplified further by studying 
equilibria in which only one type mixes.
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I will proceed by studying the seller’s behavior under a contract concerning 
the revelation of his type (Subsection 3.3.4) and then move to the simultaneous 
revelation of r  by the buyer and the seller (Subsection 3.3.5).
3 .3 .4  R ev e la tio n  o f C ost
The seller’s mixed strategy is of the following form:
1
type 1
type 2 --------------
Here, p is taken to vary between 0 and 1, such that this semi-separating equilib­
rium encompasses the two situations of a fully separating equilibrium (p =  1) and 
a pooling equilibrium (p = 0)6.
The buyer’s equilibrium beliefs follow from Bayes’ Rule
/i(l | 1) = 1
V (3.2)
7T pM l I 2) =  ==,,,
where /x(l | i) denotes the probability that the buyer attaches to seller type 1 
following announcement i. The opposite beliefs /i(2 | i) are given by 1 — p( 1 | i). 
For ease of notation, set p, := p (l | 2).
These beliefs result in one of the renegotiation offers (a), (b) or (c) in Definition 
3.1. Obviously, these offers are only made if the contract does not lead to trade
6A mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which the type 1 seller always reports 1 and a type 2 seller 
mixes between announcements 1 and 2 is similar to  a type (a) equilibrium as both involve separation 
of seller types in the renegotiation game. It will be shown in Lemma 3.3 that type (o) equilibria do 
not exist if 7r is large enough (Assumption 3.4). For the same reason, the above mixed equilibria 
fail to exist and we disregard them to simplify the exposition.
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of the good widget or if it leads to trade of the bad widget. From Lemma 3.1, 
the buyer will make a type (c) renegotiation offer after an announcement of 1 by 
the seller. The type of renegotiation offer made after an announcement of 2 by the 
seller, depends on the probability with which a type 1 seller mixes between his two 
announcements, i.e. on the size of p. Therefore, we can classify the equilibria in the 
message sending stage according to the parameter p in the seller’s mixed strategy.
Definition 3.2 There are three types of mixed strategy equilibria for the seller
(a) A type (a) equilibrium has p > max 7T(U— C l )  — ( V - C 2 )  7T C 2 -C 1
7r (C 2 — C l )  ’ 7 r ( C 2 - C l )
(b) A type (bi) equilibrium has < p < ■ A type (Mi) equilib­
rium has *(»-«)-(«-<*) < p < jp=si-
7T(C2 — C l )  “  —  7T(C2— C l )
(c) A type (c) equilibrium has p < min f l ~ ( « - C l ) - ( v - C 2 )  7TC2-C1
7 r ( C 2 ~ C l )  ’ 7 r (c 2 —C l )
I now turn to the seller’s incentive constraints. The mixed strategy above must 
be the optimal strategy for him.
First, a type 2 seller’s incentive constraint is independent of the subsequent 
renegotiation stage. A type 2 seller has high cost for the good widget and low cost 
for the bad widget and can never expect to benefit from eventual renegotiation. He 
will be either indifferent between accepting or rejecting the buyer’s renegotiation 
offer (the (a) and part of the (b) offer) or he will strictly prefer to reject it (the (c) 
and part of the (b) offer). Therefore, we can write his constraints as
P2 ~ P2C2 ~  ol2Ci >  p i -  (3ic2 -  aiiCi.
A type 1 seller’s incentive constraint on the other hand, is dependent on the buyer’s 
renegotiation offer and will thus be different for the three kinds of offers defined in
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Definition 3.1:
P2 ~  P2 C1 -  Q.2 C2 +  (1 -  ft)(c2 -  ci) +  a2(c2 -  cj). (a)
Pi ~ PlCl ~ 0 iiC2 =  <
P2 ~ P2 C1 -  ol2c2 + (1 -  P2)(c2 -  Ci) 
P2 ~  P2 C1 -  a2c2 +  a2(c2 -  ci)
P2 ~ P2 C1 -  a 2c2
(bi)
(bii)
The equality constraint comes from the fact that in a mixed strategy equilibrium 
the type 1 seller has to be indifferent between announcing either type 1 or 2. The 
expression p2 — fi2C\ — a 2c2 is the type 1 seller’s payoff under the contract if he 
announces type 2. Whether he will obtain an additional payment at renegotiation 
depends on the type of renegotiation offer the buyer will make.
In a type (a) offer the seller will be offered a high price of c2 for the good widget 
if the good widget was not traded under the contract, i.e., with probability 1 — (32. 
This increases his payoff by the difference in price and cost, that is, by c2 — C\. 
Similarly, if the bad widget was traded under the contract he will be allowed to buy 
it back for a low price of ci. This will also raise his payoff by the difference in costs.
Consider next a type (c) offer. It involves a low price for the good widget and 
a high price for the bad widget. The seller’s gain from this offer is 0. As he is 
indifferent, he will accept. The payoffs involving a type (b) offer can be understood 
in a similar way.
Combining the constraints of the two seller types we arrive at the following 
Lemma.
Lem m a 3.2 A given contract G allows type (a), (b), (c) equilibria with associated 
renegotiation offers only if
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(a)
( b )
(c)
A = 1, ai = 0
P i  =  P 2 ~  ol2Ci +  (1 -  0 2 ) c 2 .
(i) 0 <  0i -  1 -  ai +  a2,
P i  =  P 2 +  (A — l)ci + (1 — 0 2 +  Qii — ol2 ) c 2,
(m) 0 < 01 -02 -C L i,
P i  =  P2 +  ( A - A - « 2 ) C l + Q ! 1C2,
0 < A  -  0 2  -  Oil +  «2
Pi =  P2 +  (A ~ A)Cl +  (Q!l ~  0L2 )C2 .
(3.3)
(3.4)
(3.5)
Lemma 3.2 shows that the more information is revealed through a contract, i.e., 
the more efficient is the renegotiation game, the more stringent are the conditions on 
a contract arising from the interplay between incentive constraints and renegotiation.
Compare the above constraints to the ones imposed by incentive considerations 
in a situation where renegotiation can be prevented. The revelation principle applies 
and without loss of generality one can consider truthful revelation of costs (in our 
model this would be a type (a) equilibrium). The incentive constraints in this 
situation can be written as
(A ~ A )c2 + (<*2 -  oli)ci < P 2 - P 1  <  (A “ A)ci +  (012 ~  a i ) c 2.
These constraints are similar to the constraints in a type (c) equilibrium with rene­
gotiation. Nevertheless, when renegotiation is possible, the more the equilibrium 
involves separation of cost types the tighter are the constraints imposed on a con­
tract. In a type (a) equilibrium only very few degrees of freedom for a contract 
remain. In the following chapter I show, that in a continuous type setting it is in 
fact impossible to separate types through a contract.
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3 .3 .5  R ev e la tio n  o f th e  C onfiguration
The analysis has so far been centered on the revelation of costs. The revelation of 
r , the widget configuration, implies a new set of incentive constraints. Revelation 
of r  is necessary because a general mechanism makes use of this information. In 
particular, Pi and a* are the probabilities that the good and bad widgets are traded 
on the equilibrium path. As the widget configuration is common knowledge between 
the two parties a contract can elicit this information from both the buyer and the 
seller. This implies incentive constraints for the two seller types, 1 and 2, and the 
buyer.
As noted, for the revelation of r , attention can be restricted to direct revelation 
in which r  is announced truthfully by both parties. Nevertheless, the amount of 
information revelation concerning i affects the incentive constraints with respect 
to r. Therefore, the tree types of equilibria (a), (b) and (c) need to be analyzed 
separately.
3.3.5.1 T ype (a) Equilibria
If a contract with a type (a) equilibrium exists, it achieves the first-best regardless 
of the contractual details. This is, because starting from any status quo point 
renegotiation is ex-post efficient. It will be shown that, under certain conditions, 
this type of equilibrium fails to exist. To show this, only the buyer’s and the type 
2 seller’s incentive constraints need to be considered.
The buyer’s incentive constraint is
v - p i  >  ( v - c 2) + 7 r p ( c 2 - c 1)
+ i r p  [7}c2 +  7 i c i -  9i]
+ (i -  717?) [llc\ +  72C2 “  92] •
To understand this inequality, first consider the buyer’s equilibrium payoff. Because 
of (3.3) he obtains v  — p i  with probability 717?, the probability with which a type 1 
seller announces that he is type 1. With probability 1 — 717?, an announcement of 2
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is made by the seller. This case comprises a type 1 seller who announces that he is 
type 2 and the type 2 seller. The buyer then obtains (32v — P2 under the contract 
and ol^ Cx -f (1 — (32)(v — C2) through renegotiation. Using the constraint in (3.3), one 
can show that this is equal to v — p\ as well. The buyer’s out-of-equilibrium payoff 
is composed of two components. With probability 717? the buyer receives 7J1; — q\ 
under the contract and achieves 7^2  4- (1 — 7i)(^ — Ci) through his renegotiation 
offer. With probability 1 — 717?, the buyer receives 7|u  — <72 through the contract and 
72ci +  (1 — 7 |)(v — c2) through his renegotiation offer. Adding these payoffs weighted 
by their probabilities explains the right-hand-side of the above inequality.
The type 2 seller’s incentive constraint for truthful revelation of r  is
Pi ~ P2 C2 ~ ol2Ci > maxqj -  7^c2 -  7 (3.6)
The left-hand side of this expression is his equilibrium payoff if he announces r  
truthfully. The right-hand side is his out-of-equilibrium payoff when he lies about 
r  and simultaneously chooses his type announcement j  (possibly his true type) to 
maximize this out-of-equilibrium payoff. It is based on a type (c) renegotiation game. 
The types (a) and (6) are neglected. That is, I restrict attention to equilibria that are 
supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs for the buyer of the form p > max[j5^ ) ^]- 
In fact, this is not restrictive for our purposes. The more inefficient the out-of- 
equilibrium renegotiation game, the more scope there is for contracting, i.e. the less 
stringent are incentive constraints. As the aim is to show that type (a) equilibria do 
not exist, such a result is the more forceful, the more power we give to contracting.
Remark, that the buyer’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs, and therefore his renegotia­
tion offer, differ in the two cases when the buyer lies about r  as opposed to when the 
seller lies. In the first situation, the beliefs are given by the equilibrium beliefs, in 
the second, they are not determined and we are free to choose the best beliefs from 
the viewpoint of the contract. This follows from the definition of a Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium, see for instance chapter 8 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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To combine the two incentive constraints we write (3.6) as
J>2 -  ftC2 ~  <*2Cl >  T T p  [?1 -  7 ^ 2  -  7[Cl] +  (1 -  7Tp )  -  72c2 “  72Cl] .
(3.7)
which allows us to add the two constraints. Then, by using (3.3) we obtain 
-7Tp(c2 -  Ci) > (1 -  7T/2)(7| -  7$)(C2 -  Cj).
Making the right-hand-side of this expression as small as possible involves setting 
7|  =  0 and 73 =  1, which implies that we must have
P < | .  (3-8)
Condition (3.8) is inconsistent with the definition of a type (a) equilibrium in Defi­
nition 3.2, if
A ssum ption 3.4 7r > max v~c2 _J_ C2- C 1 £ L  1 c2-cxv-c\  2 ( v - c i )  ’ c 2 2 c 2
This condition is slightly stronger than Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. Observe, that, 
if v = Ci +  C2 is assumed, Assumption 3.4 and Assumption 3.3 are equivalent. 
Similarly, Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 are the same. This completes this section.
Lem m a 3.3 Under Assumption 3.4 it is impossible to write a contract with a type 
(a) equilibrium. In particular, there is no contract with a fully separating equilib­
rium. I f Assumption 3.4 does not hold, contracts with type (a) equilibria exist. They 
achieve the first-best.
The intuition for Lemma 3.3 is simple. It is a generalization of the result obtained 
for Contract 3 in Section 3.3.2. A type (a) equilibrium reveals information to the 
buyer which he can exploit at the renegotiation stage. It is therefore difficult to 
satisfy his incentive constraint with respect to the truthful revelation of the widget 
configuration r. This is particularly difficult if 7r, the probability that the seller is of 
type 1, is very large because the buyer expects to gain the most from renegotiation.
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Also, in such an equilibrium a type 1 seller has much to gain from making the buyer 
believe that he is in fact a type 2 seller. This will make it very hard for a contract to 
satisfy the seller’s incentive constraint with respect to revelation of cost (see Lemma 
3.2). The interplay of both incentive constraints makes it impossible for such an 
equilibrium to arise if 7r is large.
3.3.5.2 T ype (b) Equilibria
For the remainder of the chapter I assume that Assumption 3.4 holds. The value 
of a contract with a type (bi) equilibrium depends on one of its parameters only, 
namely, on the probability with which it prescribes trade of the bad widget after 
an announcement of 2 by the seller in equilibrium, i.e. on a 2. The larger is a 2) the 
smaller is the benefit of the contract, because a type 2 seller will reject the buyer’s 
renegotiation offer concerning the bad widget and the wasteful trade is enforced. 
Only if a 2 =  0 is the contract first best. The other parameters f t ,  f t  and cti play 
no role for efficiency because renegotiation is ex-post efficient with respect to the 
good widget independent of the type announcement and it is ex-post efficient with 
respect to the bad widget after announcement 1.
Similarly, the value of a contract with a type (bii) equilibrium depends on the 
probability with which it prescribes trade of the good widget after an announcement 
of 2 by the seller, i.e. on f t .  The smaller is f t ,  the smaller is the benefit of the 
contract because a type 2 seller will reject the buyer’s renegotiation offer concerning 
the good widget. The parameters f t ,  ol\ and a 2 are of no importance because 
renegotiation with a type 1 seller is always ex-post efficient and trade of the bad 
widget is undone through a type (bii) renegotiation offer even with a type 2 seller.
It can be shown that in both cases, in order to fulfill incentive constraints, the 
critical parameter must be set to its least optimal level. More precisely,
Lem m a 3.4 Under Assumption 3.4, for v — c2 > clf a contract with a type (bi) 
must have a 2 =  1. It (weakly) dominates the null contract. The equilibrium is 
unique with p = For v — c2 < c\, a contract with a type (bii) equilibrium
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must have /?2 =  0. It is equivalent to the null contract. The equilibrium is unique
With p =  )-(«-•*),
"  7 T ( C 2 - C l)
A discussion of this result in conjunction with the result for type (c) equilibria 
can be found at the end of the following section.
3.3.5.3 T ype (c) Equilibria
The final candidate for a contract allows only type (c) equilibria. For efficiency, 
two parameters are important, the probability of trade of the good widget and the 
probability of trade of the bad widget after an announcement of 2 by the seller. The 
type (c) renegotiation offer is rejected by a type 2 seller and therefore the optimal 
contract has /?2 as large and a 2 as small as possible.
It is shown that type (c) equilibria are the most efficient because parties can be 
punished the most heavily off-the-equilibrium-path. Indeed, it turns out that
Lemma 3.5 Under Assumptions 3.4, the optimal contract has only type (c) equilib­
ria. I f  v—c2 > ci, the good widget is traded with certainty and the bad widget is traded 
with a probability smaller than 1 after an announcement of 2 on-the-equilibrium- 
path. Off-the-equilibrium-path, after an announcement of 2 by the seller, no widget 
is traded.
fa =  1 cl2 =  -&=§-Z 7TC2—Cl ’
72 =  0 7i =  0
I f v —C2 < Ci, after an announcement of 2, the good widget is traded with a probability 
smaller than 1 and the bad widget is not traded on the equilibrium path. Off-the- 
equilibrium path both widgets are traded.
A  =  ( ! - * ) £ »  “ 2 =  0 ,
rJ> — 1 'W3 — *C2~d12 — x 12 C 1 + C 2 - 2 0
Lemma 3.5 has an intuitive explanation. The benefit of a contract consists in 
raising the probability of trading the good widget when its costs are high. The
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benefit can therefore be roughly measured by v — c .^ On the other hand, trading the 
bad widget results in a loss of overall surplus of —C\ in the high cost state because 
renegotiation breaks down and the bad widget is kept by the buyer.
If the cost of taking the inefficient action is relatively low compared to the increase 
in surplus resulting from the efficient trade, i.e. if v — c<i > ci, the threat of taking 
the bad action off-the-equilibrium path has no bite (72 =  7! — 0)- On the other 
hand, if costs of the bad action compared to the benefits of the good action are 
very high, i.e. v — c<i < c1? the parties can be forced to reveal the configuration r  
truthfully by being threatened with trade of the bad widget off the equilibrium path 
(72, 7l > 0).
To see this more clearly consider the two off-the-equilibrium-path options for a 
contract. Either it prescribes trade of the widget that the buyer claims to be the 
good widget or it prescribes trade of the widget that the seller designates. The first 
option is indeed good for the buyer’s incentives because he receives the bad widget 
out-of-equilibrium which he will not be able to resell to the seller. Joint surplus is 
reduced by c\. On the other hand this is bad for overall incentives because, if it 
is instead the seller who is lying about r , this results in trade of the good widget 
which raises the parties joint payoff out-of-equilibrium by v — c^ Next, consider 
the option of trading the widget that the seller claims to be the good widget. If it 
is the buyer who is lying this raises overall surplus by v — C2, if the seller is lying, 
surplus is reduced by c1. In either case total surplus is increased by such actions by 
v — c<i — c\. The best solution therefore depends on the sign of this expression.
If v —c<i > Ci, it is best to prescribe no trade off-the-equilibrium-path. In contrast, 
on-the-equilibrium-path, it is beneficial to enforce both actions. In particular, the 
bad action should be taken. This is a generalization of the result that is obtained 
for Contract 1 in Section 3.3.2. Trading the bad widget on the equilibrium path 
provides incentives for truthful revelation because the buyer expects to obtain a 
high price for it in the renegotiation game. With probability 7r he can sell it back 
to the seller for a price of c2. A type 2 seller also prefers to provide the bad widget
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because it is very cheap.
The difference to the result in Lemma 3.4 is that in a type (c) equilibrium the 
probability of trading the bad widget does not need to be raised as high, i.e. cti < 1. 
To understand why this is so, compare the buyer’s out-of-equilibrium payoffs when 
he lies about r  in the two types of equilibria. In a type (c) equilibrium the buyer 
expects that a total surplus of i r(v — C\) is realized off-the-equilibrium-path, whereas 
his expectations are 7r(v — c1) +  ( l —7r)(v — c2) in a type (bi)  equilibrium. Therefore, 
it is more difficult to satisfy the buyer’s incentive constraints in a (bi)  equilibrium 
and his compensation in equilibrium (trade of the bad widget) must be higher.
If v  — C2 < Ci, it is costly to enforce trade of the bad widget on-the-equilibrium- 
path. In contrast, from the above discussion parties can be threatened with trade 
of both widgets off-the-equilibrium-path, which will lower joint surplus compared to 
the surplus realized in equilibrium.
Finally, the situation when v —C2 =  C\ is such that costs and benefits of a contract 
balance each other. Neither the threat of inefficient off-the-equilibrium-path trade, 
nor the enticement of inefficient on-the-equilibrium-path trade can be used to make 
the parties’ incentive constraints less binding. Thus, any contract with a type (c) 
equilibrium is as good as the null contract.
Lem m a 3.6 Under Assumption 3.4, asv  — c  ^ approaches c\, a contract with a type 
(c) equilibrium achieves less and less. Finally, at v — c  ^ =  C\, no contract with a 
type (c) equilibrium can raise efficiency above the null contract situation.
3.4 Results
This section summarizes the above results. The first main result is the following.
P roposition  3.1 I f  t he  benefit o f  co n tra c tu a l c o m m itm e n t  o u tw eig h s  th e  loss in  
f le x ib i l ity  du e  to  co n tra c tin g , i.e . v  — Ci > c1; co n tra c tu a l lo ck-in  e ffec ts  are a 
n e c essa ry  im p lic a tio n  o f  a s y m m e tr ic  in fo rm a tio n .
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Proposition 3.1 is the collective result of Lemmata 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. Lemma
3.2 shows that precise information revelation about costs implies very strong con­
straints on a contract. Lemma 3.3 proves that full revelation of costs under a 
contract is impossible and that consequently renegotiation is inefficient. Therefore, 
Ci measures the cost of contracting or the loss in flexibility. It is the loss in total 
surplus when the wrong action is enforced under a contract. On the other hand, 
v — C2 is the benefit of contracting. It is the increase in total surplus resulting from 
trade of the good widget which could not be realized in the absence of a contract. 
Lemmata 3.4 and 3.5 show that if v — c<i > ci, parties can be induced to truthfully 
reveal the configuration by contractually forcing them to undertake the bad action 
in equilibrium. Intuitively, the bad action involves a very small loss in total surplus 
at the same time as being very desirable to both the buyer and a type 2 seller.
The second main result concerns incompleteness of contracts.
P roposition  3.2 Contracting is the more beneficial the larger (or the smaller) is 
the benefit of contractual commitment compared to the loss in flexibility due to con­
tracting, i.e. v — C2 »  c\ (v — C2 «  ci). As c\ approaches v — C2 , no contract is 
better than the null-contract. Therefore, contracts can be expected to be incomplete 
if costs and benefits of trade are similar.
When costs and benefits are close contracts have very little screening options. On 
the one hand, parties cannot be punished with the bad action if it is found that they 
are lying, on the other hand, they cannot be enticed with the good action if they tell 
the truth. Thus, Proposition 3.2 claims that if stakes are not very high contracts can 
achieve very little. More precisely, if ex-ante an action can have a similarly negative 
or positive effect on total surplus, writing a contract, and in a sense committing to 
an action, is of little value. This result is intuitive if one considers commitment at a 
point at which the true consequences of an action are not known. In other words, if 
only simple, non-contingent contracts in the same vein as Contract 1 in Section 3.3.2 
are allowed, commitment to trade might well be detrimental to total surplus. More
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surprisingly though, this intuition carries through to situations where an action is 
enforced at a point at which all necessary information is known.
Furthermore, if 7r, the probability of low costs for the good widget, is large, it 
is difficult to fulfill the buyer’s incentive constraints. Because he can exploit his 
strong bargaining position in the renegotiation stage, reaching an agreement under 
a contract is of little value to him. Thus, the proposition implies that, if the overall 
benefit of a contract to a party that has a strong position without a contractual 
agreement is very small, it is unlikely that a contractual solution will be reached.
The final result that I want to stress concerns the fact that for all feasible con­
tracts, on-the-equilibrium-path-renegotiation can not be avoided.
P roposition  3.3 Under Assumption 3.4, any feasible contract involves renegotia­
tion on the equilibrium path.
This result has been already discussed in the introduction. The reason that in 
this model contract renegotiation occurs in equilibrium is that renegotiation happens 
in a static game under asymmetric information. As renegotiation is the last stage of 
the game it separates seller types. But because separation under a contract cannot 
occur in equilibrium (Lemma 3.3), including renegotiation into a contract as the 
Renegotiation-Proofness-Principle suggests is impossible. In addition, the outcome 
of a contract is not ex-post efficient and so the two parties will make use of the 
possibility of renegotiation in equilibrium.
I have assumed a very crude bargaining procedure for renegotiation: The buyer is 
allowed one proposal which the seller can accept or reject. In particular, bargaining 
might end even though there is still surplus left unexploited, in which case it can be 
argued that renegotiation should reopen. Assume instead that renegotiation consists 
of two rounds of sequential offers by the buyer, where payoffs in the second round 
are discounted by some positive discount factor smaller than 1. Assume further that 
the parameter configuration of the model is such, that the buyer screens seller types 
intertemporally, i.e., trade of the good widget occurs in the first round at a low price
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with a type 1 seller and in the second round at a high price with a type 2 seller. 
Then, although all surplus is exhausted ex-post, inefficiency arises through delayed 
trade. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the last result is still valid. I conjecture 
therefore, that for any finite bargaining game that is not fully efficient contracts 
will be renegotiated. What results are obtained when the bargaining procedure at 
renegotiation is infinite could be subject for further research.
Finally, let us investigate some of the assumptions made throughout the model. 
First, for an extension into a model with continuous type space, the reader is referred 
to the following chapter. It is shown that a contract cannot be made dependent on 
types, i.e. there exists essentially only a pooling contract in a continuous type 
framework.
Second, consider the specificity of the assumption that information is asymmet­
rically distributed only on one side of the relationship. Why should the seller have 
superior information about the buyer’s value of the two goods? This assumption 
is not stringent. In fact, the results would not be altered by the introduction of 
multiple buyer types and two-sided asymmetric information. What is important for 
the derivation is that both parties must be aware which of the two goods is the 
good widget and which one is the bad widget. Imagine for example that the seller 
does not know the widget configuration. Consider the following contract: The seller 
is asked to announce his type and the widget that he indicates as the cheapest is 
traded for a fixed price of p. This is a separating equilibrium if he tells the truth and 
his payoff in equilibrium will be p  — C\. He will not obtain additional surplus from 
renegotiation even if the cheaper widget is not the efficient one. On the other hand, 
if he does not play according to his equilibrium strategy and points out the more 
expensive good he will obtain p — C2, any possible renegotiation offer from the buyer 
will be rejected. Thus, as this is less than what he would obtain in equilibrium, 
a separating equilibrium in this context exists and the proposed contract achieves 
first-best.
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Why the same is not true when the seller is informed about the widget config­
uration is explained in Section 3.3.2, Contract 3. Here, we have an example of the 
observation that superior information of one of the parties is actually hurtful from 
an efficiency point of view. This is not straightforward. If the widget configuration 
is symmetric information between the two parties, a contract can use the announce­
ment of one of the parties as a check against the other parties’ announcement and 
this should reinforce the position of a contract. But, on the other hand, the seller’s 
superior knowledge increases his gain from lying about the other parameter of the 
model, his cost. Thus, the positive effect of an additional instrument for the contract 
is off-set by the possibility for the seller to behave strategically when he reveals his 
cost.
To conclude, this chapter has provided a possible interpretation of the term 
‘transaction costs’ and its link to contractual incompleteness. Transaction costs 
arise in this setting because incentive considerations force contracting parties to 
undertake some negative action. The more far reaching step would be to investigate 
a model in which these kind of transaction costs lead contracts to be strictly worse 
than no contract. If the negative effect on total surplus from the bad action is too 
large the null-contract, which trivially fulfills all incentive constraints as it forces 
no action, might dominate any more contingent contract. Intuitively, ‘acting’ is 
worse and less flexible than ‘not acting’. Whether this result can be obtained in 
such a model is an open question. Another form of incompleteness is found in this 
model in the sense that all contracts are renegotiated. Here, we have the result that 
all contracts must be renegotiated. An interesting question is whether there are 
instances in which some contracts are renegotiation-proof but the optimal contract 
is not.
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3.5 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3.4 
Proof.
First, I consider the case where v — C2 > C\. The proof proceeds similarly to the 
analysis of type (a) equilibria. But in addition to the buyer’s and the type 2 seller’s 
incentive constraints for truthful revelation of r, we need to consider also a type 1 
seller’s constraint. In a type (bi) equilibrium the buyer’s incentive constraint is
P2 C2 4- a27TC2 —p2 > np fa  ~  ci)
+ 71-p [7JC2 +  Tfci -  gi]
+ 7T(1 -  p) [7^2 +  72C2 -  32]
+ ( 1  -  7r) [tJcj -  92] •
A type 2 seller’s incentive constraint is as in (3.7). Assume that the contract is such 
that the type 2 seller, when lying about r , is indifferent between his two possible 
cost announcements 1 and 2. Formally this means
Qi ~  7?C2 -  7ici = q* ~  72c2 -  72ci- (3-9)
This is without loss of generality, because 52 can be adjusted to fulfill the above 
equality. As to derive the results, we add the incentive constraints of buyer and 
seller, the transfer payments cancel.
Then, a type 1 seller’s out-of-equilibrium payoff, when lying about r, depends on 
his announcement concerning his type. If he announces 1 his payoff is q \— 7{ci—7fc2, 
if he announces 2 it is ?2~ 72ci —7| c2- Due to (3.9), the former expression is (weakly) 
greater than the latter if
7? -  7? >  75 -  71  (3-10)
Assume that (3.10) holds, the symmetric case when 7} —7® < 72 —72 proceeds along
the same lines.
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Then by using (3.4) and (3.9), a type 1 seller’s incentive constraint can be written
as
P2 -  P2C2 -  &2 C2 +  (C2 -  Cl) >  TTp [gx -  gfd  -  7 iC2]
+(1 -  7Tp) [g2 -  72c2 -  7|ci +  (7i -  7?)(c2 -  ci)] .
This allows us to add the buyer’s incentive constraint to both seller types’ incentive 
constraints to obtain the set
Oi2( ^ c 2 -  c2) > (3-11)
7rp(c2 -  ci) +  (1 -  ^ p ) l a2(c2 -  c2) -  (1 -  t t) t \ c 2 
(c2 -  ci) -  a 2(l ~  ?r)c2 > (3.12)
i rp( c2 -  cj) +  (1 -  n p ) j 2(c2 -  cj) -  (1 -  t t) t \ c 2 +  (7} -  7j)(c2 -  Ci),
where the first (second) line is the sum of the buyer’s and type 2 (1) seller’s incentive 
constraints. In order to meet (3.12), it is best to set (7J — 7J) as small as possible 
and (3.10) implies 7i — 7i =  72 — 7|.  Also, both (3.11) and (3.12) are satisfied the 
easier the smaller is p. Substituting for the smallest value of p consistent with a 
type (bi) equilibrium, i.e. p = , the two constraints become
a 2(7rc2 - c i )  > ?rc2 - c i -  (72“ 7!)(1 - t t ) c 2
- 0:2(1 -  7r)c2 > - (1  -  7r)c2 +  (75 -  7|) (7rc2 -  c2).
The objective is to minimize a2 while at the same time fulfilling the two above 
constraints. Given Assumption 3.4, this is done by setting 72 = 7! and it follows 
that a 2 = 1. If Assumption 3.4 does not hold, a2 can be set equal to 0 and the 
contract can be made first best.
Next, I consider the case where v — c2 < c2. The three parties’ incentive con­
straints can be constructed using similar arguments as in the above demonstration.
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In a type (bii) equilibrium the buyer’s incentive constraint is
f a 6 +  a 2c i  -  p 2 >  + 7rp [ ) \c 2 +  7 i c i “  Qi]
4-tt(1 -  p) [72Ci +  7 Jc2 -  q2\
+(1 -  7r) [7 ^ 1  +  -  q2\ ,
where 0 := 7rci +  (1 — 7r)u. Remark, that C\ < 6 < c2 from Assumption 3.1.
A type 2 seller’s incentive constraint is as in (3.7). Assume that (3.9) and (3.10) 
hold. Then the type 1 seller’s incentive constraint is
P2 -  A>Cj -  q 2ci >  7173 [gi -  7 JC1 -  7 JC2]
+ (1  -  7rp) [92 -  72c2 -  7 lci +  (7i -  7?)(c2 -  <=i)] .
Adding the buyer’s incentive constraint to both seller types’ incentive constraints 
and, as above, substituting for the smallest values of (7 J — 7 *) =  (72 — J2) and
P =  yields
f a { 6 ~ c 2) >  —(72 — 7 l ) ( ^  — c i )
A (0 -C i)  > (72 -  7l)(^ -  c2)
The objective is to maximize fa under the two constraints above. Under Assumption 
3.4, c2 — 0 > 6 — Ci and therefore fa  =  0 and 72 =  7|- If Assumption 3.4 does not
hold, fa  can be set equal to 1 and the contract can be made first best. ■
Proof of Lemma 3.5 
Proof.
The argument is as in the proof of Lemma 3.4 and we can write the sum of the 
buyer’s and the two seller types’ incentive constraints as
fa(Q ~  c2) +  ol2(t:c2 — Cj) > 72(0 “ ci ) +  72( ^ 2 - c 2) (3.13)
/? 2 (0 -C i)+ a 2(7rc2 - c 2) > 72(0-C 2)+75(7TC2 - C i ) (3.14)
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As 9 < c2 and 7rc2 > Ci, raising (32 above 0 is only possible if either a2 is sufficiently 
large or if the right-hand-side of (3.13) is negative. At the same time, the solution 
should respect (3.14).
Let us consider the first option. Because a positive a 2 involves a true loss of 
efficiency we set it just large enough to offset the negative impact of /32 on the 
left-hand-side in (3.13):
R °2 ~ 6 &2 =  Pi ­ts c2 -  Ci
For simplicity set all the 7J- equal to 0. The increase in expected surplus from such 
a contract is
( l - 7 r ) ( f t ( v - c 2) - a 2ci).
Substituting the obtained identity for a 2 and rearranging this expression we obtain 
that the expected gain in surplus is equal to
Pl(l -  7r)7T(c2 -  Ci)V C; Cl.
t sc 2 -  Cl
The sign of v — c2 — Ci determines whether such a contract is beneficial to the two 
parties or not. If v — c2 > ci, this is the case and optimally (32 =  1. Then, (3.14) 
holds automatically.
Next, assume that 7I, 72 > 0 are chosen such that 72(0 — Ci) +  72(^2  — C2) is 
negative and set a2 = 0. The maximal f32 consistent with (3.13) is
=  ( g - c . )
c2 — U
This (32 must also satisfy (3.14) and therefore a contract has to ensure that 
7^(c2 -  ttc2) -  7j(0 — ci)
c2 — 9 
which is equivalent to
(9 -  ci) > 71(9 -  c2) +  75(7tc2 -  ci),
b ^  s C 1 +  c2 ~  20 
72 < 72' 7rc2 -  9
Both the numerator and the denominator of the fraction on the left-hand side are 
positive due to Assumptions 3.4 and 3.3. Also, this fraction is smaller than or equal 
to 1 if v — c2 > ci, and it is greater than or equal to 1 if v — c2 < ci.
Chapter 3. Incomplete Contracts and Inefficient Renegotiation 92
Consider the first case. To make the right-hand side of (3.13) as negative as 
possible, 72 should be made as large as possible. Therefore, setting 7|  =  1 and 
replacing the above expression with equality in (3.15), we obtain
* /1 , c i + c 2 - v
A = (l -  * ) — — r - < o.7rc2 — 0
Consequently, in this case, making the right hand side of (3.13) negative does not 
result in a positive P 2.
If v — c2 < Ci on the other hand, 72 =  1 and 7J =  c™l~9w allows us to compute 
P 2 in (3.15)
a  H  A Ci +  C2 -  V  ^  n  p2 =  (1 -  7T)— — -----— > 0.
C 1 I c 2  ~
Due to Assumption 3.3, p2 < 1.
Chapter 4 
C ostly Contracting
4.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies a strategic reason for incompleteness of contracts. As in 
chapter 3, a contract merely serves as a starting point for negotiations between 
contracting parties, which are governed by an exogenously given, costly bargaining 
procedure. In the model of the preceding chapter a complete contract can constitute 
a worse status quo point for such ex-post negotiations because it can lead to wasteful 
trade. In contrast, in the model of this chapter no such bad outcome exists. Rather, 
it is the informational status quo that is changed by a contract. The uninformed 
party, by learning something about his contracting partner through a complete con­
tract, is not able to credibly keep a ’tough’ stance in the ex-post bargaining game. 
This party therefore prefers the contract that releases the least information, i.e. the 
null contract.
In order to make this point I modify the buyer seller story. The chapter abstracts 
from the issue of widget types that has been at the heart of the preceding two 
chapters. It concentrates instead on a more standard contracting problem, the sale 
of a single, indivisible good. In order to allow an easy comparison with the durable 
goods monopoly literature, the buyer-seller relationship is reversed. In this model 
the seller makes the contracting offer and is uninformed about the buyer’s valuation.
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He also has all the bargaining power in the final bargaining game. Furthermore, a 
continuous type space for the buyer’s valuation is considered. But most importantly, 
I study a problem in which information is already asymmetrically distributed at 
the time at which parties contract. Thus, the individual rationality constraint of 
the informed party imposes an additional constraint on contracts and introduces 
strategic considerations on the part of the seller. The last assumption delivers the 
strict dominance result. The seller strictly prefers not to offer an early contract. 
Instead, he moves straight into the bargaining game.
Similarly to the preceding chapters, the ex-post bargaining game is modelled 
as a take-it-or-leave-it offer by the seller. From the seller’s ex-ante viewpoint, this 
game is constrained efficient, given the asymmetry of information. To introduce 
some further inefficiency, I assume that the seller has to pay a fixed fee £ 2  in order 
to enter into the bargaining game. The fee has to be paid in advance to cover the 
opportunity cost of time spent in a meeting between the parties.
Before the negotiations the seller can decide to offer an initial contract to the 
buyer to possibly save on some of £2 . A contract offer in itself involves costs £1, 
which have to be born by the seller as well. They can for example be regarded as 
the legal costs of drawing up a contract.
To model the benefit of an early contract over the later renegotiation game, it is 
assumed that the renegotiation offer is more costly than the initial contracting offer, 
i.e. £ 2  > £\. Apart from this cost differential there is no further loss in waiting, 
i.e. there is no discounting. One reason for this exogenous increase in costs is that 
actual bargaining, where parties meet around a table, is more costly than the writing 
of a contract, which can be drafted by third parties, such as lawyers for example. 
Alternatively, it can be interpreted as resulting from storage costs because the good, 
if it is not sold at the first possible date through a contract, must be kept until the 
renegotiation period.
The disadvantage of an early contract is that it releases information before the 
final meeting between the parties. Through the messages that are sent according to
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the contract the seller learns about the buyer’s type and has an incentive to adapt his 
behavior at renegotiation. This is the ratchet effect. Because there is an incentive 
for the seller, once he has observed a rejection of a high price offer by the buyer, 
to lower his price at the final stage, strong restrictions are imposed on an initial 
contract. These restrictions are particularly strong in this model because of the 
assumption of no discounting. This has interesting implications for the form of the 
initial contract, which is almost uniquely determined by incentive considerations. 
In fact, only one degree of freedom is left in choosing contract prescriptions. This 
results in a parsimonious representation for every feasible initial contract, which 
greatly simplifies the seller’s problem of choosing the optimal contract.
In this context, two results obtain. First, assuming that initial contracting costs 
are negligible one can show that, although the benefit of early contracting outweighs 
the cost, these effects are of same order of magnitude. This result can be seen as a 
first step towards explaining incompleteness of contracts because of bounded ratio­
nality. If contracting parties base their reasoning on a rough cost-benefit analysis, 
there is no strong reason in this context to write a contract. Parties are ’indiffer­
ent’. Second, if initial contracting costs are strictly positive, the null contract is 
strictly preferred even if those initial costs are of order of magnitude smaller than 
the renegotiation costs.
The intuition goes as follows. One can show that any early contract is equivalent 
to a so called simple contract with a partition equilibrium that separates buyer 
types into two groups. Trade is concluded contractually with the first group of high 
valuation buyers, whereas the second group moves into the bargaining round. This 
simple contract saves on the bargaining cost £ 2  for the first group. On the other 
hand, by revealing information too early it imposes a ’cost’ on the seller through 
the ratchet effect. This cost is a function of the size of e2 . Intuitively, the larger e2, 
the larger the optimal size of the first group, the lower the final price offer after the 
simple contract compared to the final price offer after the null contract. So, when 
e2 decreases, both the benefit of a contract decreases because the optimal size of the
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first group of buyers decreases, and the cost from information revelation shrinks. 
Through a form of envelope theorem argument one can show that benefits fall more 
quickly than costs.
The papers most closely related to this chapter are Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), 
Hart and Tirole (1988) and Hart (1989). Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) study a two- 
period bargaining game with discounting, in which a decreasing price path is found. 
Hart and Tirole (1988) explore short term and long-term contracting in a T-period 
version of this model. Instead of assuming a given bargaining procedure, they derive 
the optimal contracting structure explicitly. Finally, Hart (1989) studies the effect 
on the length of disagreement in a sequential bargaining game if one party faces a 
crunch, i.e. if its value decreases sharply at a fixed point in time. The main difference 
to these models is that there is no discounting but a fixed cost of contracting in this 
paper. With discounting, a strict preference for waiting can never be obtained.
A paper which is similar in spirit is Anderlini and Felli (2001) who study an 
infinite horizon bargaining game with symmetric information and transaction costs. 
The authors argue that the equilibrium in which these costs are not paid and con­
sequently an agreement is never reached is a pervasive equilibrium. It is the unique 
equilibrium if either these costs are sufficiently high or if parties in the course of the 
game have the option to renegotiate inefficient outcomes.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The following section contains the set­
up of the model with fixed contracting cost and solves for the benchmark contract 
under full commitment. Section 4.3 derives the optimal contract when renegotiation 
is allowed. The final section concludes. Appendix A deals with the question of 
whether the revelation principle applies in a set-up with renegotiation. I prove 
a result which I call Revelation Principle with Renegotiation^. It establishes that 
without loss of generality, in this set-up, the set of feasible contracts can be taken to
XA recent paper, Bester and Strausz (2000), studies this problem with a finite type space in a 
more general framework. Since the type space considered in this paper is a continuum the same 
techniques cannot be applied.
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be the set of direct revelation mechanisms in which the informed party mixes over 
announcements of his type. Appendix B contains some minor derivations.
4.2 The M odel
Consider a buyer-seller model in which a seller has one unit of an indivisible good 
for sale. The seller’s production cost is fixed and normalized to 0. The buyer’s 
valuation for the good is randomly drawn according to some distribution function 
F(-) with continuous, strictly positive density /(•) on a closed interval V = [v,v]. I 
further assume that v > 0, so that trade is beneficial for all possible realizations of 
the buyer’s value. If parties agree to exchange the good for a price p, payoffs to the 
buyer and the seller respectively are given by
ub(v) =  v — p
u3 = p,
hence, parties are risk neutral.
Assume that the seller has all the bargaining power in the relationship, that is, 
he can choose the price at which he is willing to sell the good. If he is informed 
about the buyer’s valuation, he will ask a price of v. The buyer being indifferent 
will accept.
If the seller is uninformed about the buyer’s type, there is some potential for 
inefficiency due to the asymmetry of information. As a reference point I will first 
describe the standard second best contract under the assumption that the seller is 
bound by his contractual offer. That is, contracts cannot be renegotiated. Such 
a contract will typically entail some ex-post inefficiency which it would be in the 
common interest to renegotiate. Nevertheless, from an ex-ante viewpoint the seller 
weighs this inefficiency against the lower price he would have to accept in order to 
increase efficiency and chooses the contract that maximizes his own payoff. The 
problem is a standard contract design problem. For later reference I include a time 
line at this point:
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date 0 date 1
 1 1-----------------
v is realized S proposes a contract
B sends message 
contract is enforced
4.2 .1  T h e B enchm ark: Full C om m itm en t
From the revelation principle the seller can restrict attention to a contract in which 
the buyer announces his type v. The contract specifies a probability of trading 
the good together with a payment from buyer to seller conditional on the buyer’s 
announcement. Call these /3(v) and p(v). The seller maximizes his expected payoff 
subject to the relevant incentive and individual rationality constraints for all buyer 
types. That is, the optimal contract (f6*(v), p*(v))vey for the seller is given by the 
solution to the program
f  p(v)dF(v) (4.1)
«ev J y
max
(0(v), p(v))
(3(v)v — p(y) > P(v')v — p(v') Vu, v' G V  (IC)
/3(v)v — p(v) > 0  Vu e V  (IR)
The solution to this problem is a simple cut-off level v*2, such that
(1, v*) v > v*
(/?*(«), p*(v)) = {
(0,0) otherwise.
(4.2)
2See for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chp 7, Section 7.3.
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The level v* solves
max q( 1 -  F(q)),
Q
which implies a first-order condition
1 -  F{v*) -  v*f(v*) =  0. (4.3)
For v* to be uniquely defined through (4.3), assume that the seller’s expected surplus 
S(q) := q( 1 — F(q)) is strictly concave in q. This offer is not first-best if v* lies in 
the interior of V  because the good will not be sold to low buyer types. For there to 
be an inefficiency created by the asymmetric information I introduce the following 
assumption
A ssum ption  4.1 v* > v
4 .2 .2  R en eg o tia tio n
Imagine now, that after the prescriptions of the contract have been carried out, 
there is time for the seller to make a further offer to the buyer. If the good was not 
exchanged under the contract (P(v) < 1), the seller can make a second proposal to 
the buyer3. In particular, assume that this offer is made after randomization, in the 
case in which 0 < /3(v) < 1, has taken place4. The time line is as follows:
date 0 date 1 date 2
v is realized S proposes a contract renegotiation,
B sends message, final offer
contract enforced
3Because v  >  0 the seller will never offer to buy the good back from the buyer.
4If this is not the case, the seller has to take the buyer’s random participation constraint
13(v)v — p(v)  into account when designing the renegotiation offer.
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If there is a contract in place which includes an exchange of messages at stage 
1, the seller obtains additional information about the buyer’s type and can use this 
information to tailor his renegotiation offer. The whole game becomes a signalling 
game in which the informed party (buyer) signals his type to the uninformed party 
(seller) through his strategy at stage 1. In this setting it is therefore impossible to 
employ the revelation principle in order to analyze the set of contracts.
Instead, a contract defines more generally a measurable message space (M, S), 
where M  is a set of messages and S  is a o'-algebra of its subsets5, together with 
an outcome function (/?, p), where f) : M  —> [0,1] and p : M  —+ R  are real-valued 
functions on M. If message m  is sent by the buyer, P(m) is the probability with 
which the good is contractually traded and p(m) denotes the price that the buyer 
pays. A possibly mixed strategy equilibrium for the buyer parametrized by (pv)V£V 
is considered, where for all buyer types u, pv defines a probability measure on M. So, 
pv{m) denotes the probability with which type v sends message m  in equilibrium. 
Define Vm := [um, vm], where vm (vm) is the infimum (supremum) of all buyer type 
v with pv(m) > 0 .
Note first, that in this setting the seller can reach the same utility as in the game 
in which commitment is possible. Renegotiation does not restrict his opportunity set 
because he can simply refrain from proposing a contract at stage l 6. The second-best 
outcome is implemented at stage 2 through the ’renegotiation’ offer v*. On the other 
hand, he cannot do any better than in the game with commitment because contract 
plus renegotiation can be viewed as a two stage mechanism with commitment after 
the second stage. From the revelation principle, it is known that any outcome that 
can be achieved with such a sequential procedure can be reached through a simple 
revelation mechanism. The utility the seller obtains in his most preferred revelation 
mechanism therefore constitutes an upper bound on the payoffs he can expect in
5S  is assumed to contain the elements m  of M  itself.
Alternatively, G  can be constructed by setting M  — (m ), (3(m) =  0, p (m)  =  0, p v {m) =  1 for 
all v.
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any two stage mechanism, and in particular in the mechanism-f renegotiation game 
studied here.
4 .2 .3  C o n tractin g  C ost
To introduce some friction in the model between the two different dates at which 
offers are made, I want to assume that each time the seller makes an offer to the 
buyer he has to pay a small fee. Offers are made at date 1 and 2, which leads us 
to distinguish two different costs. Call the cost of the first offer £i, the cost of the 
second £2 .
The first fee £\ can be regarded as the cost of a phone call or the legal cost 
of drawing up a contract. The second type of cost £2 can be interpreted as the 
opportunity cost of time spent in a meeting between the two parties when they 
meet for the bargaining round. It can also be viewed as the cost of delayed trade. 
When trade happens through renegotiation rather than through the initial contract 
the good is exchanged at a later stage in the game and some additional cost might 
be incurred. Modelling £2 as a fixed cost rather than a proportional cost such as a 
common discount factor for example, has the advantage that in the former case the 
analysis of the incentive constraints for the stage 1 contract is very clear-cut and 
allows us to derive a very strong result, see Proposition 4.1.
With this change, a friction between the different dates of the model is intro­
duced. Contracting at date 1 is different from bargaining at date 2 and it is not 
obvious how big the advantage is of one action over the other. More precisely, when 
comparing the null contract to a more complex contract the seller faces the following 
trade-off: Not writing a contract at date 1 and proceeding directly to the final offer 
at date 2 saves on the initial contracting costs £\ but comes at the cost of paying e2 
for the final stage offer. Roughly, the seller has to compare £\ with £2.
In what follows, we will be interested in the case in which £\ < £2) so bargaining
7£\  and e2 are positive.
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at the deadline is more costly. It is for example more likely that bargaining ends 
without a satisfactory conclusion simply because time is up. If the deadline is some 
official deadline as in an internet auction for example, costs are increased because 
of congestion, phone lines are more likely to be blocked and there is an increased 
probability that the final offer does not even reach the receiver. Similarly, legal cost 
could be increased because parties are more eager to reach a conclusion and lawyers 
can exploit their superior position by raising their fees. Another interpretation is 
that the seller has to pay a cost to store the good from one period to the other.
4.3 Contracting
Given these definitions, the analysis proceeds by backward induction. I solve for the 
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game. A strategy for the seller consists 
of a contract offer G =  [(M,S), (fi,p)]s at stage 1 and a set of renegotiation offers 
(g(m))m€M at stage 2. A strategy for the buyer consists of a probability distribu­
tion (pv)V£v on M  at stage 1 and a decision to either accept or reject the seller’s 
renegotiation offer q(m) at stage 2.
4 .3 .1  R en eg o tia tio n  S tage
First, I solve the game by setting £ 2  equal to 0. To derive the buyer’s response to a
proposed price offer q(m) by the seller is straightforward. The buyer will accept this
offer if and only if v > q(m). The seller’s optimal renegotiation offer is therefore
given by a similar expression as (4.2), where the cut-off level is found by using
the seller’s posterior beliefs about the buyer’s type. The analysis depends on the
contract put into place and the message sent by the buyer at date 1. For each
8For simplicity, I assume here that the seller offers only contracts that are accepted by the 
buyer, i.e. contracts that fulfill the buyer’s participation constraints.
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message m  the optimal renegotiation price offer q(m) is found by solving
max 9(1 — F(q | m)), (4.4)
q £ V m
where F(q \ m) denotes the seller’s updated beliefs about the buyer’s value910. With 
a slight abuse of notation set
fi(m) := f  fiv(m)dF(v). (4.5)
J  V
The seller’s beliefs can then be stated formally using Bayes’ Rule
F (q  ^m^ = J ^ n )  J v d F
For the integral in (4.6) to exist, pv(m) must be a measurable function with respect
to the measure F(-) on V. Remark that q(m), the optimal renegotiation price after
message m, depends on the equilibrium strategy (pv)vev  of the buyer. If for a 
given m the function {pv{F^))v^v is continuous in v , the first order condition of the 
maximization problem in (4.4) is obtained by substituting (4.6) into (4.4) and taking 
the derivative with respect to q(m):
rv
/  pv(m)dF(y) -  q(rn)f(q(m))iiq(m)(m) = 0. (4.7)
J  q ( jn )
There is no need to consider corner solutions: the constraint in (4.7) is always a 
strict equality constraint. For all messages m  that are sent in equilibrium by a set 
of buyer types with positive mass, q(m) = vm is never optimal. Also, if q(m) = vm, 
given the definition of vm, the seller’s objective function cannot be increasing at 
that point.
Turning now to the question of contracting cost, an additional assumption re­
garding the renegotiation cost £ 2  is needed. If £ 2  is very high and discourages the
9For P(m)  =  1, the seller’s ’renegotiation’ offer is not determined. In this case, q(m)  is the
unique limit when P(m)  —+ 1.
10If a message m  is sent with probablity 0 in equilibrium by all buyer types, i.e. / iv (m ) =  0
for all v,  it is eliminated from the message space. This implies that the seller’s beliefs are always
determined by Baye’s Rule and there is no problem with multiplicity of equilibria due to the
freedom of choosing out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
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seller from making a further offer at date 2, this additional cost could serve as a form 
of commitment device. In order to ensure that this is not the case and renegotiation 
is an issue, the following assumption is needed:
A ssum ption 4.2 £2 < v
Assumption 4.2 guarantees that even for the most pessimistic beliefs about the 
buyer’s type the seller prefers to trade and pay the fee £2 at stage 2 rather than walk 
away from trade. Given Assumption 4.2, the analysis of the equilibrium behavior of 
seller and buyer in the last stage of the game is exactly as detailed above.
4 .3 .2  M essa g e  S en d in g  S tage
Having solved for stage 2 of the game, we now turn to the analysis of stage 1. 
In choosing his equilibrium strategy (/j,v)eV} & type v buyer solves the following 
maximization problem
max /  fi'v ( ( 3 { m ) v  — p ( m )  +  (1 — / 3 ( m ) )  max[u — q ' ( m ), 0]) dm, (4.8)
Pv j  771
where q'(m) is the seller’s renegotiation offer, which depends on (j!v.
Take an equilibrium strategy of the buyer (fJLv)ev that maximizes (4.8) and a re­
sulting set of renegotiation prices (q(m))meM• The maximization procedure in (4.8) 
imply constraints for the contract that the seller must have proposed11. Namely, 
the buyer must be indifferent between any message in the support of his equilibrium 
strategy and he must weakly prefer such a message to any message which is not in 
the support. Importantly, this depends again on the seller’s stage 2 renegotiation 
offer. Although this seems to imply a quite complicated interdependency it turns 
out that a contract is almost fully defined by these constraints. Furthermore, it 
must be of a surprisingly simple form. Either it must involve complete pooling or it 
can involve only a very restricted amount of separation.
11 Contracting costs play no role in the analysis of this stage because they are borne entirely by 
the seller.
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Because the seller’s renegotiation offer determines the type of contract that is fea­
sible at stage 1, we separate the two cases of pooling and separating. The following 
two possibilities span the whole set of renegotiation offers.
C ondition 4.1 The renegotiation offer is independent of the buyer’s equilibrium 
strategy at stage 1, i.e.
q(m) =  q for all m  E M.
C ondition 4.2 The renegotiation offer is dependent on the buyer’s equilibrium 
strategy at stage 1. That is, there exists an equilibrium (pv)vev of the stage 1 con­
tract, such that
q(m) ^  q{m') for some m, m! E M  
where m and m! are in the support of (pv)v<=v for some v.
I first characterize the feasible set of contracts given Condition 4.1. The following 
Lemma provides the first step in the characterization.
Lem m a 4.1 Under Condition 4-1, q = v*.
Proof.
Consider the seller’s maximization problem in (4.4), which implies that
Vm 6 M  and Vr E V.
Taking expectation over M, this expression simplifies to
q( 1 -  F(q)) > r ( l  -  F(r)) Vr E V.
But this problem has as a unique solution the cut-off level v*, and therefore q =  v*.
The main result concerning the stage 1 contract under Condition 4.1 is given in 
the proposition below:
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Proposition 4.1 Full Pooling: Under Condition 4-1
(3(m) = (3 G [0,1] p(m) = p e R ,
for all messages m  G M, for which F({v : pv(m) > 0}) > 0, except for a set of 
messages of zero measure.
Proof.
First, I show that for all messages m, buyer types above and below the unique 
renegotiation price v* send m  with positive probability in equilibrium. That is, I 
prove that for all m, there are types V\ and V\ < v* < v<i with > 0 and
pV2 (m ) >  0.
First, if there was no such V2 > v*, the seller would optimally decrease his 
renegotiation price to capture a set of buyers with valuations below v* who would 
accept the new price. This proves the first part.
Second, assume that for some m  there is no such V\ as above. Divide the message 
space M  into two disjoint subsets M and M. M_ is defined such that for all m  G M, 
buyer types below and above v* send message m. In particular, there exists v < v*
with pv(m) > 0 . M  is defined such that for all m  G M, only buyer types above v*
send m, i.e. pv(m) = 0 for all v < v*. The aim is to show that M  is empty or has 
measure 0. Assume the contrary.
Because v* is the seller’s optimal renegotiation offer after every message m, it 
must be that
nv pv
v* I pv(m)dF(y) > (v* — a) I pv(m)dF(v) Vm G M, a > 0.
J  v* Jv*—a
(4.9)
Call x := f M pv(dm) dF(v). Because a set with positive mass of buyer types 
above v* must send messages in M  and M  is assumed to have a positive mass in M, 
f M fiv(dm) < 1 for those types. It follows that x < 1 — F(v*). By taking expectation 
over M in (4.9) and changing the order of integration we obtain
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Given the definition of M, this expression is equivalent to
v*x > (y* — a) (x 4- F(v*) — F(y* — a)) Va > 0,
which is equivalent to
x  > v*G(a) -  (F(v*) -  F{v* -  a)),
where G(a) := ~Q). Now, as a  approaches 0, this inequality is violated.
The first part of the right-hand side approaches which is, substituting for
the definition of u*, equal to 1 — F(v*), whereas the second part approaches 0. 
Therefore, the right-hand side approaches 1 — F(v*) > x.
This shows that for all m  there are buyer types V\ and V2 , with Vi < v* < t»2,
who both play m with positive probability in equilibrium. Take any two messages 
m  and m! with such buyer types v\ < v* < and v[ < v* < vf2. In equilibrium, 
type V\ must weakly prefer to send message m  over ml and type v'2 must weakly 
prefer to send m' over m  which leads to the following constraints:
/?(m)u! —p(m) > P(m!)vi — p(m!) (4-10)
and
I3(m')v'2 -  p(m') +  (1 -  /3(m'))(v'2  -  v ’) > /3(m)v'2 -  p(m) +  (1 -  p(m))(v '2  -  v').
(4.11)
(4.10) and (4.11) together imply the following:
(j3(m) -  (3{m!))vi > p(m) -p (ra ')  > (/3(m) -  (5{m!))v*,
i.e. /3(m) < P(m!). The same is true for buyer types and V2 , where the roles of m
and m' are reversed implying similar constraints as (4.10) and (4.11) and thus
{P{m) — P(m!))v* > p(m) — p(mf) > (P{m) — ^ (m '))^ .
Thus, it must be that /3(m) > P(m!), which finally implies that /3(m) = P(m!) and 
therefore p(m) = p(m'). ■
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Proposition 4.1 says that, if the renegotiation offer is independent of the buyer’s 
message under the contract, the contract itself must be independent of his message, 
i.e. it must be a pooling contract.
The proof proceeds in two steps. First one shows that under Condition 4.1, every 
message must be sent by buyer types above and below the unique renegotiation price 
v*. This is easy to see for buyer types above v* since the seller expects to capture 
a positive surplus with his renegotiation offer. To see that this is also the case for 
buyer types below, assume that there is a message m  for which this is not the case. 
Since v* is the optimal renegotiation offer for the seller knowing m  for all m, it must 
also be the optimal offer knowing M \ m .  In words, the seller sets v*, when he faces 
the entire pool of buyer types except a set of types v > v*, namely those who send 
m. But this is in contradiction with the definition of v*, which is defined as the 
renegotiation offer when the seller faces all buyer types. The second step is to show 
that this implies that the outcome function must be independent of the message. 
Incentive compatibility necessitates the familiar monotonicity condition. Since here, 
types below and above v* send a message m, the monotonicity condition must hold 
in both directions.
Finally, the following proposition deals with the case when the renegotiation 
offers differ according to the messages sent at stage 1, i.e. when Assumption 4.2 
holds. It makes use of the following definition.
D efinition 4.1 Define q* as the lowest renegotiation price, that is,
q* = min q(rn). (4-12)m
Define M* C M  as the set of messages which result in renegotiation price q*, that 
is,
M* := {m  : q(m) =  q*}.
Now, we are ready to state the following proposition and corollary.
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Proposition  4.2 Separation: Under Condition 4-2,
/3(m) = 1 p(m) = p(m*) +  (1 -  P(m*))q*
for all messages m  £ M*, for which F({v  : pv(m) > 0}) > 0, and for all messages 
m* e M*.
Proof. Consider the two renegotiation offers q* < q(m) with corresponding mes­
sages m* E M* and m  £ M*. Then, there must exist a buyer type Vi, with 
q* < vi < q(m), who plays m* in equilibrium with positive probability and a type 
V2 , with q(m) < V2 , who plays m  with positive probability. To see this, assume first 
that there is no such type V2 . But then, the seller obtains an expected payoff of 0 
from his renegotiation price q(m), whereas he will obtain a strictly positive expected 
payoff if he decreases his offer sufficiently. Next, if there is no V\ in between the 
two renegotiation prices q* and q(m), such that pVl(m*) > 0 , the seller can raise q* 
to q{rn) without affecting the probability with which his offer is accepted while in­
creasing his expected payment. Consider now two values v± and V2 as above. Given 
a contract G = (M, /?, p) with an equilibrium probability measure (pv)vev on Af, 
the incentive constraints for the two buyer types V\ and V2 are
P(m*) Vi -  p(m*) +  (1 -  P(m*))(vi -  q*) > (3(m) vx -  p(m)
and
P(m) v2 —p(m) +  (1 -  (3(m))(v2 -  q{m)) > P(m*)v2 -  p(m*) +  (1 -  /3(m*))(v2 -  q*) 
Taken together they imply
(1 -  P(m))vi -  (1 -  P{m*))q* > p(m*) -  p(m) > (1 -  P(m))q{m) -  (1 -  (3(m*))q*
and thus /3(m) = 1 and p(m) =  p(m*) 4- (1 — f3(m*))q*.
■
Proposition 4.2 shows that even with differentiated renegotiation prices, only 
a small level of screening is achieved. It allows the seller to separate buyer types
Chapter 4. Costly Contracting 110
into a maximum of two groups according to whether they send messages in M* or 
not. For those who send a message that leads to a renegotiation price above the 
minimum price q* the contract is completely determined. It must enforce trade at a 
fixed price, i.e. the outcome must be [l,p]. To see this intuitively, observe that any 
buyer type above q* can ensure himself [l,p] by sending a message m* in M*. Call 
the outcome after a message m  ^ M*, x. Now, x  must be weakly preferred to [1, p] 
by those buyer types who send a message not in M*. On the other hand, a type 
above q* who sends m* in M* also obtains [l,p] and must therefore weakly prefer it 
to x. This shows that x  =  [1 ,p].
Finally, the outcome function after messages in M* need to be determined. The 
following corollary provides a characterization
C orollary 4.1 Proposition 4 implies the following for buyer types v < q*.
(i) I f  there exists a buyer type v < q*, who sends message m  ^ M* in equilibrium, 
then also P(m*) — 1 for all m * E M*.
(ii) All buyer types v < q* send message m* E M*, for which m* =  argminm/. /3(ra'*)
Proof.
To see (i) assume that there is a buyer type v < q* who sends message m  ^ M* 
in equilibrium, that is > 0. For such a strategy to be optimal for type v ,
sending message m  must weakly dominate sending some message m* E M*. Using 
Proposition 4.2, this implies that
v — p(m*) — (1 — P(m*))q* > /3(m*)v — p(m*),
hence
(1 -  (3(m*))(v -  q*) > 0 ,
which is only guaranteed if /3(m*) = 1.
To see (ii), observe that from Proposition 4.2 it follows that for two messages 
m*, m!* E M*
f3(m*)q* — p(m*) =  {3(m'*)q* —p(ml*).
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But then a buyer type v < q* obtains
/3(m*)v — p(m*) =  /3(m*)v — — {/3{m*) — P{m!*))q*
= (5{w!*)v -  p(m!*) +  (P(m*) -  P(m’*))(v -  q*).
So he will send m* 6 M* if and only if P(rn*) < P{m'*) for all m 1* 6  M*.
■
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 highlight the limited scope of ’early’ contracting in this 
set-up when contracts are vulnerable to renegotiation. Basically, with renegotiation 
a contract has only one degree of freedom, namely to fix one level of trade and
one price. This is in sharp contrast to the limitation that incentive constraints
impose on contracts in the case when renegotiation can be prevented. Then, for two 
announcements v and v' to be incentive compatible we need
(P(v) -  P(v’))v > p(v) -p (v ')  > (P(v) -  P(v'))v',
and therefore
sign(P(v) — P(v’)) = sign(v — v').
The decision rule needs to be monotonic but P can take as many values as v and 
also the price is not constrained to two levels only. Because the set of possible 
contracts is strongly restricted we can expect that contracting is much less valuable 
with renegotiation than without.
Finally, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 go beyond what is needed in this section. In 
fact, the seller, to maximize his payoff, only needs to consider single price offers at 
stage 1. Nevertheless, most prior papers on durable goods monopoly and bargaining 
with asymmetric information do not derive the incentive constraints on a general 
mechanism in a set-up without commitment. Mostly, a given bargaining game is 
assumed12. The above analysis allows us to solve the situation for other objective 
functions than the seller’s payoff and allows us to incorporate the above simple model 
into a more complicated one. The latter will be especially useful in the sequential 
screening model of the following chapter.
12An exception is Hart and Tirole (1988).
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4 .3 .3  In itia l C on tractin g  S tage
We are ultimately interested in the contract that the seller chooses within the set of 
implementable contracts, i.e. among the ones that satisfy the conditions of either 
Proposition 4.1 or 4.2.
Formally the seller’s maximization problem in (4.1) must be adapted to include 
the possibility of renegotiation and the two contracting cost. The seller’s problem is
/«/ f  +  /  pv(m)dF(v)J dm (4.13)
—£\ 1° — £ 2  f (1 — (3(m))fi(m)dm (4.14)
J M
subject to the constraints in either Proposition 4.1 or 4.2 
subject to the buyer’s individual rationality constraints
The first term in this expression is the total expected price the seller receives 
for the good under the contract and the renegotiation offer. The contracting costs 
£\ are only incurred if the seller makes a first stage offer. Then, I c  is the indicator 
function, where I c  =  1 if a contract is signed initially and I c =  0 if no contract is 
signed. Finally, in the last term, the expression under the integration operator is 
the probability that trade does not occur under the contract after message m. The 
seller computes the expectation of ’no trade’ over M.
Pooling Contracts. We first investigate the problem using the constraints 
detailed in Proposition 4.1. It is easy to see that among the contracts that satisfy 
these conditions the optimal contract for the seller is the null-contract, i.e. (3 = 0 
and consequently p = 0. The seller’s maximization problem in (4.13) is simply
max p +  v*(l -  P ) ( l  -  F(v*)) -  exI c -  e2(l -  P) (4.15)
P, p
s.t.
fiv — p >  0 Vu.
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Because the individual rationality constraints must be met for all buyer types, the 
seller optimally sets p =  (3v. Therefore, 4.15 becomes
max j3v 4- (1 -  P)[v*(l -  F(v*)) -  e2] -  £ \IC
This is a linear expression in (5 and is therefore maximized by setting (3 equal to 1 or
0. The following assumption guarantees that, independent of the size of the initial 
contracting cost £i, /? =  1 is never optimal.
A ssum ption 4.3 e2 < u*(l — F(v*)) — v
Because it is impossible with such a contract to separate the buyer types above 
and below the cut-off level the seller can either sell to everybody for a low price 
at stage 1 or wait until stage 2 and sell only to a proportion of buyers. If waiting is 
not too costly, i.e. e2 satisfies the above assumption, the neutral stance of ’doing- 
nothing’ is strictly optimal.
Separating C ontracts. Next, we turn to the constraints detailed in Proposi­
tion 4.2. Define m* := argminm/*ejvf* (3{jn'*). Write /3* and p* for the probability 
of trade and the price after message m*. Because of the constraints imposed on a 
contract in Proposition 4.2 and Corollary 4.1, part (zz), there is no loss in generality 
in restricting attention to so called simple contracts. The message space of a simple 
contract contains only two messages, namely m* and one other generic message m. 
After message m  is sent by the buyer, the contract enforces trade of the good at a 
price p = p* +  (1 — as detailed in Proposition 4.2. Denote by q the renegotiation 
price after message m .13
Assumption 4.3 implies that the null contract strictly dominates a separating 
contract in which buyer types below q* send message m. This follows from Corollary 
4.1, part (z). Therefore, the only type of contract that the seller might prefer has 
only equilibria in which all v < q* send message m*. This is summarized in the 
following figure:
13Remark that this price plays no role in the following analysis because there is no scope for 
renegotiation after message m.
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messages sent in equilibrium m* 77i* and m
I-------------!------------ 1--------------- 1
buyer type v q* q V
Figure 1
The seller’s maximization problem (4.13) reduces to
max p* +  (1 -  fi*)(l -  F(q*))q* -  e j 0  -  £2(1 -  P*)p{m*) (4.16)
0*, p*
s.t.
v - p *  -  (I-/3*)q* > 0  Vv>q*
P*v — p* > 0 Vu < q*,
where p(m*) was defined in (4.5). The second set of individual rationality constraints 
in (4.16) is the most stringent and it follows that p* =  (3*v. The buyer’s problem 
can be simplified even further to
max p*v 4- (1 -  /?*)[(1 -  F(q*))q* -  p{m*)e2\ -  £ \IC.
This expression is a linear function in the choice parameter /3*. As shown above, 
setting ft* = 1 leaves the seller with a suboptimal payoff of v — e\. When P* = 0 
(which implies p* = 0) on the other hand, the seller obtains q*(l—F(q*))—p(m*)e2 — 
£\. This payoff has to be compared with the payoff v*(l — F(v*)) — e2 that the seller 
can secure by ignoring date 1, i.e. by not writing a contract initially, and by making 
his optimal static offer at date 2. From our assumption about the uniqueness of the 
optimal offer v*, q*( 1 — F(q*)) is strictly smaller than v*(l — F(v*)) for all q* ^  v*. 
It can be shown that q* = v* is not an optimal response for the buyer after having 
observed message m*, given that the seller mixes as detailed in Figure 1 above. In 
fact, q* must be strictly smaller than v*. The proof proceeds along the same lines a 
the proof of Proposition 4.2 and is relegated to Appendix B.
To see the intuition for this result consider the following reasoning. Call the set 
of buyer types who send message m  with positive probability in equilibrium V(m ).
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Formally, V(m) := {v : fiv(m) > 0}. If V(m) has measure 0, i.e. if F(V(m)) = 0, 
the only possible renegotiation offer given the definition of v* is q* =  v*. Neglecting 
initial contracting cost, contracts of this form are equivalent to the null contract 
because all parties receive the same overall payoff as under the null contract. The 
larger the measure of buyer types that have m  in the support of their equilibrium 
strategy, i.e. the larger F (V(m )), the smaller must be q* and the larger is the 
disutility of the contract to the seller modulo the contracting costs.
To gain an intuition about the relationship between q* and the measure of V(m ) , 
consider a particular equilibrium of the set of equilibria detailed in Figure 1:
E xam ple 4 Partition Equilibrium
There is a buyer type v > q*, such that the equilibrium behavior of the buyer at stage 
2  is given by:
pv{m) = 1 = 0) v > v
pv(m) =  0 =  1) v < v.
This equilibrium partitions the set of buyer types into two subintervals, such that 
the seller trades contractually with all high valuation buyers in V(m) = {v : v > 
v} and offers to trade with the low valuation buyers only at renegotiation. The 
measure of the set of buyer types for whom trade occurs under the contract is given 
by F(V(m))  =  1 — F(v). For q* to be a consistent renegotiation offer given the 
buyer’s equilibrium strategy, q* must maximize
q { l -  F(q\m') ) ,
14In fact, any other equilibrium of a separating contract is equivalent to  a partition equilibrium 
in the sense that the seller’s and buyer’s payoffs are identical. Indeed, for a given equilibrium of 
such a contract and a minimal renegotiation price q*, define v  by
F(t>) := F(q' )  +  q'f(q*).
Because q* <  v* and S(q)  is strictly concave, v  is well defined. It is easy to verify that parties’ 
payoffs are the same in both equilibria.
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where
! 1 q > v EM $ < $F(€)
The first-order-condition of this problem is
F(v) -  F(q*) -  gV(9*) = 0. (4.17)
Implicit differentiation yields
<W_ = _______ f(v)  (A i ^
dv -2/(9*) -  9*/'(9*)'
The denominator of this expression is the second-order-condition of the above max­
imization problem. The whole expression must therefore be nonnegative. That is, 
the optimal renegotiation offer q* is weakly decreasing in the measure F(v) of buyer 
types for whom trade occurs under the contract.
If the difference between the null contract and a more complex contract is rep­
resented by the measure of the set of buyer types for whom trade occurs under the 
contract, i.e. by the measure F(V(m)) of types who send message m  in equilibrium, 
one can state the result in Example 4 in the following form:
The closer a contract is to the null-contract, the better it performs. The null 
contract strictly dominates any complicated contract. Nevertheless, its outcome can 
be approximated arbitrarily closely by a sequence of contracts that converges to the 
null contract. Convergence means that the best equilibrium for the seller in such a 
sequence of contracts has F(V(m)) —> 0.
If the seller’s strategy is given by the partition equilibrium of Example 4, the 
renegotiation cost £ 2  are only incurred for buyer types below v. A simple contract 
with partition point v yields a payoff of
nsc(£l,£2) = q'(v)( 1 -  F(9*(«))) -  F{v)s2 -  S l (4.19)
to the seller. On the other hand, the null contract yields
nwc(£2) = «*(1 -  F(v’)) -  e2. (4.20)
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Comparing IISC in (4.19) with II^*7 in (4.20), the advantage of the null contract 
is that it saves on the initial contracting cost E\. A simple contract on the other 
hand saves on renegotiation cost £2, but comes at the disadvantage of lowering the 
overall price that the seller can ask for the good. Which of the two contracts the 
seller prefers obviously depends on the relative size of £ 2  and £\. Trivially, if the 
cost of writing a contract at the initial stage is very large compared to the cost of 
recontracting, the null contract will be preferred. In contrast, the seller prefers to 
write a contract at stage 1 if £ 1  is very small compared to e2.
Two more interesting points can be made. First, assume that initial contracting 
cost are 0 but that there exist a non negligible cost of recontracting, i.e. e2 > 0 . 
It can be shown that, although the cost saving effect on e2 outweighs the informa­
tion effect on price in a simple contract, these two effects have the same order of 
magnitude. Second, initial contracting cost of order of magnitude smaller than the 
recontracting cost e2 support the null contract as the strictly optimal contract.
Formally, define £i(e2) as the initial cost on contracting such that a simple con­
tract yields the same payoff to the seller as the null contract
£ l(£2) := £2(1 -  F(i>)) -  (v * ( l  -  F(v')) -  q'( 1 -  F(q')))- (4.21)
Proposition 4.3 (i) Neglecting initial contracting cost, benefit and cost of a simple 
contract are of the same order of magnitude
£2(1 -  F(£)) =  0(v '(  1 -  F(v')) -  5*(1 -  F(«*))).
(ii) The minimum cost on contracting £.1 (6 2 ) that is needed to support the null con­
tract as the strictly dominant contract, is of order of magnitude smaller than the 
recontracting cost e2. That is
£ ^ £ 2 )  =  o ( £ 2 ) .
Proof.
Following the assumption that in a simple contract the best equilibrium from 
the seller’s viewpoint is played, v maximizes expression (4.19). It solves the first
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order condition
By using the definition of q* in (4.17) and the expressions for in (4.18) of Example 
4, it is possible to simplify further
[ l - F ( v ) + e 2 S"(q*)]f(v)=0, (4.22)
where S" (q) stands for the second derivative of the seller’s surplus function S(q) = 
q(l — F(q)). Expression (4.22) defines v implicitly as a function of the renegotiation 
cost £2- If S(q) is a strictly concave function, v will lie in the interior of V.
To prove the statement in (i) we need to show that there exists a constant K , 
such that
£2(1 -  F(v))
v ' ( l - F ( v ’) ) - q ’ ( l - F ( q ' ) ) ~ *  as s2 u.
Both the numerator and the denominator tend to zero. We only need to show the 
latter which follows from q* —► v*. To see this, note that because f(v)  > 0 for all v , 
expression (4.22) can be divided by f(v). Then, because SH is bounded, £2 S" —► 0 
for £ 2  —► 0 and therefore v —> v. Comparing (4.17) and (4.3), it follows immediately 
that q* approaches v*.
Using Hopital’s Rule:
£ 2(1 -  F{v)) = 1 - F ( v ) - £ 2 f ( v )%
e ^ o  q*(  1 -  F(q*)) -  v*(l -  F(V)) e2->o - S ' ( q * ) % ^
(4.23)
To obtain the rate of change of v when £ 2  changes, we use the Implicit Function 
Theorem and equation (4.22):
dv = — g 'V )  (4 24)
ds2 m + e 2 S"'(q*)%- 
Exploiting the expressions for — in (4.24), in (4.18) and (4.17), we see that the 
limes in (4.23) is equivalent to
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The first part of Proposition 4.3 follows with K  = 1 from the strict concavity of S  
and the assumption that all derivatives of S  are bounded in V.
Next, part (ii) follows almost immediately. To prove it, we need to show that
£2(1 — F(v)) — (f*(l — F(v’)) — g*(l — F(q'))} _---------------------------------------------------------------> U as £ 2  —■► U.
£2
(4.25)
First, note that £1 (8 2 ) > 0 from the definition of v. Next, the first term £2^ ~ ^ v^  
in (4.25) tends to 0 because v goes to v. Then, it follows that the second term 
v.L1~.F(v ))~9 (i--F(g )) (4.25) must also tend to 0 because it is always positive but
smaller than the first.
■
To gain an intuition for Proposition 4.3, consider the case when F(-) is the 
uniform distribution on [|, |]. Then, v* =  | ,  v =  |  — 2^2 and q* = v* — £2.
With a simple contract and partition equilibrium indexed by v the savings on 
the renegotiation cost is 2£t| , whereas the loss to the seller due to a lower price is 
equal to e\. Therefore, benefit and cost of a contract are of same order of magnitude. 
Also, it follows that the boundary on initial contracting cost £1, such that the null 
contract is strictly preferred to all other contracts is £1 (8 2 ) =  £2 =  °(£2)*
Intuitively, even if the cost £\ of writing a contract is smaller than the cost £ 2  of 
recontracting, the seller prefers to incur these higher cost because they come with 
commitment. Paying £\ at date 1 does not preclude the additional payment of £ 2  
for at least some buyer types. Furthermore, through an initial contract the seller 
learns something about the buyer and will contract with the remaining buyer types 
date 2 for a price that lies below the optimum. Together these two forces imply that 
for very small levels of renegotiation costs £ 2  he is prepared to wait, even if they are 
higher than the initial contracting cost £1.
But the strength of Proposition 4.3 lies in the fact that it goes beyond a mere 
comparison of two different levels of contracting costs. It makes a strong point 
in favor of the null contract because the null contract is chosen by the seller even
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though the order of magnitude of i t ’s savings on contracting cost (e\) is smaller than 
the order of magnitude of i t ’s loss due to higher bargaining cost (ei). Models that 
have tried to explain incompleteness of contracts by evoking writing costs have been 
vulnerable to criticism. The difficulty to measure these costs empirically is one of 
the main arguments against such explanations. Proposition 4.3 is an example in 
which the absence of a contract is explained by writing costs without the need to 
resolve to a pure comparison of size.
Compare the obtained result to the result generated under full commitment. The 
second best contract yields a total surplus of u*(l — F(v*)) — e\. If £\ < £i , this 
amount is greater than v*(l—F(v*))—£2 , the total surplus that the null-contract plus 
renegotiation delivers under no commitment. Under these conditions renegotiation 
is harmful and the situation is in that respect similar to other models that consider 
renegotiation in dynamic contract environments.
Some parallels can be drawn between these results and the ones in Hart (1989). 
The author tries to explain strikes ’of reasonable length’ by studying a bargaining 
model between a firm (uninformed) and its workers (informed). A first ingredient 
is that real time elapses between any two of the firm’s offers and that this is costly 
because the firm is inactive during the strike. A second ingredient is that the firm 
faces a crunch at some point in time, that is, if the strike has continued up to a 
certain point, the firm’s value decreases dramatically after that. It is shown, that 
these two forces can yield strikes of considerable length up to and beyond the crunch 
line. These results are very similar to what is shown in this paper, which takes them 
to the extreme. There is no discounting and the crunch line is in fact the end of 
time, i.e., the good’s value decreases to zero. The implications are therefore also 
stronger. I find no contracting before the deadline, whereas there is some positive 
probability that a strike ends before the deadline in Hart’s paper. Also, in his paper 
the type distribution is discrete and a strict ’waiting’ result cannot be found with a 
discrete distribution.
Hart and Tirole (1988) study contracting in a dynamic durable goods monopoly
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model with two types. They derive optimal long term and short term contracts in 
the rental and sales version of the model with T  periods. The difference between 
long term and short term contracts does not arise in a two period model and their 
sales model, whether with long term or short term contracts, is therefore very similar 
to the one in this chapter. The difference lies in the fact that in Hart and Tirole 
(1988), there is discounting. Also, in this chapter, a continuous type version is 
studied. Interestingly, as in the current chapter, the authors study the optimal long 
term contract, i.e., they do not restrict themselves to a given bargaining procedure.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has taken a first step towards establishing strict dominance of the null 
contract over more complicated contracts. In a durable goods monopoly model, 
where the seller cannot commit not to renegotiate an initial contract offer, it is 
shown that he might strictly prefer not to make this offer at all.
Three ingredients are necessary for this result. First, no real time passes between 
the time at which the initial contract is carried out and the final renegotiation offer, 
i.e. there is no discounting. With discounting, there is always some amount of early 
contracting, i.e. trade, as can be seen in the earlier literature on the durable goods 
monopoly and in related models of bargaining with asymmetric information (see for 
example Stokey (1981), Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) and Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1983)).
Second, we need a continuous type setting. With continuous types, the bargain­
ing offer varies continuously with the amount of information revealed beforehand 
through a contract. In contrast, in discrete type settings a small amount of in­
formation revelation, i.e. early contracting, does not necessarily result in a lower 
renegotiation offer (see for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1983)).
Finally, the fact that an early contract can only regulate the starting point of the 
final bargaining game and cannot already prescribe what is to be done at renegoti­
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ation is crucial. If this was possible, the seller would pay E\ for an initial contract 
specifying that the optimal static offer v* is to be made in the final bargaining game. 
Such a contract, if feasible, is indeed preferable over the actual bargaining, which 
involves paying the higher costs £2.
I want to argue that such a contract is in contradiction with the assumption 
that contracts can be renegotiated. Namely, the way renegotiation is modelled in 
this thesis is to assume that any inefficiency in a contract is subject to renegotia­
tion. Trying to include the renegotiation game into the contract fails, because the 
renegotiation game itself suffers from inefficiencies.
To understand this point, it is useful to picture the exact timing of the game. 
The bargaining game is such that parties must sit together at a table. Once they 
have sat down, the clock starts ticking and there is just time for one take-it-or-leave- 
it offer. The value of the transaction declines sharply after this offer and is then in 
fact smaller than the opportunity cost of the parties’ time. They therefore prefer 
to leave the table without having concluded the trade. This bargaining situation 
cannot be recreated in a contract. On the one hand, a contract that simply mimics 
the outcome by specifying that the buyer can buy the good at the price v* and that 
no follow-up offer will be made once this offer has been rejected, is vulnerable to 
renegotiation. On the other hand, a contract that tries to recreate the bargaining 
game by bringing parties together at the bargaining table, in addition to costing £1, 
suffers from the same £2 costs.
Finally, it would be interesting to model the bargaining game with an infinite 
horizon, in which payoffs are discounted by a factor 6. Take for example the one­
sided offer game which is studied in Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986). If 6 = 0, 
this is exactly the bargaining game assumed in this chapter. But for other discount 
factors, this game leads to bargaining over several periods in which the good is sold 
at a decreasing price to buyers with decreasing valuations. In such a model one could 
dispense with the exogenous bargaining cost £2. In fact, the closer <5 is to 1, i.e. the 
more efficient is the bargaining game, the more costly it is from the seller’s point of
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view. In this model, would an ex-ante contract increase his bargaining position?
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4.5 Appendix A
This Appendix formalizes the idea that it is possible to restrict attention to mech­
anisms for which the message space over which a buyer type v randomizes is taken 
to be the set of types itself. More formally:
R em ark  4.1 (Revelation Principle with Renegotiation) Suppose that a mechanism 
G with message space M  and allocation function y (•) =  [/?(•)> p(')] ^as a Bayesian 
equilibrium (pv)vev- Then it is possible to construct a mechanism G, for which the 
message space is the space of types V, with allocation function y(-) =  [/3(‘), p(-)] that 
has a Bayesian equilibrium {jiv)v^v, which gives rise to the same levels of utility to 
the seller and all buyer types. Therefore, one can restrict attention to mechanisms 
in which the buyer types randomize over announcements of their valuation.
The proof proceeds by construction. If the two spaces M  and V  are isomorphic,
i.e. there exists a bijective mapping r  : V —► M , the mechanism G has y(-) := 
y(r(')). The equilibrium strategies of the different buyer types are given by jiv(-) =  
/i„(r(-)) for all v. As r  is one-to-one, pv(‘) is a measure on V  for all u15. Obviously, 
G together with (fiv)vev thus defined ensure that each party obtains the same level 
of utility as with G and (pv)v^V‘
Suppose now that M  and V  are not isomorphic. There are two possibilities.
Either no mapping r  : V  —► M  is one-to-one, that is, for each such mapping r  
there are at least two buyer types v and v', such that r(v) — r{v') =  m. Then, 
add an additional message m! to M  and proceed as follows. Redefine r(v) := m, 
r(v') := m! , y(m') := [0,0] and pv(A U {m'}) := pv(A) for all measurable sets 
A  in the sigma algebra of M. By repeating this procedure for all v in the kernel 
of the original mapping r , a new message space M  which is isomorphic to V  and 
an isomorphism r  are constructed. The thus obtained (pv)vev is an equilibrium 
strategy for the buyer in the new mechanism, given that the seller’s renegotiation
15In particular, f v pv(v) dv = f v pv{r{v)) dv = Im (m) dm ~  ^ o^r aii v-
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offer in equilibrium is taken to be his offers in the original game for the original 
messages m  and q(ml) = v for all new messages m!. It is easy to see that the new 
mechanism G gives rise to the same levels of utility as the original contract. G and 
{M vev  can then be obtained as above.
The second possibility is that no mapping r  : V —* M  is onto, that is for 
all such mappings r, there always exists some message m  such that for no v E V, 
t(v) = fh. Then, for at least two messages m  and ml (possibly different from m), the 
renegotiation price offered by the seller at stage 3 is the same, i.e. q(m) =  q(ml) =  q. 
To see this, assume the contrary. This implies that the mapping i : M  —*• V  defined 
by i(m) = q(m) E V  is one-to-one and can be inverted. Then, : V  —* M  is onto, 
which is in contradiction with our assumption above. Now, a ’smaller’ message space 
and mechanism can be constructed by simply ’deleting’ message m \  say, from M. 
The buyer’s equilibrium strategy is adapted by setting pv(m) =  4- for
all v and m  and m! as above, the buyer’s equilibrium strategy remains the same. 
Finally, if ml ^  m, we set r~ 1(m/) := r _1(m). The new mapping is onto.
We need to check whether this transformation constitutes an equilibrium in 
the new mechanism and finally whether it leaves all involved players’ final payoffs 
unaffected. Because q is the renegotiation offer after both announcements m  and 
ml in the original mechanism, it remains optimal for the seller to offer q after the 
announcement of m  in this changed set-up16. Furthermore, because the buyer type q 
has to send both messages with positive probability in the equilibrium of the original 
game, by taking his incentive constraints with respect to the two messages m and 
ml y we obtain the constraint
{P(m) — P(m'))q =  p(m) — p(ml). (4.26)
16Simply note, that the first order condition (4.7) must hold at q for both m  and m ' , implying 
that also
(pv (m) +  p v {ml)) dF(v)  -  q f {q ) {pq{m) +  p q(m')) -  0.
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W.l.o.g we can assume that either there are buyer types v , v '  < q with m  in the 
support of fly  and m !  in the support of fiy> or that no buyer type v  < q sends m !  in 
equilibrium17.
Assume that the first of these possibilities holds. Then, by taking the incentive 
constraints with respect to m  and m !  of types v  and v '  and by combining them with 
(4.26) we conclude that
P(m) = j3(m) and p(m) =p(m!).
In that case, the incentive and participation constraints of all buyer types as well as 
everybody’s final payoff are unaffected by the above ’deletion’ of message m'.
Assume now that there is no such v  as above. Then, m !  is sent only by buyer 
types above q and he obtains
(3{m!)v 4- (1 -  /3(m!))(v — q) — p{m!)
after sending message m! under the original mechanism plus renegotiation, which 
because of (4.26) is the same as
P(m)v +  (1 -  P{m))(v - q ) ~  p{m),
the amount he would receive by sending message m. Therefore, his payoff is un­
changed by the deletion of ml. Every other buyer type has fiv (m !)  = 0 and his 
equilibrium strategy as well as his payoff is unaffected by the transformation. As 
the final allocation of the good is unaltered in all states of nature and this is a 
zero-sum game, the seller also receives the same payoff in the new game.
17The other alternative is to have >  0 and Pv(m)  =  0 for some v  <  q. But then we can
simply interchange the roles of the two messages m  and m! in the preceeding argument.
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4.6 A ppendix B
This appendix finalizes the argument of Section 4.3. We need to show that in a 
separating contract, where the buyer’s equilibrium strategy is as detailed in Figure 
1, the seller’s lowest renegotiation offer must lie below the ex-post optimal price 
offer, i.e. q* ^  u • For this, cissume thsit inst6Ed ^ ^  \) » 13ecciiJ.se ^ mcocimizes the 
seller’s payoff at renegotiation after message ra*, it must be that
q* f  /x* dF(v) > v ' ( T  fil dF{v) +  F(q') -  F(v‘)
where I have used the specific form of the equilibrium of a simple contract. But 
also, given the definition of v*
v - ( l - F ( v ' ) ) > q - ( l - F ( q ' ) ) .
These two inequalities together imply
(g* - V - )  f  £  dF(v) > (g* -  F ) f  dF(v). (4.27)
J q *  J q *
Because a positive mass of seller types above q* send message m  in equilibrium,
fi*dF(v) < J^dF (v)  and the inequality in (4.27) can only hold for q* = v*.
But if v* maximizes the buyer’s payoff at renegotiation a similar argument as in the
proof of Proposition 4.1 shows that
”nldF(v) > ~  F (U* ~ a ) (ti* - a )  V a >  0. (4.28)
* a
The right hand side tends towards f(v*)v*, which because of (4.3) is equal to 1 — 
F(v*). Therefore, the inequality in (4.28) is violated for a  close to 0 and q* must 
be strictly smaller than v*.
Finally, we need to prove that all other equilibria of a simple contract yield the 
same payoff as the partition equilibrium in Example 4. Take any such equilibrium 
as in Figure 1 of Section 4.3 with corresponding q and q*. In what follows I will 
refer to this equilibrium as a ’non-partition’ equilibrium to distinguish it from the
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partition equilibrium. By the Intermediate Value Theorem there must exist a level v, 
q* < v < v ,  such that JJi pv dF(v) = 1 — F(v). Because pv + pl = 15 this implies that 
pi dF(v) = F(v) — F(q*). Take the partition equilibrium of a simple contract that 
has cut-off level v and call q* the seller’s renegotiation offer after message ra*. We 
show that the seller obtains the same payoff in both equilibria. Then, without loss 
of generality one can choose the equilibrium that gives all buyer types the highest 
payoff. So, the two equilibria are equivalent.
First, assume that q* > q*. The renegotiation offer q* is optimal for the seller in 
the non-partition equilibrium after message ra* and therefore,
5* fi'v dF(v) > q- ( f  !i'v dF(v) +  F(q') -  F(g*)) , (4.29)
which is equivalent to
q' (F(v) -  F(q♦)) > q’(F(v) -  F (?)). (4.30)
In the partition equilibrium, q* maximizes the seller’s payoff after message ra*. In
particular,
?(F (v )  -  F(<D) >  q' (F(v) -  F(g*)). (4.31)
Together, (4.30) and (4.31) imply that the payoffs to the seller in the non-partition
equilibrium and in the partition equilibrium are the same.
Last, it is shown that q* < q* is impossible. (4.30) is amended to give
9* (F(v) -  F(q')) > r  f \ l d F ( v ) .
Jq*
Combining this inequality with (4.31), we obtain
F ( v ) - F ( q ' ) >  f  tildF(v),
Jq*
which is equivalent to
f  (1 -  ill) dF(v) > 1 -  F(v) =  / ”(1 -  I t )  dF(v).
Jq* Jq*
This inequality cannot hold if q* < q*.
Chapter 5
Sequential Screening and 
R enegotiation
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I consider a sequential screening problem in which information about 
the buyer’s type is released over time. Some part of his value for the good is realized 
at date 0 and therefore already privately known to the buyer at date 1 when he 
contracts with the seller. A second state of nature, which further influences the 
good’s valuation, is realized at date 1.5 shortly before trade occurs. Its realization 
is again only observed by the buyer. Finally, trade can take place any time between 
dates 2 and 3. This set-up opens the black box of fixed contracting costs that were 
assumed in the preceding chapter. In this set-up contracting is costless. Instead, 
early contracting is beneficial for the seller because it softens the buyer’s participa­
tion constraints. The seller prefers to contract early because there is less asymmetric 
information at the initial stage which makes contracting more efficient.
If the seller can commit himself to a single contracting offer, he will offer a 
sequential mechanism at date 1 in form of a fixed initial fee and a price. In paying 
the initial fee the buyer purchases the option to buy the good at a reduced price 
once the second parameter of the valuation is realized, i.e. at date 2. Typically, a
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higher access fee is paired with a lower final price. Sequential price discrimination 
is common practice in a variety of circumstances such as fidelity cards in cinemas, 
book clubs or air plane tickets.
In this chapter, it is assumed that commitment is not feasible. More precisely, 
whatever an early contract prescribes concerning the good’s purchase between dates 
2 and 3, as long as it is not ex-post efficient, the seller has the opportunity to make 
one final renegotiation offer at date 3. Here, an alternative interpretation of the 
idea that renegotiation cannot be included in a contract is used compared to the 
preceding chapter. I assume that in order for a contract to be made contingent 
on parties’ messages concerning their preferences, these messages must be sent in 
a verifiable way. More precisely, I assume that dates are contractible and that 
therefore a contract can completely specify what should be done at dates 2 and 3. 
Parties’ messages, on which contractual prescriptions are based, must take the form 
of letters, emails or conversations in the presence of a third party such as a judge1. 
Assume, that the writing of verifiable messages takes time and that they must be 
sent well in advance to the actual trading date. For instance, a meeting with a 
third party cannot be scheduled necessarily at the same time at which trade should 
occur. Similarly, there is a possible delay between the receipt of a letter and the 
execution of the contract. This time gap leaves an opportunity for renegotiation. 
In contrast, messages that parties exchange as part of a private bargaining game 
need not be verifiable. As such, renegotiation does not necessitate a formal message 
system. It can for example take place in an informal telephone call or in a private 
meeting between the two parties. Therefore, it is instantaneous and allows parties to 
exchange information directly before trade. A contract that contains a prescription 
of what is to be done at the last possible moment, i.e. at date 3, in reality necessitates 
the sending of messages some time before date 3, date 2.5 say. This contract is 
therefore vulnerable to a ’last minute’ renegotiation in between dates 2.5 and 3.
1In Hart and Moore (1988), there is an interesting comparison between different message systems 
and the impact they have on the efficiency of a contractual agreement.
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Under this assumption an initial contract must have a very simple structure. 
The optimal contract from the seller’s viewpoint is either no contract or a simple 
sales contract that concludes trade with only the highest initial buyer types. The 
null contract is the strictly superior alternative if uncertainty concerning the first 
variable is large compared to uncertainty concerning the second variable. Intuitively, 
under this condition an early contract provides only a small benefit while the ratchet 
effect is relatively severe. The null contract is therefore strictly dominant and the 
seller prefers to regulate trade in an informal ex-post bargaining game. If on the 
other hand, uncertainty concerning the first variable is small relative to uncertainty 
concerning the second variable, a simple trade contract is optimal. This contract 
allows the seller to conclude trade with initial high buyer types for sure before they 
learn their exact valuations. In addition, such a contract provides a commitment to 
the seller to offer a low price at the final bargaining round. Ex-ante, the seller can 
extract the benefit of this low price through an initial flat payment from every buyer. 
Remark, that this payment has to satisfy the individual rationality constraint of the 
lowest initial valuation buyer. At the final bargaining round, intermediate buyer 
types buy the good.
Literature on screening when information is released sequentially include Courty 
and Li (2000) in static contracting environments, and Baron and Besanko (1984), 
in dynamic environments. These papers study the case when commitment is fea­
sible and make use of the revelation principle. A paper that studies a buyer seller 
relationship with time varying valuations and contract renegotiation is by Blume 
(1998), which is an extension to Hart and Tirole (1988). The author retains a per­
sistent component for the buyer’s valuation and in addition introduces a transient 
component. By assumption the seller does not want to screen this transient compo­
nent. This is in contrast to the model in this chapter, where the seller has always 
an incentive to ex-post screen the total valuation of the buyer.
The next section contains the set-up. Section 5.3 solves for the optimal contract 
in the benchmark case when commitment is feasible. The following section solves
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for the optimal contract when renegotiation can occur. The final section concludes.
5.2 The M odel
The buyer’s valuation for the good is influenced by two states of the world which 
are realized sequentially. For simplicity, an additive structure for the valuation, 
v = Vi 4- V2 , is assumed2. At the time at which the first contract is signed V\ 
is already private information to the buyer. I will call V\ the buyer’s first stage 
type as opposed to u, the buyer’s second stage or final type. The second variable 
is privately revealed to the buyer shortly before trade occurs. Both variables are 
drawn independently3 according to commonly known distribution functions Fl(-) 
with strictly positive densities /*(•), i =  1,2. The supports are denoted by 
The seller’s production costs are fixed and normalized to 0 and we assume that the 
& > 0 , i = 1, 2. The seller makes all contracting offers.
In order to simplify on necessary notation we extend FJ(’) and /,(•) over the 
borders of [ijj, v j such that
Fi(vi) = 4
and similarly
=  <
0 Vi < v {
Fi{vi) V i  E \ v i , V i )
1 Vi > Vi
0 Vi < Vi
fi(vi) V ie[v i,v t]
0 Vi > Vi.
2To extend the analysis to a framework in which the valuation is a more general function of two
consecutively realized states of nature is beyond the scope of this paper. It might be interesting
material for future research.
3I conjecture that the dominance result is reinforced if the variables are correlated. If there
is perfect correlation for example, the buyer is informed about V2 from the beginning, which is
basically the situation of the preceding chapter.
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Then, the distributions on the individual ViS induce a probability distribution over 
the final value v on the interval [uj +  v 2 ,V\ 4- v2\, which can be written as
F (v)=  f  *  f  ^  dF2 (v2 )dF 1 (v1). (5.1)
5.3 The Benchmark: Full Commitment
Consider first the set-up with full commitment. The revelation principle tells us 
that we can restrict attention to a contract in which the seller asks the buyer to 
truthfully reveal his first stage type which determines what kind of contract the 
buyer receives. Once the second variable is realized, the buyer is asked to announce 
its value and obtains the good with a certain probability and pays a price, both of 
which are functions of his two announcements. Price and probability of trade are 
chosen such as to maximize the seller’s expected surplus subject to the constraint 
that the buyer tells the truth about both V\ and v2 and, conditional on V\t receives 
at least 0 in expectation.
Consider the following time line:
stage 0 stage 1 stage 1.5 stage 2
V\ realized S proposes v2 realized contract
contract enforced
For future reference let us consider what happens if no contract is signed at stage
1 and the seller relies on ex-post bargaining at stage 2 to sell his product. He faces a 
continuum of types v distributed on [uj + v2,Vi + ^ 2] and he maximizes u(l — F(v)), 
where F(v) is given by (5.1). Call the solution to this problem v* in line with the 
notation of chapter 4.
Let us now turn to the full problem. It turns out that a relatively simple contract 
in which the buyer initially pays a fee A(v 1) dependant on his type and then, once
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v2 is known to him, can decide whether or not to trade at a price p(vi) is optimal 
for the seller.
Lem m a 5.1 With full commitment the seller offers a contract of the following form 
C = [^4(^i),p(^i)]u1g[v1,Ui]- The buyer selects a pair (A(vi),p(vi)) at the first stage 
and then decides at the second stage whether he wants to trade at the predetermined 
price p(vi).
Set U(v 1 ,v2) = P(vl lV2 )(vi+V 2 ) - p ( v 1 ,v2).
Formally, the principal’s program can be written as
r v i r v 2
m a x /  / \j3(v1 ,v 2 )(v1 + v 2 ) - U ( v 1 ,v 2 )\dF2 {v2 )dF 1 (v1) (5.2)
S.t.
(.ICn ) U(vi,v2) > /?(vi,t/2)(vi +  v2) -p (v i ,v '2), Vvi,v
(/C 7) f^X J(vu v2 )dF 2 (v2) > v2 ){v! + v2) - p ( y [ tv2 )\dF2 (v2 ), Vvl)v'
where v2 (= v2 (^i, v[ , v2))
=  arg maxC2 j3(v[, v2) (vx +  v2) -  p(v[, v2)
(IR) U(vi, v2) dF2 (v2) > 0  Vv!
The first set of constraints are the incentive constraints at the final screening 
stage. Given that at the preceding stage a V\ buyer has selected the right contract, 
he should also truthfully announce his second type v2.
The second set of constraints is concerned with the announcement of the buyer’s 
initial type v\. The left-hand side is his payoff when he announces both his types
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truthfully in the two consecutive revelation stages. The right-hand side is his payoff 
when he lies in the first stage and then chooses his optimal announcement in the 
second stage. Given that he lied in the first stage, he does not necessarily tell the 
truth in the second period. Instead, his announcement v2 is a function of his true 
type, Vi 4- v2, and his first stage announcement v'v
Finally, the last line formalizes the buyer’s individual rationality constraint. He 
must receive at least his reservation utility in expectation if he tells the truth in 
both stages.
Proof.
First, let us consider the (ICu) constraints. By a familiar argument, which 
makes use of the envelope theorem, it can be shown that the buyer’s utility at the 
final stage can be written as
U(v1 ,v2) = U(vu v2)+  (  P{vi,v2 )dF 2 (v2). (5.3)
J  V.2
Second, the level of U(vi,v2) for each first stage type V\ needs to be determined 
which will be done by looking at the first stage incentive constraints (ICj).
Write := i ,62X 1^ + ^ 2) -  p K , ^2) )dF2 (v2), where v2 is defined
in the second line of the (IC i) constraint. The buyer chooses his announcement v[ 
to maximize this expression and (IC i) ensures that v[ =  V\ is optimal, i.e.
d U  f V2 T /  d ( 3 1 . d p \  ( d / 3 , . d p \  d n
~  L  [ f e  +  Vi) ~  W j  + \ d e 2{vi + Vi)
Now, the second term in round brackets is equal to 0, because it is the first order 
condition of the buyer’s maximization problem with respect to v2. Using this, one 
can write the buyer’s expected utility U(v 1) := U(v 1, Vi) at the first stage conditional 
on his type V\ as
n v 2 r v 2 t v  1
U(v 1) = /  U(v1 ,v2 )dF2 (vt ) = U(v)+  /  f t v i . v J d F t M d F i f o ) .
J v 0 i/u, Jv - t
" " (5-4)
Remark that, given that the buyer announces V\ truthfully, (ICu) implies that 
P(v 1 ,^ 2 ) = {3(vi,v2). Obviously, the seller would like to keep the lowest first stage
dF2 (v2) =  0
v\=v±
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buyer type on his reservation level and therefore sets U(v) =  0. Combining (5.3) 
and (5.4), one obtains
dF2 (v2)
PV2 r v  1 r V 2
u{v 1 ,v2) =  /  /  P{vi,v2 )dF 1 (v1) ~  P{v1 ,v 2 )dF 2 (v2)
J  v 2 j  v  1 J v 2
r v  2
+ / /?(V1,V2)^2(^)-
dv_2
This expression can be substituted into the seller’s objective function in (5.2) to 
obtain
max
P
rv  i  rv  2 r i '2 /* v i
/ / /9(ui,T^)(vi+ v2) -  / /  /?(tfi,fy)dFi(i5i)d.Fj
Jv\ dv 2 dy_2 Jy.1
rv  2 /»#2 /*V2
+ / / /?(viiV2 )dF2 {v2 )dFi(v2 ) -  j  P(vi,v2 )dF2 (v2)
dy_2 Jv  J J  v2
(*2)
dF2 (v2 )dFi(v1).
Remark, that the last line is equal to 0, because the first term is independent of 
and the second term, once the integral with respect to i>2 is included, is identical to 
the first (just replace v2 with v2). Therefore, the above expression is just equal to
max
0
rv  j  rv2 rv\
/ / P(v!,v2)(vi +  v2) -  /?(wi)dFi(ui)
Jy.i Jy.2 Jv.i
dF2(u2)dFi(ui),
where with some slight abuse of notation ^(fii) denotes the expectation of P(vi,v2) 
with respect to its second argument. A familiar argument based on integration by 
parts shows that the above expression is equal to
max
0
j T  j f 2 v2) (v ,  + v2 -  1  / i ^ ) )  dF2 (v2) d F M ).
Therefore, the optimal solution is a cut-off rule, such that
P(vl t v2) =
if
0 otherwise.
Vl
The buyer’s first stage utility level U(vi) is given by (5.4). Finally, it is easy to see 
that this allocation can be achieved by the following contract. At the first stage, 
the buyer pays A(i>i) for the option to buy the good for a price p(vi), which he can
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decide to exercise or not once he has learned his complete type. The final price is 
set p(vi) =  and the expression for A(vi) follows from (5.4).
■
The solution to this contracting problem has some interesting features. First, re­
mark that the solution is bang-bang although there is some non-linearity introduced 
through the expectation operator in the incentive constraint (ICi). The solution is 
similar to a static problem in which the good is sold if and only if v > . In the
sequential model total valuation must lie above > the hazard rate of the first
variable’s distribution function because only the first variable is known at the time 
of the contract. Also, the allocation depends on the realization of the second vari­
able although the price does not. This is in contrast to what can be done without 
commitment as will be seen in the next section.
The model is a special case of Courty and Li (2000), a version of which they 
discuss as an example. The authors study general sequential screening problems 
with commitment when the buyer has some private information with respect to the 
distribution of his total valuation. Here, he has no better information about the 
distribution but he knows the support. In Courty and Li (2000) the support is fixed 
and therefore a slightly different proof must be employed.
5.4 Sequential Screening w ith No Commitment
Finally, we consider the situation when the seller is not committed by his stage 1 
contract. More precisely, I am interested in the case when the contract renegotiation 
is effected after all prescriptions of the contract written at stage 1 have been carried 
out. That is, if the good has not been traded according to the contract, the seller 
can make a final offer to the buyer after which the good becomes obsolete and time 
ends. The time line is
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stage 0 stage 1 stage 1.5 stage 2 stage 3
Vi realized S proposes v2 realized contract final offer
contract enforced
We will be interested in the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria of the game that 
consists of the contract offer at stage 1, the message game played at stages 1 and 2 
and the final renegotiation offer.
Parallel to Section 4.2.2, a contract consists of two message spaces M\ and M24 
with elements m\ and m2. Message m\ is sent by the buyer after the contract 
offer at stage 1, message m 2 is sent by him at stage 2 once he has learned v2. 
Given messages (mi, m2), the contract enforces trade with probability P(m i,m 2) at 
price p(m i,m 2). A buyer’s strategy can be written as | V\) at stage 1 and
p 2 (m2 | Vi,v2 ,m i)  at stage 2. The latter for example is the probability with which 
a buyer with value v =  V\ +  v2 who has sent message mi at stage 1 sends message 
m 2 at stage 2. Following messages (m i,m 2), there is a final offer at stage 3 by the 
seller which will be denoted by q(mi,m2).
Finally, it is convenient to write the problem as in the above section. We define 
the utility that a final buyer type v =  Ui + v2 receives under the contract, i.e. before 
the final renegotiation offer, as
U (m i,m 2 ,v) := /?(mi,m2)u -p (m i,m 2).
We can now state the final proposition which will be proved using several lemmata.
P roposition  5.1 I f  uncertainty concerning V\ is much larger than uncertainty con­
cerning v2, any contract is strictly dominated by the null contract. I f  uncertainty 
concerning v\ is smaller than uncertainty concerning v2, then the optimal contract
4The message space M 2 could depend on the earlier message m \. For simplicity this dependency 
is suppressed. The following analysis is independent of this simplification.
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is a simple contract in which trade only occurs for high stage 1  buyer types at a 
relatively low fixed price. The seller conlcudes trade with intemediate final buyer 
types for a higher price at renegotiation.
The proof relies on arguments already encountered in section 4.3. It is divided 
into several lemmata, which are concerned with the constraints imposed on a con­
tract through the buyer’s equilibrium strategy in the message sending game and the 
resulting beliefs by the seller.
5 .4 .1  M essa g e  S en d in g  S tages
The first lemma is the counterpart of Proposition 4.1 in subsection 4.3.2. It states 
that the contract must involve complete pooling, if the buyer’s equilibrium strategy 
in the induced message game does not affect the seller’s beliefs, i.e. if it does not 
affect his renegotiation offer:
Lem m a 5.2 I f  q(m i,m 2) =  q V(m1,m 2), then q =  v* and a stage 1 contract must 
have /3(mi, m2) =  (3 and p(mi, m 2 ) = p, V(77ii,77i2).
Proof.
Write /z(m1,m 2) := | Vi) [/"22 ^ 2(^2 I ^2,™i) dF2 (v2)^  dFi(vi) as
the probability that message pair (mi, m 2 ) is sent. The seller’s belief after messages 
(m i,m 2) is
F ( v \ m 1 ,m 2) :=
K )  I dF^ih).
Assume that q ^  v*. The fact that q is the seller’s renegotiation offer after message 
pair (mi, m 2 ) implies that
(1 -  F(q | m i,m 2))q > (1 -  F(v* \ m i ,m 2 ))v* V(mi,m2).
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Taking expectations over M2, then over M\ implies that this expression is equivalent 
to
(1 -  F{q))q >  (1 -  F (v ') )v \  
which contradicts the fact that v* is the unique maximizer of (1 — F(v))v.
Next, I show that for every message pair (m i, m2), P(m 1, m2) =  P and p(m i , m2) =  
p. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, it is shown that P(mi, m 2 ) =  P(m i,m 2) 
for all messages m2, m2, second that /?(mi, 777,2) =  /?(m'1}m2) for all messages mi,
m 'j.
To see the first point, we need to consider the second stage incentive constraints. 
The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.1 is used. First, it is shown 
that every message m2 must be sent by second stage buyer types below and above 
the final renegotiation offer v* : Because v* maximizes (1 — F(y | 777,1,7712))^ for 
all message pairs (m i,m2), v* must also maximize (1 — F(v \ mi))v\ simply take 
the expectation with respect to m2. But then the exact same reasoning as in the 
proof of Proposition 4.1, where F(v | mi) replaces F(v) and F(v | mi, m 2 ) replaces 
F(v  | m) shows the first claim. Second, for two given messages m2 and m'2, the 
incentive constraints of buyer types below and above v* who send these messages in 
equilibrium finalizes the argument. We can then simplify notation by suppressing 
the dependency of /?(mi, 777,2), p(m i,m 2) and t/(m i, 777,2,7;) on m2.
To see the second step in the proof, we need to turn to the incentive constraints 
of a first stage buyer type who sends message mi. For this, we need to compute 
the expected utility that he receives by sending this message. A second stage buyer 
type v > v* who has sent message mi obtains a payoff of
P(mi)v +  (1 -  P(mi))(v — v*) -p (m i)  = (v -  v*) + U(m1 }v*),
whereas a second stage buyer type v < v* who has sent message mi obtains a payoff 
of
P(mi)v — p(mi) = P[mi){v -  7;*) +  U(mi,v*).
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Therefore, a first stage buyer type V\ expects the following payoff from message m\:
r v * - v i
U(mi,vi)  =  (3(mi) / {vi +  v2 -  v*) dF2 (v2)
J v 2
r v  2
4- (v i+ v 2 -v * )d F 2 (v2) + U(mi,v*)
J v * —v 1
: =  /?(mi)f (vi) 4- C(^i) 4- U (mu v*).
Note, that f(ui) < 0 and C{vi) > 0 anc  ^ that both are monotonically increasing in 
Vl-
Take first the situation in which two different first stage buyer types vj, V\ both 
send the two messages ra'j and m\ in equilibrium. This would imply that
P(m'iK(vi) + C M  + U(m'1 ,v ’) = /3(mi)f(tii) +  C(wi) +  l/(mi,u*) 
and consequently that
(P(m i) ~ P(m i))€(vi) = (P(m i) ~ Pim i))f (vi).
Because €(v[) ^  f(^i) if ^  Vi, this is only possible if ^{rn^) = (3{m\).
Next, consider the situation in which no two buyer types send the same two 
messages m\ and m\. So, there are disjoint sets V(rai), V(rrii) C [ujjUi], s.t. all 
buyer types in V(m,1) send only message w!l and all buyer types in V{m{) send only 
message m\. Then, either =  (3(rrii) or V^rai) and V(mi)  must be connected.
Assume for example that V^m^) is not connected. Then there must exist three types 
< v\ < v'l with v[,v" 6 V fa i )  and V\ 6 V{m\). The incentive constraints of uj 
and V\ yield
(/3(mi) -  /3(m1))£(v'1) >
and P(rn\) < /3(mi). The incentive constraints of types V\ and v" together imply 
that
(fi(m i) -  P(m i))t(v") ^  -  P(m i))£(vi),
which is only satisfied if /3(m\ ) > /3(mj). Therefore, =  j3(mi) if V(m'-l ) is not
connected.
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Finally, consider the situation in which Vim'-f) and V(mi) are two disjoint in­
tervals with V(m'i) ’below’ V(m\). But then it is impossible that v* simultane­
ously maximizes (1 — F(v  | rr^))v and (1 — F(v  | m\))v. The v that maxi­
mizes (1 — F(v | m'^f)v should in fact lie strictly below the one that maximizes 
(1 — F(v | m\))v. Therefore, the fact that V(m 'x) and V{m\) are two disjoint in­
tervals is inconsistent with our initial assumption that the renegotiation offer is the 
same after every message. This proves that ^(mj) =  P{m\) from which it follows 
that [/(rrijjU*) =  U(mi,v*) and also p{m'i) = p(m i). ■
It remains to investigate the situation in which the seller, depending on the 
buyer’s messages, sets different prices at the renegotiation stage. For this, it is 
sufficient to consider two different prices. The argument extends in a similar fashion 
to the possibility of more than two prices. Before we start some definitions are 
needed. Define
q*(vi) := argmax(l -  F{q))q, (5.5)
Q
where
0 if Vi <
That is, F(') is the distribution function of the final valuation, given that the first 
stage type Vi lies below a certain threshold Vi. The definition will become important 
for the type of equilibria that will emerge in the following contract. The next lemma 
mirrors Proposition 4.2, subsection 4.3.2:
Lem m a 5.3 Assume that the seller sets two different renegotiation prices q* < q 
depending on the buyer’s messages at stages 1 and 2. Without loss of generality, i.e.
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without affecting final payoffs, we can set
= P(m \,m 2) =  /? (777,1), Vmi and V7712,rn2.
that is, the second message can be deleted.
Furthermore, if q* is the renegotiation price after message m\ and q is the price 
after message mi, then two situations can occur. Either fd(mf) =  /3(m,i) = 1 and 
P(m  1) =  Pim i)> or the buyer’s equilibrium strategy can be described by a partition 
equilibrium, i.e. there must exist a first stage buyer type v\, such that all first stage 
buyer types below V\ send message m\ and all first stage buyer types above Vi send 
message 777,2. In the latter case P{m\) < P(mi).
Proof.
Assume that there are two different prices at renegotiation q* < q. Following 
a first message 777,1 there are three possibilities: i) Either there are two different 
messages m 2 and m 2 such that the renegotiation price after message m '2 is q* and 
the price after message m 2 is q2 or the renegotiation offer is either ii) q* or Hi) q, 
regardless of the second stage message. Let us investigate these possibilities in turn.
i) In the first case, similarly to the proof of Proposition 4.2, we can use the 
incentive constraints of final buyer types vf and v , with q* < v' < q and q < v, 
who send messages m 2 and m 2 respectively, to show that (3(m\,m2) — 1 and 
p(rai,777,2) =  p{m 1, ^ 2) +  (1 — p(m i,m 2 ))q*. Therefore, we can suppress the 
dependency on m!2, m 2. Then, regardless of which message m 2 is sent after 
message ttt-i5, a final stage buyer type v with v > q* receives
v - q *  + U{ 77i i , 5*) 
and a final stage buyer type v < q* receives
P(mi)(v -  q*) + U(ml tq*).
5Assume here, that there are only two possible messages m 2 and m'2. If there are more than 
two messages that result in renegotiation price q*, the case is as in the following subcase ii).
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ii) Turning to the second case, the renegotiation price is q* after any two messages 
m 2 and m2. The incentive constraints of two final stage buyer types v ',v> q *  
who send messages m '2 and m2 respectively, imply that
p(m i,m 2) - p { m u m'2) =  (/3(m1 ,m 2) -  P{mu m!2 ))q*.
Therefore, U (m i,m 2 ,q*) = U(mi, m2, q*) and we can suppress the dependency 
of U on m2. If a final stage buyer type v < q* sends message m 2, he obtains
P(mu m!2)v -  p(mi,m!2) =  /3(mi,m'2)(u -  q*) -f P(m 1 ,m 2 )q* -p (m i,m 2)
= /%rn\,™!2 ){v-q* ) + U(mu q*).
whereas sending message m2 yields
P{m1 :m 2)v -  p{m i,m 2) =  /?(mi,m2)(u -  q*) +  (3(rrii,m!2 )q* -  p(rrii,m!2)
= ^(m i,m 2)(v — q*) +  U(rrii,q*)}
Therefore, a last stage buyer type v < q* sends message m2, such that m2 = 
argm in^  (3(mi,m2). Set (3(mi,m2 ) =  P(mi) and we obtain the same overall 
utility levels as in case i).
Hi) The latter case is similar to case ii) but the final levels of utility are
v - q  + U(mu q) 
for final buyer types v > q and
Pirni)(v ~ q) +  U(m i, q)
for final buyer types v < q.
This finalizes the proof of the first statement.
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When analyzing the incentive constraints for a first stage buyer type V\ , we now 
only need to consider two possible messages6: m\ and m\ with expected payoffs
U(m\,v\) = P(m\) f  (vi + v2 -  q*) dF2 (v2)
J  V 2
r v  2
4- / (vi + v2 -q* )dF 2 (v2 ) + U(ml,q*)
J q * —v  i
p v 2 f V 2
= p(m\) /  min(ui 4- u2, q*) dF(v2) +  / (v1 + v 2 -  q*) dF2 (v2) -  p(m\)
J v 2 J q * —v \
= P(™\)£.(v\,q) + s(vi,q*) 
and
U(mu vi) =  l3{m1 )fi(v1 ,q) + q (v i ,q ) -p (m 1).
First, assume that there are two first stage buyer types v[ < V\ who both send 
messages m\ and m\. It will be shown that then (3(ml) = f3(m\) =  1. Both types 
must be indifferent between sending either message and therefore
£ (™ i)fK > 0  + s(v[ ,q* )-p (m \)  = (3(m1 )£(v'1 ,q) + q(v'1 ,q ) - p (m i )  
^ ( ^ i ) ^ i , 0  +  c(v i,g*)-p(m ;) =  P(rn1)£(vl iq) + q(v1 , q ) - p ( m 1).
These two together imply that
/% ^)(£M >9*)-£0> i .9*))+cK>9*)-«(»>i . 9*) =  /3(n'»i)(£K >9)-£(t'i.9))+?K >?)-c(1>i>9)-
This expression is equivalent to
(1 -  P(m\)) f  F2 (v2 )dv2 = (1 -  P(m\)) f  F2 (v2 )dv2. (5.6)
J q * —v  i J q —v  i
To see this, we compute q(v'x,q*) — q(vi,q*) :
/,*-«; K  +  "2 -  9*)dF2 (v2) -  (V! +  v2 -  ?♦)dF2 (v2)
= W  -  V\)  +  (ft -  rfi)Fi(<t -  *>i) -  ( t  -  vi)Ft (q* -  Vr) -  v2 dF2 (v2)
=  M  -  «i) +  F2 (v2) dv2,
3The case with more than two initial messages can be treated similarly as in Lemma 5.2.
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where the second line is obtained through integration by parts. Next, a similar 
calculation shows that {(ui, q*) — f  (i>i, q*) =  — Jq*_v ' -^ 2(^2) dv2 - The right-hand side 
of (5.6) is obtained symmetrically. Because i^ - )  is strictly increasing, it follows 
that _ Jj1 F2 (v2) dv2 < Jq_^ F2 (v2 ) dv2 for q > q* and Vi > v[ and therefore 
P(ml) =  Pirrii) =  1.
Next, assume that there are two disjoint subsets V(raJ) and V(mi)  of first stage 
buyer types who send messages raj and mi respectively. We want to show that
unless V'(raJ) and V(rrii) are two connected intervals, as above, /3(raJ) =  /3(mi) = 1.
Assume w.l.o.g. that V(raJ) =  [^1,^1] U [^1,^1] and V(m\)  =  [vJ, vj]. Then the two 
border types v\ and uj must be indifferent between sending messages raj and m\ 
and the same argument as above can be applied.
Finally we have the possibility that V’(raJ) and V(rai) are two connected, disjoint 
intervals, where because q* < q we can write V(raJ) =  (ui,0i] and V'(rai) =  [vi,vi]. 
In this instance, the renegotiation price q* = q*(v 1) is defined through V\ as in (5.5). 
Because the first stage buyer type V\ must be indifferent between messages raj and 
ra 1 we have
P{m’l ) t{vu q’) +  <>(vl ,q') -  p(m\)  =  P{m{\£{ih,q)  + « ( « i > ? )  - p ( " * i ) -
(5.7)
Therefore, the incentive constraints of a type Vi > V\ together with the incentive 
constraint of a type v[ < V\ imply that
P(m i)f  fai, q) ~ P(mj )f {v! , q*) + c(vx, q) -  c{vi, q*) >
~ P{'m*1 )((v1 ,q*) +q(vi,q) ~<i(vi,q*) > (5-8)
P { j ^ i ) ^ i A )  -  PimD^v^q*) + q(i/l t q) -  ^{v^q*).
Also, we can conclude from (5.6) that /?(raj) < P(m\). ■
5 .4 .2  C ontract Offer S tage
Last, we need to compute the contract that maximizes the seller’ expected payoff. 
We first consider a contract as detailed in Lemma 5.2. It is optimal to put the lowest
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first stage buyer type on his reservation utility. The reservation utility of a type V i  
buyer is the expected payoff he receives from no contract at stage 1 followed by the 
seller’s final offer. It is therefore not necessarily equal to 0. It can be expressed as
f V 2
R i v i )  =  ( V ! + V 2 -  V * )  dF2 {v2).
J v * —v  1
Then, the lowest first stage buyer type’s participation constraint can be written as
P +  E[v2\) -  J  (v1-{-v2 -  v*) dF2 (v2) j^ -  p = 0.
Substituting for p in the seller’s objective function we obtain
P \(U i + E[v2] ) -  f  (v i+ v 2 -v * )d F 2(vi)) + ( l - P ) ( l - F ( v * ) ) v * .
\  J v * —v x J
The first part of this expression is the price that he receives under a contract,
the second part is the expected price he receives at renegotiation. If for example
(uj +  E[v2]) < (1 — F(v*))v*, this expression is maximized by setting P =  p = 0.
Now, let us consider a contract as detailed in Lemma 5.3.
The seller’s objective function is
r v  1 /  pV2 \
/  ( p ( m i)  +  (!  -  P(mi)) /  q*dF2 (v2) J dFifa)
J v x \  J q * - V \  J
r v i  /  r v 2 \
+  /  (p(rai) +  (1 -  P(mi)) / qdF2 (v2) J dFifa).
J v  1 \  J q - v 1 /
The first part of (5.9) is the expected payment he receives from first stage buyer 
types below v\. They send message m\ and pay a price p(m\) under the contract.
With probability 1 — P(rn\) trade does not occur before the final offer and all final 
buyer types V\ -\-v2 > q* accept the renegotiation offer q*. The second part of (5.9) 
is the expected payment that the seller receives from first stage buyer types above 
V i .  Using (5.7), we can write (5.9) as
P(m  i ) +  [  (P(m1 )t(vl i q )-P (m l)£ (v 1 ,q*)+q(v1 ,q ) - q { v 1 ,q*))dFi(vi)
J v  1
r v i  rV2 r v i  r v 2
+(1 -  P(m\)) I /  q*dF2 (v2 )dF 1 (v1 ) - \ - ( l~ P ( m 1)) / qdF2 (v2) dFi(ui).
J v x Jq *—v 1 J  v x J  q—v  1
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From the lowest first stage buyer type’s binding participation constraint we obtain
+  c(2>i>9*) ~P(m i) = ?(«i>«*)
and substituting this into the seller’s objective function we derive the following linear 
expression in (5{m\) and f3(mi)
Now, the only possible solution is to set P{m\) — 0 and (3{m\ ) =  l 7. This simplifies 
the above expression to
>v*) + q* f  (1 -  F2 {q* - 'y i)dF i(u i) (5.9)
rv  i  rV2
+  / / min(f)i +  v2, q*) dF2 (v2) dFi{vi)
J  t ? i  J  v 2
Here, one can see two possible benefits of contracting for the seller. Because the 
contract allows the seller to credibly commit to a lower final price offer q* after 
message m*, he can ex-ante extract the possibly positive rent £(!>!,<?*) — 
that the lowest first stage buyer type obtains from this decrease. Next, a contract 
might ensure trade with some high first stage buyer types who would not have traded 
for sure without a contract. First stage buyer types above i}\ pay a lower price than 
without a contract because m in ^  +v2, q*) < v*, but more buyer types accept trade.
The next conditions are sufficient to guarantee that both benefits are 0. The 
conditions are far from being necessary, because we only need that the expression 
in (5.9) lies below u*(l — F(v*)).
7From incentive constraints (3(m{) <  Then, setting both parameters equal to 0 violates
(5.8), setting both equal to 1 is inconsistent with profit maximizing on the part of the seller.
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Assume that uncertainty about Vi is much larger than uncertainty about v2 in 
the sense that V2 ~ v 2 <<  Iq — IZi- This makes it easier for the following assumption 
to be true
A ssum ption 5.1 It exists a yx <V\, such that 4- V2 < Q*{vi) < V\ +  y 2 for all
vi e
The assumption implies two things. First, the lowest first stage buyer type can 
never expect to benefit from the reduced renegotiation offer that a contract entails 
because the offer always lies above his highest possible total valuation. Then, the 
first possible benefit of a contract is 0. Second, a set of high first stage buyer types 
obtains trade for sure even without a contract. Therefore, the second possible benefit 
of a contract is 0. Then, only the ratchet effect kicks in: The above expression (5.9) 
simplifies to
q* 1 -  F2 (q* -  Vi) dF\(v\) = q '(l -  F(q*)) < v*(l -  F(v*))
Jv 1
for all Vi E [ui, v j .  Therefore, within this interval the above expression is maximized 
for Vi = V\. Finally, if g*(u1)(l — F(g*(uj))) lies sufficiently below u*(l — F(v*)), 
Vi =  Vi is also the global maximum.
5.5 Conclusion
This last chapter models the fixed contracting costs assumed in the preceding chapter 
and derives a strict dominance result of the null contract. The main assumption 
is that messages must be verifiable in order to be included in a contract. Because, 
such a message system introduces a time gap between information revelation and 
execution of the contract, parties will make use of pareto improving renegotiation.
This last model leaves some open questions. The sequential screening model has 
a simple additive structure and the two variables are independent. A first question 
is of whether the results are robust and in how far we can generalize them. A more
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general structure such as in Courty and Li (2000) could be used. Also, the idea 
that correlation between V\ and V2 could strengthen the result, because the ratchet 
effect is reinforced, would be interesting to explore. Another way of extending the 
result is to assume different reasons for contracting than the ones considered here, 
such as risk-sharing or investment, and see whether the ratchet effect still can make 
contracting obsolete. It seems unlikely to me at this stage, because the proofs of 
Lemmata 5.2, 5.3 and Proposition 5.1 rely heavily on the linearity of the problem 
(i.e. risk neutrality and no discounting) which would be destroyed by assuming risk 
aversion or investment (except perhaps if investment increases the surplus by a fixed 
amount).
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